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EDITORS' NOTE

We are very happy to present to the members of the Indian Philosophical Congress and to all persons interested in Philosophy the Proceedings of the 41st session of the Indian Philosophical Congress. The session was held at Varanasi in the month of December 1967 under the auspices of the Centre of Advanced study in Philosophy, B.H.U. This volume contains a selection of the papers read and discussed in that session. We are aware that many interesting papers have not been included in this selection but that is partly due to lack of space and partly on account of a desire to be broad-based and comprehensive.

Because we did not have sufficient funds at our disposal we were not in a position to bring out a bigger volume, and therefore, we decided to be comprehensive in a different way and tried to include in this volume all *varieties* and *kinds* of views and opinions expressed during the session.

On account of certain unavoidable reasons the publication of this volume was delayed almost by a year, and therefore this volume and the Proceedings of the 42nd session of the Congress (Patna-1968) are being published simultaneously. That partly explains why the two volumes do not have any common contributor.

The work of the publication of the Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress had remained suspended for a number of years. When this work was resumed in 1966/67 and a combined volume including the proceedings of the 1965 and 1966 sessions of the Congress was brought out, it was hoped that this work would not be further interrupted. We are particularly happy because we have been able to keep that promise.

We are very much thankful to the authorities of the Banaras Hindu University, particularly to the Director of the Centre of Advanced studies in Philosophy and to the Local Secretaries of the 41st session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, for their generous contribution towards the cost of the printing of this Volume. Our thanks are also due to Shri Mantu Sircar of the Sulekha Printing Works, Patna, who took personal care in supervising the Press-work.

ЭТО ВОПРОСЫ

INTRODUCTION

In one of the papers included in this selection Eliot Deutsch speaks about four kinds of possible approaches to Comparative Philosophy that we find in the west today. Deutsch's Categories, with some modifications, can provide us with a basis for classifying the papers included in this selection.

Kalghatgi's analysis of 'Dreams in Jaina Psychology', Bagchi's treatment of 'Maya, thought and subjectivity' and K. C. Das' 'comparative study of the Sankhya-Yoga and the Freudian conceptions of the Unconscious' reflect, what has been called, 'the wisdom of the East' approach to Philosophy. They all seem to be convinced that ancient Indian Philosophy is the repository of all wisdom, and that the need of the hour is to bring to light the ancient Indian reflections on such subjects that have become important and significant in contemporary times. Kalghatgi gives a descriptive analysis of the Jaina conception of Dreams and comes to suggest that it presents a problem even to the empirical Psychologists of today. He is of the opinion that in the light of the Jaina's treatment of the phenomenon of 'Dream', a re-orientation of our outlook towards the study of dreams is necessary. Bagchi gives a modern interpretation of the vedantic concept of Maya, and comes to his conclusions by differentiating the vedantic position from that of the western Idealist. He appears to be convinced that in certain respects the vedantist advances beyond the western Idealist — atleast in so far as the vedantic idealist is able to transcend meaning and thought in subjectivity. K. C. Das gives a comparative account of the sankhya-Yoga and the Freudian conceptions of the Unconscious and comes to feel that some of its aspects that have been emphasised in Sankhya-Yoga were not even considered by Freud or the Freudians.

There are some other papers, more or less of the same kind, which, instead of emphasising the prominent aspects of Indian Philosophy, seek to reduce Indian Philosophy to forms, epithets and models of western Philosophy. Deutsch calls this the realist technical approach'. The papers that are being placed under this head have all adopted the technical approach, although they are not necessarily realistic. Ramakant sinari tries to demonstrate that Sankara in the orient furnishes a unique instance of adopting the phenomenological attitude. He defines the phenomenological attitude as comprising "a manner of dis-sentient, a preserved scepticism, a penetration into the genesis of essences 'in consciousness' and a persistent analysis of the

'given' from the standpoint of one's own subjectivity" Particularly in the last he finds a perfect similarity between this attitude and that of Sankara. He also feels that Sankara's *avidya* and Husserl's *naivete* are similar in import, and therefore he does not find any difficulty in instituting a comparison between the two. H. M. Joshi tries to find a justification for the static — dynamic concept of reality, an example of which he comes across in the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo, and in a different sense, in the philosophy of sankara also. For this he keeps on moving freely in the philosophies of some of the prominent metaphysical thinkers of the west — Bradley, Bosanquet, Alexander and whitehead.

But the most faithful illustration of this kind of technical approach to philosophical thinking is the Vedanta Lecture of Prof. N. K. Devaraja. Devaraja intends to highlight such aspects of Advaita Vedanta which are both significant and relevant for the contemporary times. The modern man, for him, is the man who is aware of "the tensions and strains characterising contemporary life and sensibility and shares the concern of a disillusioned generation for objective evidence and verifiable utterance." Advaita Vedanta appears to him as relevant for such a modern man, and therefore he attempts to ascertain the relevance of Advaita Vedanta from three points of view — metaphysical, epistemological and religious. Among others the most challenging notions that Devaraja places before the modern man are those of saintly life and 'Jivanmukti.'

Most of the papers included in this selection appear to have adopted, what Deutsch calls, 'the cultural History approach'. Methodologically, this approach works from original source materials, compares various systems with one another and analyses their historical development. It may concentrate on individual thinkers or on movements, and evaluate their view —points in the light of the culture of the time and place. According to Deutsch such a philosopher can only be a good or bad historian, but that is not necessarily true; it is very much possible for a thinker, who has used the historical method for self-education, to develop significant philosophy on the basis of the lessons of history that he has been able to learn. And so, in the present volume some of the papers coming under this head are purely historical, while some others are historically constructive. Some of the papers have taken up the analysis of such topics that have become important in the recent times and some others have given thought to such

classical topics that have remained important almost through out history.

Deshpande's paper is a critical examination of Max Black's paper on "The Gap between 'Is' and 'should' ". He follows Black's arguments carefully and is able to conclude that Black has not succeeded in showing that some non-factual conclusions can follow from factual premises. Another similar excursion into analytic philosophy is made by Ruprekha Verma. In her brief paper she firstly elaborates the arguments of Strawson against the thesis, of logicians like Quine, that there are no necessary truths. Then she points out the limitations of Strawson's arguments by showing that the case of necessity as mentioned by Strawson is not the only case of necessity. She also examines Strawson's objections to an anticipated reply from Quine's side and points out that strawson's replies are not consistent with the accounts given by Quine.

From Analytic Philosophy to the Logical Positivistic critique of metaphysics is a backward movement, but the four symposium papers on 'Can Metaphysics survive ? deal, somehow or other with the same question — viz, 'Has metaphysics survived the Positivistic attack ?' Their conclusions and also the manner of arriving at their conclusions are peculiarly similar. They all examine the positivistic standpoint and discover some discrepancies and defects in the standpoint itself. A. K. Verma does this in a strictly conventional style, K. N. Upadhyaya adopts the same approach, but in a more direct and detailed manner. He enters right into an examination of the fundamental thesis of Logical Positivism and brings to light their defects, some of which are again traditional and some novel. B.S. Sanyal adopts a somewhat different procedure and arrives at his conclusion with the help of a logical analysis of synthetic a priori sentences. While they are all content with their negative approach Nayak goes a step further and suggests the outlines of a possible metaphysics for the present times. He emphasises the importance of vision by comparing it with a map, and in the process comes to say that a metaphysical theory can have an assertive content that is verifiable in *Anubhava*.

Cheenakesvan's paper on 'Dimensions of the mind : Is mind a machine?' appears to be scientifically oriented. This problem has become very important in the contemporary times, and so, she analyses this problem in the light of its scientific background. She admits that at the present level of knowledge we have to accept that man is more

than body and mind, but she is hesitant in making predictions about the future possibility of mind being reduced to the status of a machine. Uma Gupta also seems to be impressed by the achievements of natural sciences and the recent social sciences. That takes her to examine the origin and evolution of the sense of morality, and her scientific analysis enables her to assert the conclusion, which today appears obvious to common sense, that the origin of morality does not lie in any Divine or mysterious will, but in some biological and psycho-social need.

Then, there are some other papers which also reflect the cultural history approach, but which have taken up for analysis some classical or traditional problems. S. N. L. Shrivastava takes us back to consider Rudolf Otto's analysis of religious experience. He states and examines objections against Otto's emphasis on the non-rational aspect of religious experience and comes to develop a justification for Otto's viewpoints. Marneff's paper is another example of an insight, which, inspite of being traditional, is sufficiently illuminating. He gives a reflective description of some of the prominent neo-scholastic studies of Kant, and then tries to determine how far neo-scholasticism can go with Kant and how it goes beyond it. Finally, he is able to arrive at a conclusion regarding the possibility of metaphysics by showing that the very use of the Kantian method can enable one to discover the ground of some higher but also sure knowledge. S. S. Sharma is purely descriptive in his analysis of the problem of Being and Non-being. He traces the history of the problem down from the early Greeks to the recent Existentialists. Bijoyanand Kar also has taken up an old problem — the problem of Truth and he analyses it both historically and linguistically. The two main questions that engage his attention are the question regarding the meaning of Truth and the question regarding its criterion. He examines the different possible answers to these questions and analyses their merits and demerits.

This cultural history approach is extended to the realm of Logic by Gajendragadkar, who, in his 'two conceptions of Logic', makes a distinction between 'Formal Logic' and 'Philosophical Logic'. While maintaining the usefulness of Formal Logic he brings to light its limitations, and thereby finds a justification for Philosophical Logic. He also strikes a note of warning by suggesting that a slight carelessness will turn philosophical Logic into a fanciful metaphysical adventure.

Deutsch has spoken approvingly about 'a philosophical approach' also, whose adoption he recommends. This approach demands a broad acquaintance with the main aspects of both oriental and western Philosophies, so that one's philosophical background is enriched and he is able to develop his own line of thinking in the fields that interest him. Thus, he does not recommend a complete breaking away from tradition, he merely asserts that tradition must also be viewed in such a way that it is able to influence and facilitate ones own thinking. It can not accurately be said that any of the papers included in this selection adopts this approach faithfully, but S. H. Divatia and Debi Prasad Chattopadhyaya appear to be doing something similar, while Basant K. Lal clarifies further the nature of such an approach to philosophical thinking.

Deutsch would be amused to find this approach illustrated in terms of examples gathered from history of philosophy—both Indian and western. Lal does it in his reflections on 'Conservatism in Philosophy.' He tries to show when conservatism is a merit and when a defect of philosophical thinking. Taking the example of British philosophy he demonstrates clearly what Deutsch suggests only in principle, namely that it is possible to develop significant and original philosophy without losing contact with tradition.

Divatia's paper on "Freedom and Democracy" and chatto-padhyaya's paper on "Individuals and worlds" appear to have roughly adopted the philosophical approach. Divatia gives a philosophical analysis of the notion of Democracy and comes to feel that freedom is one of the chief values of Democracy. She tries to determine the nature of democracy in the light of this value. Debi Chattopadhyaya, inspite of his realistic pretensions, is more metaphysical than Divatia both in the choice of his subjectmatter and in its treatment. His first thesis is that individuals can not exist in isolation. To act significantly man must be social. It is true, he agrees, that the real world is a human world, it is by man that the true identity of the world is disclosed and it is in man—as scientist, historian and philosopher—that the true identity is realised. The conclusion, thus, becomes safe and natural; the universe can not have a significance without reference to individuals living in it, the universe has to be a lived universe.

In conclusion, it can be said that Indian philosophers have to come to realise the value of what Deutsch describes as the Philosophical approach. This approach does not consist in a grand synthesis of world-thoughts but in an inward assimilation of the fruits of all possible kinds of study and experience.

A. Jha

B. K. Lal

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CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF ADVAITA — VEDANTA*

N. K. DEVARAJA

In the Indian tradition philosophy and religion have been more closely associated than in most other traditions. As a consequence, the Advaita Vedanta is accepted by many of its adherents almost as a religion. Now the teachings of religion all over the world are taken to embody eternal truths, not susceptible to change or open to questioning. As philosophers, however, we are bound to regard the Advaita Vedanta as one among many philosophical systems. As such, it can not claim any special sanctity, and must be judged by the criteria applicable to any other classical system produced in one or other of the major cultural traditions of the world.

The question as to the relevance of the Advaitic system for the modern man has a general and a particular aspect. In its general aspect the question may be posed thus : what is the use or significance of any classical system of thought for us today? Seeing that our times, i. e. our problems and tastes, are entirely different from those of ancient and medieval people, some may be tempted to answer the above question with a categorical 'No'. The temper of the modern man as also his practice of the arts and the various intellectual disciplines seem, on the whole, to be growing more and more anti-traditional. However, I take it that a classic in any field is a work that has successfully withstood the winds of change and the ravages of time, and has relevance and meaning for properly educated persons even to-day. The same judgment applies to the systems of thought now regarded as classical. This explains why works of classical stature in different fields, particularly in the humanities, such as parts of the Upanishads, the *Republic* of Plato, the *Bhagavadgita* and the *New Testament*, the Karikas of Nagarjuna and Gaudapada, etc. should fascinate the minds of the modern readers, and why the scheme of thought produced by Dharmakirti and Sankara, Thomas Aquinas and Spinoza, etc. continue to engage and exercise our intellects to-day.

Apart from the above general question, it may be asked in regard to any particular system of thought as to what constitutes its *special* significance for the modern man. Here, by the modern man I do not mean merely the person who belongs to the modern times in a chronological sense. To us the modern man is the person who is, more or

* Srimant Pratap Seth Lecture on Vedanta.

less, aware of the tensions and strains characterizing contemporary life and sensibility and shares the concern of a disillusioned generation for objective evidence and verifiable utterance.

Speaking generally, a classical system of philosophy has the sort of appeal that is possessed by a classical work of literature and art. This is true even of single philosophical works of classical stature. Quite apart from the acceptability of its central contentions, the *Republic* of Plato, like the *Meditations* of Descartes or the *Ethics* of Spinoza, makes an exciting reading. Just as we enjoy a great play or novel without any conscious belief in the authenticity of the events recorded in it — the play or novel having appeal for us partly an account of its formal qualities, partly due to its resemblance to life — similarly a finished system of thought charms us as much by its architectonic excellences as by the resemblance of the problems posed by it to the problems agitating the minds of the modern man. These remarks would apply to almost any classic in the spheres of art, literature and philosophy. Any metaphysical scheme is, like Euclid's geometry, a deductive system consisting of a set of axioms and premises and deductions therefrom that seem to correspond to actual, lived experience of mankind at certain points. According to Euclid, two sides of any triangle are together greater than the third side; in actual life, too, men try to cross a square or rectangular field diagonally. In a similar fashion even the most speculative system of metaphysics has a reference to and bearing upon our lived experience or life.

The Advaita Vedanta claims our attention to-day as a well-knit system of doctrines offering connected solutions of a number of problems, logico-epistemological and ethico-religious. In fact, that system could not have attained the prominence it did, had it not succeeded in offering solutions to all the problems posed by Sankara's eminent predecessors and his contemporaries. These problems, as already observed, are partly logical and epistemological and partly spiritual. During the three centuries preceding the appearance of Sankara—the golden centuries in the history of Indian logico—epistemological thought—the brilliant Buddhist thinkers on the one-hand and the equally brilliant logicians and theorists of knowledge in the Nyaya and Mimamsa camps on the other, had fought deadly battles over almost all the subtle and significant issues in logic and epistemology. The nature and number of *pramanas*, the nature of sensory perception, the nature of cognition and recollection of

self—cognition and cognition of cognition—all these constituted central and provocative issues to the thinkers and exponents of the schools under reference. As a system having contemporary relevance the Advaita Vedanta, as propounded by Sankara and his disciples, had a definite and coherent stand on all the above problems. It is important to note that in his own writing Sankara concentrates mainly on metaphysical and religious issues. While the *Adhyasabhasya* casually refers to several definitions of error, it is in the commentaries on the *Bhasya*, e. g. the *Panchapadika* with the *Vivarana* and the *Bhāmatī*, that criticisms of rival theories of error from the Advaitic viewpoint have been elaborated. In the tarka-pada of the *Bhasya*, too, what Sankara criticises are the metaphysical tenets of the different schools. The logico—epistemological implications of his system have been worked out largely by his disciples and commentators. Sankara's own remarks on the nature of reasoning, the relation between perception and inference, etc. are casual and desultory. As regards dialectical reasoning, Sankara's attitude towards it is decidedly hostile. Thus, criticising the vijnanavadins under 2. 2. 28, he remarks: 'This attempt (to prove the non-existence of external objects by arguing that the latter cannot be shown to be either different or non-different from the atoms) is improper, since the possibility or impossibility of things is to be determined only on the ground of the operation or non-operation of the *pramanas*, while, on the other hand, the operation of the *pramanas* is not to be made dependent on preconceived possibilities or impossibilities. Possible is whatever is apprehended by perception or some other *pramana*, impossible is what is not so apprehended. Now, the external object is apprehended by all the *pramanas*; how, then, can it be maintained that it is not possible, on the ground of such idle dilemmas as that about its difference or non difference from atoms ?

The later Vedantists who, in imitation of the Madhyamika, sought to prove the untenability of all definitions and conceptions and the phenomenality of the world through dialectical procedure, were clearly departing from the method of the Master. It may also be added that Sriharsa, Citsukha, and Madhusudana Saraswati, the chief exponents of the dialectical method in the Advaitic camp, do not make any constructive improvements in handling the several problems in logic and epistemology posed and debated by the immediate disciples and commentators of Sankara. It may be asserted without fear of contradiction that the constructive elaboration of the Advaita Vedanta had,

more or less, been completed by the time the *Bhamati*, the works of Suresvaracarya and the *Vivarana* had been written.

Sankara's own contributions lie mainly in the fields of metaphysics and philosophy of religion. The two main concepts, both deriving from the Upanisads, that have been constructively developed by Sankara are those of pure *cit* or witness — consciousness and *Moksa*. As regards the doctrine of *Adhyasa*, it may be regarded as being partly an elaboration of some of the utterances of the *Chandogya Upanisad* and partly an innovation of Sankara himself. Here an important thing of considerable historical interest may be noted. In the first tarkapada, under Sutra 2-1-12, Sankara refers to the Sankhya as the chief rival of the Advaitic School. What makes the Sankhya particularly important in Indian philosophical thought is its highly original and daring conception of *Kaivalya* or *Moksa*, together with its equally original and bold conceptions of *purusa* and its relationship with the *Prakrti*. Metaphysically, indeed, the Sankhya is the most original realistic system produced on the Indian soil. Its theory of evolving *Prakrti* is as original and courageous as its conception of *Mukti* as consisting in *Kaivalya* or aloofness of the *Purusa*. Its conception of *Purusa* as pure consciousness is also highly significant and suggestive. The Advaita of Sankara appropriates all that is important and consequential in the Sankhya scheme; more consistent and, from the religious standpoint, more meaningful and thorough, by conjoining to it the concept of *avidya* and the doctrine of the phenomenality of the visible world. By these devices the Advaita fashions itself into a more radical, thorough and satisfying doctrine of salvation than that of the Sankhya. When Sankara described the Sankhya as the chief rival, he must have been thinking of its hold on the minds of the intelligentsia as a doctrine of salvation. The *Bhagavadgita* identifies the way of knowledge with the way of the Sankhya. In the history of Indian thought it was probably the Sankhya that conceived the spiritual principle in man to be essentially changeless and actionless. This notion of the self is taken up bodily and assimilated to its idealistic world-view by the Advaita Vedanta. The Advaita also work out thoroughly the implications of the upanisadic statement that the knower of *Brahman* becomes *Brahman* itself, that bondage can be dissolved completely by the attainment of true metaphysical insight or knowledge.

What we are trying to suggest is that the Advaita Vedanta, as elaborated by Sankaracharya himself on the one hand and by his

disciples and commentators on the other, constituted itself into a system complete in all details both as a theory of knowledge and as a doctrine of salvation. In addition, it appropriated the more significant elements in the upanisadic conception of the *Atman*. It also retained and consistently developed the monistic tendencies in the Upanisads consisting, on the one hand, in the insistence on the identity of the individual self and the cosmic principle and, on the other, in the suggestion that the phenomenal world was merely a matter of names and forms. Thus the Advaita Vedanta emerged as a system both more perfect and more orthodox than the rival Hindu systems. In its theory of knowledge, Sankara's Advaita retained the realistic bias of the orthodox Schools. Methodologically, the Advaita proved its superiority to the rival orthodox systems in that its scheme involved but a few fundamental concepts and a minimum of metaphysical assumptions. In these respects the Advaita compares and contrasts favourably with the dualistic-pluralistic scheme of the Sankhya and the unabashed pluralism of the Vaisesika. These factors make the Advaitic system appear to be more elegant to uncommitted observers. While the Advaitic scheme may not be considered superior to that of the Sankhyas and the Prabhakaras as a theory of knowledge, it certainly scores over all its predecessors as a theory of salvation. It more thoroughly works out the conception of the *Jivan-mukta* that had already been foreshadowed in the Sankhya system. Incidentally, the Advaitic doctrine of the phenomenality of the world—which, though suggested in the Upanisads, remained alien to five out of the six Classical Hindu systems—aligns its world-view to that of the great Buddhist thinkers, particularly the idealistic thinkers. This renders the Advaita system still more representative in relation to classical Indian thought; it bestows on it the distinction of being the most important synthesis of all the preceding trends in philosophical thought, Hindu and Buddhist.

II

We may now return to the principal theme of the present essay, viz. the question of the relevance of the Advaita Vedanta for the modern man. We shall attempt to ascertain this relevance from three angles, those of metaphysics, theory of knowledge and philosophy of religion. Has the Advaita Vedanta any meaning and significance from the viewpoint of metaphysics to-day? The question may seem both rash and pointless, for have not the Logical Positivists eliminated metaphysics

once for all ? Our contention is that what logical positivism has repudiated, and rightly, is speculative metaphysics; it has not succeeded, and cannot possibly succeed, in demolishing genuine metaphysics. It happens that the first principle of the Advaita Vedanta, the pure *Cit* or awareness, is not a concept by postulation; indeed, to the Vedantists, it is not a concept at all. The *Brahman* of the Vedanta is beyond all concepts and categories. In this respect, the Vedantic *Brahman* differs radically from the Absolute of both Hegel and Bradley. Both Hegel and Bradley arrived at their Absolute or Absolutes by the use of the ontological proof. This proof is foreign to the spirit of the Advaita Vedanta. To the Advaitin the *Brahman* is not so much the ontological primordium or the first principle of the universe—for such a description of *Brahman* could not escape the charge of being relational; to him, *Brahman* or *Atman* is the informing spirit of all experience, the light of awareness that constitutes the very core of the phenomenon called experience. The Advaitin reaches the notion of *Atman* or *Brahman* not through any ratiocinative or dialectical processes, but through contemplation over or contemplative scrutiny of experience as such. That is why the Advaitic *Atman* is inaccessible to the strictures of positivistic criticism. The *Brahman* may not be an empirical reality in the narrow sense of that term, but it is certainly, as seen by the Advaitin, an experiential entity — if *Brahman* can be called an entity at all. In fact, *Brahman* is not so much an entity as that in whose light the entities of the world are made to appear and are known. On the other hand, the Advaitin stoutly opposes any suggestion that the *Atman* itself may become an object of knowledge. Here it may be added that the modern student of philosophy can scarcely feel interested in the role of *Brahman* as the cause of the world. But he can certainly feel intrigued by the phenomenological presence of pure awareness as the central fact about experience.

The pure *Cit* of the Advaitin is a significant category even from the viewpoint of the ontology of knowledge. The credit for originating the concept of pure consciousness as the informing principle of all experience including knowledge should go to the Sankhya. The Sankhya conception of knowledge as a mode of *budhi* enlivened by the light of consciousness, i.e. *Purus*, is one of the boldest conceptions in the history of world's philosophical thought. This conception is incorporated by the Advaita Vedanta in its scheme with little or no alteration. An ontological description of knowledge must, at some point, refer to the

element of pure awareness; for, as T. H. Green argued at a much later date, consciousness itself cannot be a link in the chain of sensations and other changing data that it apprehends.

Indian idealistic thinkers in general and the Advaitins in particular speak about Vijnana or consciousness, identified with the ultimate reality of the world, with great ardour. According to the Indian tradition the Ultimate Consciousness or Vijnana is not the same as the differentiated consciousness consisting of the stream of ideas, volition, etc. On the contrary, the Ultimate Consciousness is conceived as being different from the transient, everchanging phenomenon called empirical consciousness. The *Brahman* is clearly described as being of the nature of Vijnana or consciousness first in the *Taittiriya Upanisad*. Among later works, apart from those belonging to the Advaita School, the *Vishnu Purana* as also the *Srimadbhagavata* represents *Brahman* or the Ultimate as being of the nature of consciousness. With the peculiar sense of self-exultation a typical Vedantic Sadhaka refers to himself as *cid-ghana* or *Cidanandarupa*, meaning thereby that he is different from the empirical self and its vicissitudes.

The Advaita Vedantic theory of perception considers perceptual cognition to consist in the fusion or identification of the knower (*pramata*) through the cognitive process (*pramana*) with the object of cognition. This peculiar view of perception enables the Advaitin to distinguish perceptual from inferential knowledge. The Advaitic theory of perception is interesting as an hypothesis, even though it fails to commend itself to the modern mind. The very ingenuity shown by the Advaitin in conceiving such entities as *pramana-caitanya*, *pramalr-caitanya* and *Visaya-caitanya*, makes his view suspect in the eyes of modern philosophers with their anti-metaphysical bias.

However, the enthusiasm of the Advaitin for the concept of pure awareness has deeper roots in his severely objective reflective consciousness as well as in his religious consciousness. It is interesting to note that classical Indian philosophers, with their religious orientation, are as thoroughly objective in their outlook as modern positivists. The Indian thinkers have great distrust of the person swayed by subjective feelings and emotions; such a person is not considered fit to undertake philosophical inquiry. According to Sankara only the person who has control over the mind and the senses and is indifferent to the pleasures of this world and the next is fit to inquire into the nature of *Brahman*.

The ideal investigator, in other words, is one who approximates to the state of the pure spectator or the completely detached observer. Therefore, if ultimate reality is to be conceived as *jnanam* or knowledge, it should be thought of as being pure, unsullied awareness, a flaming light, that remains uncontaminated by what it illuminates.

The Ultimate, then, is of the nature or pure illumination or pure consciousness. Such consciousness alone qualifies to view things in their naked objective nature; the *Brahman* alone can be omniscient. According to Jainism, too, omniscience belongs to the soul that has freed itself from contaminating contacts with *karma* — particles, and is now restored to its own real nature.

Another source of the Advaitin's predilection for the notion of pure awareness is his peculiar conception of the religious man and the religious mind. That man or mind is essentially the one that is completely detached with respect to the world of objects. The ideal religious man, according to the Indian conception, is the completely detached saint, the *sthitaprajna*, who is but a spectator in the drama of life. The *sthitaprajna* remains unaffected by the fortunes of his personal life and the vicissitudes of the historical environment. The Advaita Vedantic metaphysics offers an ontological analysis and explanation of the personality and character of the ideal religious man as revealed to the Indian religious consciousness. It is noteworthy that practically all classical Schools of Indian philosophy are agreed as regards the essential marks of the religious person or the saint. To the extent to which the religious man is able to free himself from attachment to perishable goods of life, to that extent he attains peace and tranquillity of mind. The ideal religious person, viz. the saint, according to the Indian religious scriptures, is one who has emancipated himself from the dominion of passions, particularly the passions of attachment (*raga*) and aversion (*dvesa*). In Buddhist works, passions are referred to as *klesas* or afflictions. In Jaina literature, one of the epithets applied to a Tirthankara is *Jina* or Victor which means one who has conquered the passions such as *raga* and *dvesa*. In a verse attributed to Hemachandra, the *Jina* has been equated with the three forms of the Hindu Godhead, i.e., Brahma, Visnu and Shiva, on the ground that all these have alike succeeded in eradicating passions that produce and nourish the seeds of *bhava* or *Samsara** A Jaina author, Kulabhadra, declares 'The purity

* *Bhava-bijankura-jananah ragadyah kaayam upagata yasya, Brahma va Visnur va Heru Jino va namas tasmai*

of the mind free from attachment and aversion — this is the Sublime *Brahman*, which the deluded fail to attain'.† To the Indian religious thinkers the mind free from passions equals the highest reality or value. Such a conception of the highest or ultimate reality, as the spiritual principle whose essence consists in pure awareness or the power of detached vision, is more thoroughly elaborated by the Advaita than by any other system. One of the names applied to *Atman* taken in its pure form is *Saksi-Caitanya* or the witness consciousness. It follows from this conception that the ideal man or the saint is a disinterested observer or a pure spectator of the changing reality called the phenomenal world.

According to the Christian conception the ideal religious person is the man of complete faith, who abides with a feeling of complete dependence and safety. This conception of the ideal religious man has affinities with the Vaisnava conception of the true bhakta or devotee. Both the Christian and the Vaisnava are sustained in their religious pursuits by an almost obstinate faith in God. On the contrary, the religious outlook of the classical Indian philosophers is rooted in metaphysical insight, attained by thoroughgoing rational reflection. We have already observed that this metaphysics is not altogether speculative in its procedure. To the Vedantists the *Atman* is a datum of direct experience and not a hypothetical or inferred entity. The existence of the *Atman*, as conceived by the Advaitin, is also attested by the attitude and actual conduct of the *Sthitaprajna* or the saintly person.

A compound of the spiritual and the material, man is the most complex of all entities, living and non-living, in the universe. As such, he seems to be subject to the largest variety of laws as revealed by the various sciences. Not only the well-established sciences of physics, chemistry and biology, but also such relatively younger disciplines as psychology and anthropology, sociology, economics, political science, etc. claim dominion over man and his behaviour. The normative studies such as logic and ethics also claim to have relevance with respect to man's life and aspirations. Under the circumstances, it becomes difficult indeed to indicate the real essence of man. However, there is one thing worth noticing in connection with the Advaitin's claim that the core of man's spiritual self is constituted by pure *cit* or the witness

† Etad eva param Brahma na vindantiha mohinah, yad etac cittanairmalyam raga-dyesadi-varjitam — 'Sara-Samocaya' 164.

self. According to the biologists, the governing law of animal life is the struggle for existence; according to the psychologists, man is essentially egoistic and self-seeking. According to the Freudians, man is a creature subject to the drives originating in the hidden layers of his unconscious or sub-conscious mind, while according to the economists, man is primarily concerned to obtain wealth or the means of controlling the goods and services that contribute to his comforts and luxuries. It happens that none of the scientific disciplines studying man offers a flattering picture of his inclinations and ambitions. And yet, mankind has known many a heroic personality who has pursued noble goals and ideals at the cost of all sorts of comforts, gains and acquisitions. The Sthitaprajna of the *Bhagavadgita*, or the saint of the Indian conception, seems to defy, in his bearing and day-to-day conduct, practically all the known laws of the sciences studying man. He refuses to fight for wealth and power, or even for the defence of his legitimate rights. Rising above the psychological needs of self assertion and security, he refuses to be perturbed by slander and insult and by the prospects of loss of food, shelter and other belongings. Nor is such a saint a hypothetical entity. Indian culture has produced, known and admired many a saint of the type under reference. The votaries of the different sciences, who wish to treat man almost as a mechanical entity, should endeavour to meet the challenge, offered by the saintly person of above description.

And here we are led to see another implication of the Vedantic conception of the religious man and of *Moksha*. To the Vedantists, the state of *moksha* is not a matter of faith or make-believe; it is not something to be attained in a hypothetical after — life. Nor is *moksha* a gift that can be bestowed on man by an omnipotent God properly worshipped or propitiated. According to the classical Indian systems of philosophy in general, and the Advaita Vedanta in particular, *moksha* is nothing but one's essential, inward nature made manifest by the removal of the covering of *avidya* or ignorance. Further, the Advaitic conception of *Jivan-mukti* ensures that the state of *moksha* can be attained or made manifest here in our earthly life. The full significance of the conception of *Jivan-mukti* can be realised only when that conception is contrasted with the notion of self-fulfilment or salvation propagated by the purely theistic Semetic religions. There salvation is conceived as a sort of gift bestowed on man by a gracious God living in a special sphere of existence. Obviously, such a conception of salvation or

fulfilment cannot be submitted to any experiential test or verification. On the other hand, the Vedantic conception of *Jivan-mukti* makes that fulfilment a phenomenon amenable to verification and control in terms of actual, lived experience. This is another aspect of the Advaitic doctrine that makes it both interesting to and relevant for the modern man.

SOME REMARKS ON CONTEMPORARY WESTERN APPROACHES TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

ELIOT DEUTSCH

Comparative philosophy for us today is much like "time" was for St. Augustine: we all know what it is until we are called upon to explain it. And just as with philosophy itself, as soon as several scholars do explain it, we learn that it means many different things.

There are, I believe, four main approaches to comparative philosophy in the West today. These approaches are not exclusive of one another; in fact they seem to represent stages in a natural progressive development. I should like to describe briefly these approaches; to point out what I see as their negative and positive sides, and to urge the adoption of one of these by both western and Indian philosophers.

The first approach may be called the "esoteric approach". It is the approach generally taken by those who seek to find in Indian philosophy just those values, concerns, and affirmations that they find missing in their own culture. It is the "wisdom of the East" approach which sees India (and sometimes Japan and China as well) as the repository of all pure spirituality. The goal of this approach is personal "enlightenment." Methodologically this approach demands that one become wholly identified with a small number of ideas in the given culture; it demands, in short, that one become a devotee. This approach is based, it seems, on the assumption that the essentials of Indian philosophy are entirely incomprehensible in standard/western philosophical and religious terms, and that only one who has a total commitment to the philosophy can understand the depth of its spirituality.

The negative side of this approach is quite evident. By isolating a few ideas in the tradition and wrapping them in an exotic garb, it fails to employ that critical intelligence which is necessary to make real sense out of anything. This approach leads all too frequently to over-generalized distinctions between cultures ("the West is rational, the East is intuitive") and it tends to be sentimental, romantic and cultish.

On the positive side, this approach has succeeded in calling attention in the West to the enduring quality of non-western forms of spirituality and to the contribution they make to world culture. It has

also made us aware of the fact that there can be no real understanding of traditional Indian thought without a sympathetic openness to it. In the final analysis it is perhaps the case that one must experience for oneself the living values of a culture before one can understand its most profound insights. Sympathetic imagination, we believe, is as necessary for understanding as critical intelligence.

The second approach, which stands perhaps as the opposite extreme of the first, may be called the "cultural history approach." It treats Indian philosophy in a wholly objective, dispassionate manner as a body of material to be classified, explained and analyzed. The goal of this approach is to educate one — in the broad and best sense of that term. Methodologically, this approach works from original source materials, compares various system with one another, and analyzes their historical development within the framework of the values and achievements of the culture as a whole. (In its first historical stage this approach was "comparative" philosophy in a literal sense. It looked for the similarities and dissimilarities between individual thinkers in different traditions — e. g. Kant and Samkara, Spinoza and Buddha, etc. — and tried to articulate the main "ways of thinking" in eastern and western experience. In its present stage, this approach has become more specialized ; its followers concentrate more on single thinkers or movements as they function within the framework of their particular culture. Literal comparisons are made mainly for the sake of clarification, and not as ends in themselves.)

On its positive side, this approach has been of immense educational value and the fruits of its research are clearly indispensable to any creative philosophical work which embodies Indian thought. It has succeeded to a considerable degree in breaking down the narrow provincialism typical of so many western philosophers, who believe that philosophy means western philosophy alone, and it has made us all aware of the enormous variety of ideas to be found in Indian philosophy. No one who has read deeply in the scholarly literature on Indian philosophy can believe any longer that Indian philosophy equals Advaita Vedanta.

On the other side, however, this approach has definite, and I should think obvious, limitations if pursued exclusively by a philosopher. The very nature of our scholarly methods forces us to treat traditional Indian philosophies as dead material, as museum pieces. No attempt can be made, we believe, by the strict objective scholar to bring about

within himself an inward assimilation of ideas and values and, more importantly, to see if indeed any claims for universal truth can be made about them. The philosopher, unlike the historian-scholar, must be deeply interested in the truth or falsity, the adequacy or inadequacy of the ideas that he entertains. The history of philosophy is assuredly not itself philosophy — comparative or otherwise.

The third approach taken in the West toward Indian philosophy today can, for want of a better name, be called the "realist technical approach". The explicit goal of this approach is to disclose the technical philosophical achievements of Indian thought so as to influence western philosophers; the implicit goal, if I may put it this way, is to find additional support for one's own western, naturalistic position. Interest here is usually centered on Nyaya epistemology and Navya-Nyaya and Buddhist logic. Methodologically, this approach usually involves a close detailed examination of various arguments, their logical forms and underlying assumptions.

On the negative side, this approach tends to impose western modes of classification on traditional Indian thought in such a manner that not infrequently the distinctive qualities and characteristics of that tradition get lost. It also tends to reduce the whole of Indian philosophy to a naturalistic *darsana* and to relegate everything else to "religion". It thus reduces the unique and different to what is already familiar and dismisses everything that does not come under the scheme of classification as "unphilosophical". It thus tends to make of Indian philosophy a mere extension of western philosophy.

On its positive side, however, this approach has yielded a number of extremely valuable results. It has awakened interest in, and knowledge of, the technical philosophical side of Indian thought and has helped to overcome the false stereotype of this thought as "Yoga combined with dogmatic theology".

The last approach, and the one whose adoption I would urge, is relevant, I believe, to both western and non-western philosophers. I do not have a name for it other than calling it simply "the philosophical approach"—and I mean to imply by this that comparative philosophy is or at least should be a discipline of philosophy proper. This approach studies traditional Oriental philosophy (as well as for that matter the history of western philosophy) in order to enrich one's philosophical background and to enable one to deal better with the

philosophical problems that interest one. Without losing sight of the distinctive and sometimes unique characteristics of a tradition, one concentrates here on the tradition as it is a response to a series of universal questions and problems—and with the express intention that these responses will influence one in a spontaneous unself-conscious way in one's own thinking. This would not mean attempting a grand synthesis of world thought (of taking an idea and verbally harmonising it with what is apparently contradictory to it) rather it would be an attempt to bring about an inward assimilation of the fruits of the widest possible human experience. As I see it, this approach would encompass the best of the other approaches. Without being blindly committed to a few non-western ideas, it would nevertheless genuinely appreciate the accomplishments of Indian spirituality; without treating another tradition as a collection of dead ideas, it would nevertheless be thoroughly grounded in a detailed knowledge of the rich diversity of Indian systems and feel at home with them; without necessarily imposing western classifications and categories on non-western systems, it would examine critically specific arguments and solutions to problems, and it would take a philosophical stand in affirming or denying the truth or value of a given argument or position. This approach, if wisely pursued, can thus have the best and avoid the worst of the other approaches.

In sum : comparative philosophy, as I see it, is not simply a matter of trying to show similarities and differences between thinkers from different traditions or of attempting to articulate the general features of one tradition or another. This kind of work is indeed valuable, and much has been accomplished by the pioneers in the field who have worked in this direction. Their efforts, to be sure, do still stand in need of further development and refinement, and this can be carried out by the second and third approaches. But today, I believe, we are ready for other tasks. We are ready to bring comparative philosophy back into the fold of creative philosophy—and hopefully, thereby, to enrich the latter.

'DIMENSIONS OF THE MIND : IS THE MIND A MACHINE ?

SARASVATI CHENNAKESAVAN

Recent researches in physiology, neurology, mathematical logic and feedback techniques have been responsible for creating a startling and devastating situation in the human milieu. It looks as though man would no more be considered as the crown of creation. To parody Alexander Pope, the proper study of man would no more be mankind but machine-kind. Many ideas of the sanctity of human life and his continued existence on this place are getting shaky. Perhaps I am pessimistic, but we are well on the way to an unimaginable end where human ideals and aspirations, emotions and romances, imaginations and poetic mysticisms would all be things of the past. The whole situation simmers around the question, can man be reduced to a machine ? Has he a mind different from brain and in control of the brain ? Is he the 'Lord of all he surveys ?'. I believe it is now absolutely necessary for every 'thinking' being to sit up and take notice and critically examine the situation and do some salvage work.

The two most important problems are : 'do machines think ?' and 'are machines conscious ?' While we raise these questions we must be aware of two correlate questions which are : 'If machines can think, are they minds ?' and 'If machines are conscious, are they living organisms ?' We are assuming here that thinking is possible only to a living organism. We are interested to examine if the machine, which by no length or stretch of imagination can be conceived as a living organism, is capable of discharging a function which is the sole trademark of a living organism. From this follows the next assumption that all living beings are conscious and possess self-awareness to a greater or a lesser degree. It is this awareness that, in higher beings, takes the form of thinking. So these two are linked together. 'Thinking' is not merely stimulus-response pattern. It is a form of reasoning, where the pros and cons of a situation are weighed and decisions taken. It is making a choice between different responses in any situation and determining the course of action most suited to achieve the goal which has already been set up consciously. The behaviouristic method of investigating the nature of mind stresses on the fact that all human behaviour is physiological and hence physiologically determined. But Piaget and other psychologists have reported that as the child develops its mental faculties also develop. This cannot be

completely correlated with the development of the brain. Simple organisations of stimulus-response patterns can be the result of pure cortical activity in a growing child. But activities like form recognition, concept formation, deduction from past experience are activities which are not so explainable. The fact that mentally imbalanced people have illogical associations with perceived configurations should indeed make the behaviourist pause in his sweeping identifications between the brain and the mind. It is also well known that the same set of stimuli brings forth different responses from different individuals depending on their mental conditions. The Ink-blot tests used by psychologists is in evidence of this. If the cortex is structurally and constructionally the same physiological organ in all humans, then we can not account for such differences without assuming something more than the mere brain. The field of perception where the solid three-dimensional object is perceived when what is given as stimuli is only the two-dimensional something, and where interrelations between objects is taken cognizance of before embarking on actions, shows that the story of physiological explanation is not the final story. In the first instance it is a logical fallacy to say that what is true of a part is also true of the whole. It is not denied that sensory motor activities do form a large measure of human activity. But such activities are only a very small part of human activities. The position taken by the behaviourists commits a category mistake in that they say what is workable in the field of sensory stimuli is also obtainable in the field of conceptualisation. The brain, no doubt, is a communicating organ, just like a machine. But, to equate the brain with mind is to ignore the hordes of experimental evidences gathered not only by psycho-analysts, but also by the researchers in the field of extra-sensory perceptions. It is also necessary to take into account that inspite of biological similarities and genetic sameness, there are differences in mental reactions and organisations. The painter's mind is definitely not that of a scientist. The tiller of the soil possesses a mind which is different from the cybernetician. The experiments with identical twins brought up in differing environments bear evidence to this. It is because we have a mind in addition to the brain that we are able to have pleasures and pains, are able to disagree and know that we are disagreeing and aim to bring about a certain amount of consensus. All these arguments may seem simple and naive. But they have to be met before we can make any generalisations with regard to the status of the brain.

From this position taken by the behaviourists, aided and abetted by mathematical logicians, it has been a very quick step to achieve a brain-like machine which is now challenging not only the existence of mind but also the very status of the human being. Now, it is being asserted that man is only like a machine, that he has no consciousness, no mind, no self, and that these are pseudo names for activities which are easily duplicatable by servomechanisms. It is also said that these terms can have no meaning apart from the language usages which are explainable in terms of input-output pattern of activity. Mental activity, it is claimed is observable overt behaviour and disposition, thus the existence of any unobservable inner mental states is denied. Unfortunately it seems that the denial of consciousness as a mental factor is only applicable to other people and never to oneself. For, it is not observing a way of being aware of some thing ? Observation is a 'private', 'mental' activity exclusive to the 'observer'. When two people attend to the same data and convey what they have perceived through language to the other, then the 'observation' of each becomes 'public'. That is, the word 'public' is a contrast word. It can have no meaning unless it is contrasted with 'private'. In fact the meaning of 'public' is only an extension of the meaning of 'private'. Therefore, to say that there can be no unobservable private mental thought is to deny the obvious.

Again, each of us is aware that we are aware and that we are 'conscious of'. No proof is required for this, since no proof is possible. No one can require a proof, for this is so fundamental that every one knows for himself when he is aware and that such awareness is different from any bodily happenings. For example, a man, who has cut his finger and is bleeding from it, is aware of the causal relation between the bleeding finger and the pain he has in that region.

I believe all these difficulties arise because of the use of language. Machines are constantly described in anthropomorphic language, just as we are used to describing the phenomena of Nature in an anthropomorphic manner. This situation begs the question 'Are machines conscious' ? Thus a machine is said to "take cognizance of information", "respond to stimuli", "search for optimum levels of existence", "discard discrepancies etc. To discuss all such linguistic forms of reference is impossible here. I shall just take one and discuss it. Similar arguments are possible for all forms of references. 'Taking cognizance of' means to be aware of something which is intelligible because the

impulses received have a significance for the receiving agent. If this is a human being he is aware that the impulses he is receiving are symbols of situation which, in its turn, has some significance for him. This is purely a human interpretation. Is the machine "cognisant" in the same manner? Do the symbols which are fed into the machine and processed by it have any significance for the machine? Is the machine aware that these are symbols referring to an object which has some meaning? I doubt very much. Signals, clues, stimuli are all words which have a meaning in the human context, for they suggest lines of inquiry and involve a recognition of their value in terms of solving a problem or achieving a goal. Thus it is due to habit that we apply such terms as "taking cognizance of" to machines and not because the situation involved is the same as that where the terms are applied to a human action.

There is yet another big hurdle to overcome before we can rest. It is said that the actions of machines can also be purposive. Purposiveness here is the goal-seeking activity. Psychologists are well aware of the raging battle between those who want to equate instinct with purpose and those who maintain that instinctual behaviour is not self-aware behaviour and hence not-purposive. The battle is now taken to the field of servo-mechanisms. It is claimed that all purposive activity reveals a basic form which can be reproduced by a machine. This basic form is the goal-seeking activity combined with an emotive equilibrium. Such a goal-seeking activity which results in the achievement of the target brings about a lessening of the tension and establishes an equilibrium. This is present in servomechanisms known as homeostats. This state of equilibrium and removal of tensions is achieved by a feedback of information to the source of control concerning the discrepancy between the goal-state and the previous-state. While all this is true, it is yet not possible to equate human goal-seeking with the machine's activity. The equilibrium that is established by the machine within itself is an equilibrium of electrical potentials and energy imbalances. While these imbalances are causes for human tensions there is more to it - in terms of mental strain, anxiety and states of depression and excitation. Every one of us is aware of these states. For example, the disequilibrium resulting from hunger can be restored to a balance in either of two ways. The person can die. Thus balance is indeed restored in the physical body. Or, the person can eat and still feel the pangs of hunger, which also produces a state of equilibrium and which, in its turn, produces a state of calmness and release from

tension. But which of them a man chooses depends on the circumstances and the motivations behind it. Indeed, as in the case of a hunger-striker, even without these two alternatives being resorted to, the man is able to achieve a sort of mental peace and remove tension when the objective for which he is fasting is achieved. The choice made between all these activities indicates the presence of a conscious intelligence. It does not matter to the machine whether the restoration of the energy potential equilibrium is achieved either by death or by eating. Nor is the machine aware of the consequences of its doings as man is.

The problem takes a more complicated appearance when we consider other purposive behaviours like the effort to escape danger, making up to a person in anticipation of rewards, and moral decisions which do not involve any personal gains. All these exhibit the indispensable evaluative function of conscious awareness which is the characteristic of mental activity. Such activities depend on the value a person sets upon achieving the goal. The word value is not used here, as in mathematics, meaning a numerical assessment which is a term most used in computer programming. Here value is used to mean a deliberate choice involving judgment, thinking and weighing up pros and cons. Such an activity of valuing different methods of response to a situation is not present in a machine. It is only when a goal-seeking activity is accompanied by such value-establishing deliberations that it can be called as purposive action. Till then it remains merely a target achievement and is comparable to the blind instinctual reactions of lower organisms. So to use the word 'purposive' for such actions is to use the term anthropomorphically. It is equivalent to saying "How happy the donkey is!".

The problem of consciousness in servo-mechanisms becomes acute when we take into account the so-called pereceptual activity of the mechanism. The machine is said to perceive just like a human being. I deliberately use the word 'human being' because, notwithstanding all recent researches, we do not yet know what 'perception' means at subhuman levels. It is claimed that since perception is only the differentiation of responses to differentiated stimuli and since this activity is found in mechanisms, they also perceive. But perception is not, surely, only this. Let us examine a case in point. We perceive an acquaintance, wearing different clothes, different hairstyles, adding make up of the face which is not the usual thing he does, and yet

recognise him as our acquaintance, it is not merely a response to a stimulus. It involves, doubt, assessment, awareness of what the person looked like before, an effort at comparison and then the final decision. It may be contended that this involves not just perception, but other activities such as comparison and deduction also. That is exactly my point too. Perception is never point to point reaction of stimulus and response. It is a complicated procedure where the mind is aware of many implications and complications. In addition to all this, except in very ordinary perception of tables and chairs, perception is accompanied by emotional overtones, such as joy at discovering a lost object or finding the results of an experiment take a successful shape before your eyes. Such emotional satisfactions or dissatisfactions, the biologists tell us, is the result of glandular activity in an organism composed of protein matter. A machine made of vacuum tubes diodes, and transistors, cannot be expected to have such reactions from perceptions. If this were so, then there would be no difference between a live matter and dead-matter.

Paul Weiss, the noted American phenomenologist, said that it is love that marks a man. We could make use of this pragmatically and ask can machines love ? On the other hand, if we never knew what we really mean by 'having feelings' we can never deny them to machines. We know the origins of the machine and we do not expect a combination of inanimate parts to possess human-like feelings. We have no hesitancy to attribute such feelings or lack of them to other human beings. Similarly while witnessing a play we are able to judge the quality of the acting by noting how close it is to the real thing. Thus, from all this we have to say that although machines are human-like at lower levels of activity, still they cannot replace thought or become consciousness. Nor can a machine make a mistake and show contribution. The machine can neither err nor forgive.

Several important questions arise from the claim that machines in the course of time can replace man. If this were so, whither biological evolution ? Will man become atrophied or extinct ? As against this we have the fact that no machine is known to programme itself or can have a purpose of its own. It is the purposes of the human intelligence that are achieved and the needs of the human community which serve as the in-put for the machine. Perhaps in the future these may be possible. But then the problem would have to be differently phrased

and asked. At the present level of knowledge, as long as there are recognised differences between an organism and inorganic matter and between conscious activities and unconscious imitations of them, we have to accept along with the upanishadic seer that man is more than body and mind. The Aitareya Upanishad (iii. 1. 2) gives a very instructive definition of consciousness which is very appropriate here. I quote "..... It is sentience, rulership, secular knowledge, presence of mind, retentiveness, sense-perception, fortitude, thinking, genius, mental-suffering, memory, ascertainment, resolution, life-activities, hankering, passion and such others-all these verily are the names of consciousness". It is only when these activities can be duplicated by the machines that consciousness or a thinking capacity can be claimed for them.

OTTO ON THE RATIONAL AND THE NON-RATIONAL ELEMENTS IN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

S. N. L. SHRIVASTAVA

I

The publication in the twenties of the present century of Dr. Rudolph Otto's *Das Heilige*, known in the English translation as *The Idea of the Holy*, has created a stir in religious thinking and orientated a new approach to religious experience, as perhaps no other book of contemporary times has done. It is a widespread opinion that the success of the book lies in its having vindicated in a powerful and unique manner the validity of religious experience against rationalistic attacks by showing the essentially non-rational nature of religious experience. While some think that this is the chief merit of the book, there have not been wanting critics who have criticised Otto for having given an account of religious experience slanting unduly towards the non-rational than towards the rational.

Prof. G. Dawes Hicks, for example, says :

"I am unable, then, to look upon Otto's attempt sharply to distinguish what is essentially characteristic of religious experience from the rational and the moral as any more satisfactory than other attempts of a similar kind have been..... Otto's way of taking the 'numinous' as purely non-rational and the rational as consisting merely of concepts, involves an abstraction which precludes him even from so much as indicating any middle term by which to bring them into union. Treat the 'numinous' as strictly non-rational, and it is simply incomprehensible how it could ever be clothed with the ideas of goodness, mercy and love."¹

Prof. H. J. Paton, in chapter 2 of his book, *The Modern Predicament*, subjects Otto's account of religious experience to a scathing criticism and attempts to bring out the contradictions inherent in that account. The central doctrine of Otto, as Prof. Paton puts it, is this "that non-rational numinous feeling is an essential element in religious experience and is part of its compelling power. By calling it 'numinous' he wishes to insist that it is not dependent on theoretical or moral concepts, but is something original and even primitive. The crux of his doctrine lies in the claim that by numinous feeling it is possible to apprehend

1. G. Dawes Hicks : "The Philosophical Bases of Theism", pp. 139-40.

both the existence and value of a corresponding numinous object.”² What baffles Prof. Paton is just this crux of Otto’s doctrine that numinous feeling can apprehend God. “The crucial question for philosophy” says Prof. Paton, “is the claim that by numinous feeling he [the religious man] is able to apprehend the existence of God. So far as divination is a feeling, or a source of feelings, we have to face the difficulty that no mere emotion can by itself give us knowledge of the existence of God.”³

The relation of the non-rational to the rational element in Otto’s account of religious experience is to Paton, as to other critics, precisely the most baffling aspect of it. Otto, on the one hand, Paton points out, speaks of “a unique original feeling-response”, the numinous feeling which is non-rational and non-conceptual, as the “real inmost core” of religion at all its levels; and on the other, he attempts to relate this numinous feeling to human reason. To quote Prof. Paton’s words :

“At times he speaks as if no intellectual justification of religious ‘intuition’ is possible; but he also wishes to show that it is at least not unreasonable to believe in a transcendent reality which is the object revealed to numinous feeling; and his account of the special faculty of divination and of its relation to human reason is partly directed towards this end. Hence the first question before us is this—Does he rest belief in God’s existence on reason or on divination ?”⁴

Prof. Paton pin-points the following chief difficulties in Otto’s exposition of the subject :—

1. Granted that there is a special and unique kind of religious feeling, which though having likeness to aesthetic rapture or moral exhaltation, is yet distinguishable from them, and may be termed “the faculty of divination”. The difficulty is to understand how this faculty of divination “although originating in feeling, is aware both of a transcendent reality and of its objective value, and is even able to grasp and appraise itself.”⁵

2. H. J. Paton : “The Modern Predicament, p. 133.

3. Ibid. p. 143.

4. Ibid. p. 141.

5. Ibid. p. 136.

2. The other difficulty which Paton has found in Otto's account is the latter's attempt to make the non-rational related to and permeated by the rational by resorting to the Kantian terminology of the *a priori*.

Paton is intrigued, as any reader of Otto is apt to be intrigued, by the latter's assumption, on the one hand, that the numinous feeling is a *feeling*, something distinctively non-rational and his insistence, on the other, that the numinous "is completely permeated and saturated with elements signifying rationality, purpose, personality, morality."

How is the permeation of the non-rational by the rational to be explained? To do this Otto follows or borrows the Kantian methodology of the *a priori* and schematization. The complex category of the Holy with its rational and non-rational elements is an *a priori* category, having its roots in the hidden depths of Spirit itself. This borrowing of terms from Kant, Paton holds, is inappropriate, in so far the concepts of *a priori* in Kant are totally different. There are two classes of the concept of *a priori* in Kant. One is that of the Ideas of Reason—Ideas with a capital 'I'. These are concepts of the absolute or unconditioned and as we can never experience anything absolute or unconditioned, Ideas by definition can have no object in experience. Of the other class of the *a priori* are the "categories of the understanding" which apply only to objects of spatial and temporal experience and therefore no category can be predicated of God.

"Otto" says Paton, "lumps together Ideas and Categories—he uses the words interchangeably—and assumes (by twisting the meaning of both) that the category or the Idea of "the holy" can give us knowledge of an object which transcends ordinary experience altogether."⁶

II

I have cited above two critics of Otto's exposition of the nature of religious experience who have attempted to point out what they consider to be the weak-points or short-comings in Otto's treatment of the subject. The chief defect in Otto's exposition, according to G. Dawes Hicks, is his characterization of religious experience as purely and essentially non-rational, something sharply distinguished from the rational and the moral. Paton also notices a similar emphasis in

6. Ibid. p. 139.

Otto's exposition and wonders how a feeling as such, however exalted and unique it may be, can give us a *knowledge* of the existence of God and could enable us to apply rational attributes to God. Paton's further complaint is this that Otto's attempt to bridge the gulf between the non-rational and the rational or to synthesise the two by the appraisal of the Holy as a complex *a priori* category, after the Kantian fashion, is a misapplication of the Kantian technique.

Let us see how far these criticisms are justified. Otto does indeed give prominence to what he calls the 'non-rational' elements in religious experience, but what precisely he means by the non-rational must be clearly borne in mind if we are to understand his position aright. It is of the highest importance to remember that he does not mean by the non-rational the infra-rational or something so opaque to reason that it could never be articulated through rational concepts. This he has made clear beyond a doubt. Even the mystic's 'ineffable', he tells us, "does not really mean to imply that absolutely nothing can be asserted of the object of the religious consciousness : otherwise, Mysticism could exist only in unbroken silence, whereas what has generally been a characteristic of the mystics is their copious eloquence."⁷ He is definitely inclined to "count this the very mark and criterion of a religion's high rank and superior value that it should have no lack of *conceptions* about God ; that it should admit knowledge — the knowledge that comes by faith of the transcendent in terms of conceptual thought....".⁸ What, then, does he mean by the non-rational ? By the non-rational he means the supra-rational. When Otto says that the elements of religious or numinous experience are non-rational, he does not mean to say that these elements cannot be articulated through rational concepts, but this that even when done so, they would immeasurably be exceeding our human restrictions and limitations; they would carry with them an overplus of meaning. For want of any other word available for the purpose Otto, it appears, was obliged to use the word *feeling* to indicate the complex and unusual mode of knowing peculiar to religious experience. That Otto never regarded his numinous feeling as *feeling*, pure and simple, is also clear from the way in which he differentiates his own position from that of Schleiermacher. After explaining Schleiermacher's description of religious experience in terms of 'intuitions' and 'feelings' (*Anschauungen* and *Gefühle*), Otto adds this

7. Rudolph Otto : "The Idea of the Holy", p. 2.
8. Ibid. p. 1.

significant remark : "and for all Schleiermacher's aversion to the word in this connexion they must certainly be termed *cognitions*, modes of *knowing*, though, of course, not the product of reflection, but the intuitive outcome of feeling. Their import is the glimpse of an Eternal, in and beyond the temporal and penetrating it, the apprehension of a ground and meaning of things in and beyond the empirical and transcending it."⁹

Granting, therefore, the possibility of religious experience being expressed in rational terms, Otto asks us "to be on our guard against an error which would lead to a wrong and one-sided interpretation of religion. This is the view that the essence of deity can be given completely and exhaustively in such 'rational' attributes as have been referred to above and in others like them."¹⁰

A word may finally be said about Professor Paton's objection to Otto's borrowing of the *apriori* terminology of Kant and his twisting its meaning in his religious context. It is, of course, obvious and indisputable that Otto has pressed into service the Kantian terminology of the *apriori* — even if we say he has 'borrowed' it, it is no discredit to him — but he has extended (not *twisted*) the meaning and the application of the *apriori* beyond the Kantian ranges. All honour to Kant for having brought to light the role of the *apriori* in the mechanism of knowledge, but his *apriori* — the Ideas of Reason and the Categories of the Understanding — has its drive and roots in 'thinking' whereas Otto's *apriori* category of the Holy has its drive and roots in the Spirit itself. It is not the huddling together of the Kantian Ideas of Reason and the categories of the Understanding, but a higher *apriori* of a higher range of experience, experience *ne plus ultra*, — the mystical experience.

Why should Professor Paton, with all due deference to his vast erudition in Kant, deny the possibility of a higher *apriori* than those pointed to by Kant ? The Ideas of Reason may simply leave us with a purely speculative vindication of the absolute or the unconditioned and present no corresponding object; but spiritual illumination does present the object. In pointing to the reality and the role of the higher *apriori*, the *apriori* of spiritual experience, applicable, as the Kantian

9. Ibid. p. 151.

10. Ibid. p. 2.

categories of the Understanding are not, to a reality transcending all that is known and all that is not yet known but might be known in future in the world of space and time (*viditat adhi aviditadadhi*, as the Upanishads have put it), Otto has broken a new ground in the field of the epistemology of the religious or mystical experience.

FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY

S. H. DIVATIA

One of the problems of present philosophy that worries me constantly is the problem of 'freedom and democracy'. We nowadays are strongly aware that while anti-democratic system have an elaborate system of philosophy (e.g. present communist Governments have got dialectical materialism behind them) democracy has none. Certain vague floating concepts have passed for values like liberty, equality and fraternity. But, what do they signify ?

Concept of freedom is regarded as the chief value of democracy, but what is freedom ? The minimum meaning is 'freedom' from constraint. But freedom, we feel, ought to be positive and not negative.

We find that there are various senses of the word freedom viz;

(1) freedom from (2) freedom to (3) freedom for and (4). freedom with.

(a) *Freedom from* :—When some constraint is lifted, we say that we are freed e.g. *freedom from slavery*.

(b) *Freedom to* :—It is the power to act in a particular way, say, freedom to drink and we complain that prohibition has prevented us from achieving this freedom. Most of our fundamental rights stress this e.g. right to work.

(c) *Freedom for* :—It is the power to commit oneself to an ideal e.g. in a socialist society men will be freed for a leisured civilised life.

(d) *Freedom with* :—Man is a part of a wider whole and no human being can be really free unless others are free also, and a harmony of liberated selves is achieved.

We see then, that starting from 'freedom from' and ending in 'freedom with' we are passing from an empirical concept of freedom to idealistic conception. When we view 'freedom' in this broad aspect, we feel that the linguistic analysis of the freedom of the will is unsatisfactory. My complaint against the linguistic analysis of the freedom of the will is that (1) they have insufficiently analysed the word 'free' and have failed to notice the last two types of freedom human beings want, namely 'freedom for' and 'freedom with'. The linguistic philosophers have also not viewed that problem in a proper perspective. Locke himself realised this when he said, 'Don't ask whether the will is free'. The answer to the latter cannot be given till we have some sort of a

world-view of man's relations with the cosmos. But this would be to give some sort of a metaphysical answer; by their self-denying ordinance of refusal to connect language with reality, the linguistic solution to the problem of the freedom of the will is bound to be a narrow one.

Ayer and others have said that since our actions are causes as well as effects so the reign of causation does not affect the question of the freedom of the will. But a reflective hard-headed philosopher will insist on saying that the analysis should be pushed further and that it should not stop at desires and volitions. 'What made me desire this rather than that?' is a significant question. Psychoanalysts have shown that our desires are due to unconscious motives. We did not choose our character, nor did we choose the thousand and one hereditary and environmental factors that shaped our character. Also we cannot choose our own parents or our country. If we reflect enough, democracy gives us freedom in a very limited sense and this truncated freedom is not enough for ethics. C. D. Broad has rightly pointed out that what is wanted is 'categorical substitutability' meaning that if I had done Y instead of X there must be a clear sense in which one can say that I could have chosen X instead of Y if I had wanted so to choose. And this must not be qualified by conditional clauses. We require, in other words, not only that the agent was not coerced or constrained but also that he could have chosen otherwise than he actually did and this does not merely mean that he could have done such a thing and that such a thing had happened.

But, there is a real conflict here. The reflective philosopher is painfully aware, as C. D. Broad himself is aware, that this is to ask for the impossible. Hence one is forced to conclude that if we analyse the word 'free' in all its various uses, the philosophically important sense of freedom viz; categorical substitutability i.e. freedom from constraining conditions is left out. Hence the need of regarding freedom of the will as a postulate.

My point is this :—The conflict shown above at the philosophical level about 'freedom of the will' is reflected in the 'freedom' that is chosen as a value in philosophy of democracy.

The linguistic philosopher will say at the outset that what is the essence of Democracy is a wrong question to ask. Instead we might ask, 'what are the different democratic systems ?

One good result of two world wars resulting in the triumph of democracy is, that democracy is universally accepted these days. Even those who have totalitarian regimes pay lip-service to democracy. Phrases, like 'Guided Democracy' 'New Democracy' are always found to be in use. The difference between genuine democracies lies, of course, in the concept of freedom.

A Political Science student will say along with Mayo's 'Introduction to Democratic theory' that "we need not get bogged down in a tiresome discussion about free-will and determinism.

Our problem is coercion and not philosophical determinism. But, as I have pointed out at the beginning, we, as philosophers, have to make up our minds about the controversy of freedom and determinism.

There is a minimum of democracy, viz; freedom from coercion, and there is a maximum of democracy, viz; 'freedom with' i. e. no human being is really free unless others are free as well.

So we come to the question "what is the meaning of freedom that is required in Democracy". Definitions can be very misleading. Definition of democracy is given as rule by the people, of the people and for the people. But Government will always be of 'the masses by classes' as Bernard Shaw puts it. Democracy cannot mean just Government by the people as all the people cannot take part in the Government except in the case of direct democracy. Democracy is mainly freedom for the people.

The point is that democracy is defined with an apologetic air, e. g. it is customary to say "Democracy is commonly taken to mean Government by the people but of course true democracy is.....and then follows the rest of the unique persuasive definition e. g. the qualifications may take the form of a plea for economic equality.

Thus the qualifications are references to values. The extreme pragmatist would have us believe that Democracy is value-free, but it is very doubtful whether any system of organization is value-free. If we ignore values, values may go 'underground' as it were and then—"good-bye to all rational analyses'.

So, we have to consider value. The values for democracy are contained in the classic phrase of liberty, equality and fraternity.

In "Freedom to" we have right to vote (Universal suffrage), the last named is indispensable to a democratic system.

Most of our fundamental rights come under this category, but not all such freedom can be granted, e. g. freedom to make slaves or freedom to kill anyone whom we dislike and so on.

But what is not so evident is the freedom to do our duty. Many political writers deny this, e. g. Henry Mayo in his 'Introduction to Democratic Theory' says, Such a doctrine of freedom can easily turn into the dangerous belief that we are free only when we obey the laws, and thus we have Hegel's talk about "*Compulsory rational freedom*" and "*true freedom meaning true necessity.*" Mayo concludes that "this is a semantic trick that muddy the channels of communication".

But as opposed to this, we have the view of Gandhiji that while the emphasis in the West is on fundamental rights, our civilization has always put duty first, i. e. duty takes precedence over rights and if this is not accepted, then at least Rights and Duties should be treated as correlation concepts. Without duties rights are not worth the paper on which they are written. Of course, this does not mean that State should have complete overriding power. We must emphasize 'duties' without going over to totalitarianism. The important point is where to draw the line between state interference and non-interference. (As Prof. Wisdom puts it "when to draw the line' is a phrase of great metaphysical power'). Man is a finite-infinite being and he can have no lasting satisfaction in anything but spiritual development.

Next we come to 'freedom for'. It is the power to comit oneself to an Ideal. e. g. in a Socialist Society men will be free for a 'leisured civilized life'. It is embodied in the classic phrase 'Democracy for the people' and not democracy of the people and by the people which are impracticable.

A belief in democracy commits us to the values of fraternity, equality of opportunity, and liberty. Without these values democracy will be an "emotive noise", as Prof. C. D. Broad puts it, and ultimately all these values come under the concept of common good.

Besides these classic values of democracy, there requires to be emphasized freedom for subordinate groups within a nation. Till we have this, we do not have a proper democracy. This is the main difference between true democracies and "democracies" of Communist

Government. All genuine democratic governments should not interfere with religious communities, with trade unions, cultural organizations etc. (In classical phrase this means that the State is an 'organism of all organisms'). But what about such crucial questions as 'should there be freedom of speech granted to newspapers in war-time?', 'Should we tolerate those organizations which advocate violent seizure of power' etc. It is easy to talk about freedom when everything is peaceful and smooth, but it is difficult to grant this "freedom for subordinate groups" in times of crisis. But surely, this is a test case for democracies. I feel that democracies should grant this type of freedom with some precautions.

Russian and some totalitarian states refuse to grant this type of freedom, since they believe that this freedom interferes with our loyalty to the state. But, if we want to preserve freedom we must grant this. Of course, each issue of freedom should be judged by its own merits. As Aristotle puts it 'Decision lies with perception'. There should be no sharp distinction between 'freedom' and 'no freedom', but we should recognize that freedom admits of degrees and, more or less, freedom must be given to subordinate groups. In the classic phrase state is an organism of all organisms and parts have a life of their own.

Then we come to 'freedom' for individual's as such. This also is not adequately recognized. Persons like Bertrand Russell have suffered because their views on marriage are unorthodox. Of course, no individual apart from society has a right of his own. But as citizen he has rights of thought speech and action. This is denied to Shaikh Abdullah who is imprisoned because his views are not in harmony with the Government.

Lastly, we have 'freedom with'. Here the concept of freedom verges on the metaphysical plane, e.g. no man should be considered free if others are not free as well or institutions are not free. The word 'fraternity' is relevant here. There can be no genuine fraternity without 'freedom with'.

Many political philosophers have not come as far as this ideal of freedom because this freedom involves consideration of Man's relationship with the cosmos.

This means a metaphysical investigation and linguistic philosophers are allergic to metaphysics, so this important sense of freedom is ignored by them.

Freedom which diminishes the freedom of others is undesirable. We want the "lowest" persons treated on par with the "highest" in this kind of freedom. It is freedom which recognizes and maintains man as man. It preserves the dignity of man and this alone makes democracy worthwhile.

In this paper I have tried to deal with one value of 'Democracy' viz; freedom. I have tried to analyse the different meanings of freedom and how they are relevant to democracy. In a sense, this theme is very much topical and most urgent because we are surrounded by undemocratic States and in order to preserve democracy we must understand its true worth.

NEO-SCHOLASTIC REFLECTION ON KANT

J. de MARNEFFE S. J.

1. Introduction

The interest in Kant's Philosophy and especially in Kant's *Analytic* is not only lasting but seems even to know a revival. Recently Jonathan Bennett wrote a commentary on *Kant's Analytic* (Cambridge University Press, 1966). Recently too P. F. Strawson published his book : *The Bounds of Sense : as Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (London, Methuen, 1966). We know that Strawson's book *Individuals* (Methuen, 1959) was an essay in 'Descriptive Metaphysics', and according to him Aristotle and Kant are descriptive metaphysicians. Thus there is an influence of Kant in contemporary analytic thought and this influence seems to increase rather than to diminish.

Yet notwithstanding everying is approval and praise of Kant in contemporary studies on him. Besides the exposition of his views, one finds trenchant criticism of them in several recent articles, such as the one of W. J. Walsh on "Kant" in *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, edited by Paul Edwards and published this year by Macmillan. The article on "Categories" by M. Thompson in the same Encyclopaedia discusses also and criticizes Kant's deduction of the categories.

2. The Analytic of Concepts

Kantian studies have put the emphasis at various times on various works of Kant. Yet, I think that, for those interested in defending any form of metaphysics, it is the objections levelled against all forms of metaphysics in *The Critique of Pure Reason* which make Kant an ever challenging figure in the realm of philosophy. These objections rest on the standpoint taken by Kant in his transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Kant himself has stressed the importance of this part of his work. In the Preface to the first edition he wrote : "I know of no enquiries which are more important for exploring the faculty which we entitle understanding, and for determining the rules and limits of its employment, than those which I have instituted in the second chapter of the Transcendental Analytic under the title "Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding."¹

1. We quote from Norman Kemp Smith's translation, 2nd impression with corrections, reprinted 1961. With him too we use the letter A and B to refer to the first or second edition of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason". The present quotation is from A xvi.

We cannot attempt here to give even a summary of Kant's exposition. It is also too well known. We shall only recall its main elements and then pass on to the exploration of its context.

Kant considers that, besides what is given to our senses and the *a priori* forms of space and time, scientific knowledge involves us in the use of judgments. These, as principles of unity, unify concepts, but in their turn, they require a higher principle of unity. The "I think" is the highest principle of that unity¹. The concepts unified by judgments may be many and of different kinds; but what Kant is anxious here to discover is the group of concepts which are inevitably involved in scientific thinking. These he calls the Categories.

Actually one does not understand well how, according to Kant the categories determine the unity of apperception until one passes from the analytic of concepts to the analytic of principles. Here Kant explains how the imagination connects the categories with the intuitions of sensibility through the various schemata of number, degree, permanence, succession, co-existence, agreement with the condition of time, and that simply, or for a time, or for all times². Further still, the chapter on "The System of all Principles of Pure Understanding"³ brings more light on the way in which Kant understood his categories and employed them, especially when he explains the "Analogies of Experience"⁴. Let us explore now the context of the Analytic of Concepts in order to judge better its validity.

3. The Context of the Analytic of Concepts

What are then the presuppositions which are at the basis of Kant's deduction? We may say, I think, that Kant started his *Critique* with a double conviction: first, that Mathematics and Natural Sciences are sure and certain knowledge, are governed by necessity and obtain universal validity⁵. Secondly, Metaphysics, on the contrary, remains always uncertain and this appears from the conflict of the various systems⁶.

1. B. 135.
2. B. 182-4.
3. B. 187 ff.
4. B. 224 ff.
5. Cf. Preface to the 2nd ed., B. xiv, xvi, etc.
6. Cf. Preface to the 1st ed., A vii ff.

Kant then thought that his task was to find out what gives that certainty to natural science and to explore whether it could even be extended to metaphysical knowledge. On the one hand, he accepted the empiricism of Locke to the extent that he too held that nothing which was not derived from experience could be sure. On the other hand, he accepted the critical attitude of Hume which held that no universal knowledge could be derived from the given as such. From where then came the universal validity of natural science? Kant then set about searching into the conditions of scientific knowledge, not by the means of hypotheses which he would try to verify by experience, because it was the conditions of experience itself which he wanted to investigate, but by means of his transcendental method, which tries to find out directly what is involved in the very knowledge which we possess.

This method led him to the discovery of the *apriori* in our knowledge, both at the level of sensibility and of understanding. The *apriori* of intellectual knowledge does not presuppose only a transcendental subject, but also some determinations of this subject. These determinations are precisely the categories.

The normal conclusion of such a procedure is that the categories are part and parcel of scientific knowledge; to use them independently of the given in sensible experience for metaphysical knowledge, is to use them out of context, and thus illegitimately. Here Kant presupposes that metaphysics moves "in a realm beyond the world of sense"¹ distinct from "the field of appearances."² One could question this presupposition, but when one discusses the conclusion of Kant, one must not forget that this is what metaphysics meant for him, *viz.* the study of what lies beyond the field of appearances, while in fact the world of appearance might also be the object of metaphysics. But let us not anticipate the criticism of Kant's views. Rather let me introduce the Neo-Scholastic reaction to Kant.

4. Neo-Scholastic Reflection on Kant

Neo-Scholasticism could not, of course, remain indifferent to Kant's denial of the possibility of Metaphysics. Among the many Scholastic philosophers who examined Kant's objections and tried to answer them, I would single out two names only, on account of the thoroughness of their inquiry and the extensive presentation which

1. B 6.

2. B 7.

they have made of their own views. These two philosophers are Joseph Marechal of Louvain and the Canadian, Bernard Lonergan, a professor of the Gregorian University in Rome. Joseph Marechal wrote the main part of his studies on Kant between the two world-wars. Bernard Lonergan published his book : *Insight, A Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1957) after the 2nd world-war, and his 2nd edition has already known many reprints within the past few years. Both of them tried to see what is valid in Kant and to go beyond him. I shall present here, in my own way, some of their ideas on Kant, making only occasional reference to their names.

5. With Kant

How far is Neo-Scholasticism ready to go with Kant ? First of all, Kant's emphasis on certainty rather than on comprehensiveness of knowledge is to be praised very much. In this, he is surely a precursor of the modern analysts. Hume, before Kant, had taken a critical attitude; but he had failed to find the way out of scepticism. The solution of Kant still implies a partial scepticism, but his merit is to have tried to explain why and how what is certain is certain. His use of the distinction of the question of fact (*quid facti*) and the question of right (*quid iuris*) in epistemology is important. We do have knowledge and even various types of knowledge. The point is to sort them out and discern the value of each type.

The discovery and use of the transcendental method is another merit of Kant. For, once we discern that the universality of knowledge is not to be sought on the side of the object, since it presents itself with particularity, it remains that the subject should be the source of such universality. Kant, then, began to investigate what is at work in our various forms of knowledge.

Since what is at work transcends the particular experiences in which its influence is felt, the method which discovers it, is called the transcendental method. One does not see why such form of investigation should not be valid and useful.

Kant thus discovered that there is some *apriori* in our modes of knowing. The objection which suggests itself against all forms of *apriori* in knowledge, is that the *apriori* seems to cancel the objectivity of knowledge. The objection is not decisive; for nothing prevents the

apriori to be precisely the tool or the means of attaining knolwedge. It is not because our eyes belong to us and are *apriori* to our particular acts of seeing that they are not really leading us to the vision of things. Thus space and time are really, I think, the condition under which our external senses and our internal sense are working. There is also in us a subject which is the *apriori* centre of all our activities. Some of our activities too are so differentiated that they demand the presence within us of powers which account for their diversity. I am thinking for instance of the basic differences which exist between all our acts of knowing, on the one hand, and our acts of willing on the other. It is not simply the objects which command the diversity of the acts but some different powers or faculties within us. It would be too long to pursue this analysis, but I believe that Kant rightly discerned the *apriori* which govern these various forms of activity.

6. Beyond Kant

Not content to go a part of the way with Kant, is Neo-Scholasticism ready to go beyond Kant? And, on the basis of what it accepts of Kant, how does Neo-Scholasticism try to vindicate again the validity of Metaphysics? First of all, Neo-Scholasticism would disagree with Kant when he limits the field of metaphysics to that which is beyond the world of appearances. Everything, it would say, even the appearances belong to metaphysics. The field of positive science must be determined, not by setting apart certain objects which metaphysics could not consider, but by taking certain objects which may also fall within the realm of metaphysics and considering them from a point of view which differs from the point of view of metaphysics. Positive Sciences consider beings which appear as they appear; metaphysics considers all beings, and appearances too, in terms of being.

In spite of Kant's denial, is there then any synthetic *apriori* proposition of a metaphysical character? Neo-Scholasticism is ready to admit with Kant, as I said previously, that there is an *apriori* in our knowledge. Thus, it admits the validity of some synthetic *apriori* propositions which are the expression of these *apriori* elements of our knowledge. Kant thought that these propositions could give objective knowledge only if they were connected with sensible intuition, which alone, according to him, links us with reality. But could there not be something else in us which keeps us in contact with reality?

Frederick Copleston S. J., while explaining Kant's position, in his *History of Philosophy*, writes : "It is possible to allow that there are synthetic *a priori* propositions and at the same time to hold that there is an intellectual intuition which grounds such propositions.... When I speak about synthetic *a priori* propositions I am thinking, not of propositions of pure mathematics, but of metaphysical principles, such as the principle that everything which comes into being has a cause. And by intuition I do not mean a direct apprehension of spiritual realities, such as God, but an intuitive apprehension of being, implied in the existential judgment concerning the concrete object of sense-perception. In other words, if the mind can discern, in dependence on sense-perception, the objective, intelligible structure of being, it can enunciate synthetic *a priori* propositions which have objective validity for things in themselves."¹

While here Copleston merely hints at a possible solution, Marechal had made this point the particular object of his inquiry in his book on *The Starting Point of Metaphysics*.² He writes in the first volume of that work: "Our intention is not to examine the theory of knowledge in all its aspects, but to concentrate our efforts on the fundamental problem... We could formulate this problem provisionally thus: Metaphysics, if it is possible, has necessarily its starting point in some absolute objective affirmation: do we meet such an affirmation in the content of our consciousness and do we find it surrounded by all the guarantees which the most exacting Critique requires ?"³ The *a priori*, insufficiently exploited by Kant, according to Marechal, is the very dynamism of the intellect exercising itself in all our judgments. This dynamism is the basis of our metaphysical knowledge of certain, and not only problematic, noumena.

Kant himself has written: "I have never been able to accept the interpretation which logicians give of judgment in general. It is, they declare, the representation of a relation between two concepts...."⁴ Kant then goes on to say: "I find that a judgment is nothing but the manner in which given modes of knowledge are brought to the objective unity of apperception."⁵ It is this, but it is also more than this.

1. Vol. VI : Wolff to Kant, London, Burns and Oates, 1960, pp. 275-6.
2. 'Le point de départ de la Metaphysique' 5 volumes, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1923-1947.
3. Vol. I, 2nd ed., 1943, p. 11.
4. B 140.
5. B 141.

Marechal claims that there is always also a reference to the real as it is in itself and not only as it appears, and that in function of the very *a priori* dynamism of the intellect towards being. Here Marechal follows Fichte who pointed out that Kant had not emphasized enough the active and outgoing element of knowledge. Metaphysics can have *a priori* synthetic propositions based on the transcendental analysis of this necessary condition of all knowledge, without however falling into the idealism of Fichte who did not give sufficient attention to the passivity implied in our knowledge and rightly acknowledged by Kant.

Bernard Lonergan pursued the idea of Marechal. He examined understanding especially as it works in scientific and metaphysical inquiries. Like Marechal, Lonergan finds the ground of synthetic *a priori* knowledge in the dynamism of the intellect. From this broader outlook a much more flexible conception of the categories become possible.¹ "To know, for Lonergan, means to know being, and to know being includes knowing objects and subjects."² This is far more than the Kantian category of reality which means "that which corresponds to a sensation in general,"³ or "that....the concept of which in itself points to being (in time)."⁴ It is also something more than "the positing of a thing."⁵ Being is the object of the unrestricted desire to know. Being "refers to all that can be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation."⁶ And this may be much more than being simply posited as an effect is posited out of its causes.

7. The Resulting Position concerning Metaphysics

If the efforts made by Marechal, Lonergan and others are not vain but valid, it appears that there are other categories than those vindicated by Kant, namely metaphysical categories which may be broader in their field of application than the Kantian categories. The category of substance may not stand, then, only for what is permanently given in sensibility, but for any principle which sustains accidents. The category of cause may not be limited, then, to being a phenomenon connected with another phenomenon in an irreversible way. It may be a source

1. 'Insight' Chapter 11, Sect. 10: "Contrast with Kantian Analysis," pp. 339-42.
2. 'Ibid', p. 340.
3. B. 182.
4. Ibid.
5. B. 626.
6. 'Insight' p. 360.

of being which itself does not belong to the phenomenal order. If one justifies these categories by a method similar to the transcendental method, one may claim, then, not only to have gone along "with Kant", but also on "beyond Kant."

Actually Kant himself had admitted that there is a great variety in our concepts and categories. Certain criticisms of Kant reproach him for not having seen that there are other categories than those presented in his *Analytic*. Kant admitted that there are other categories, such as those derived *a posteriori* from the content of experience. His effort has been to discover the categories involved in scientific thinking, and such an effort does not seem to me to have been quite unsuccessful : we seem really to use these basic concepts when we use the language of science. Kant's shortcoming is to have passed on from this to some agnostic views in metaphysics. I have indicated that this came from an incomplete exploration of the elements involved in the activity of thought. If he meant that we should not use the categories of science just as they are used by science in some other field of knowledge, we are ready to accept his view. But his sweeping assertions that all sure knowledge is limited to the field of science does not seem acceptable, especially when one sees that by the very use of the Kantian method one can discover the ground of some higher but also sure knowledge.

What we have said so far allows us perhaps to touch, in conclusion, upon a question which may trouble the mind of the would-be metaphysician. He may wonder whether he is allowed to begin the work of metaphysics, before language analysis has completed the task of sorting out our categories. I would answer briefly that a metaphysics which inspires itself of the Kantian transcendental method, need not wait for the task of analysis to be completed, for metaphysics is not made of concepts which are picked out from the mass of all possible concepts. It is made of the concepts which are involved in the necessary experience of thought and discovered to be at work in this experience of thought. They are thus as necessary and as valid as objective thought itself. And this was the criterion which Kant himself set for critical validity. We may thus begin metaphysics from such an elementary experience and what it reveals.

DREAMS IN JAINA PSYCHOLOGY

T. G. KALGHATGI

I. Dreams are universal, natural, and necessary. But they have been a mystery to man. For centuries, attempts have been made to unravel the mysteries of the operations of mind during dreams. The primitive man believed in dreams as referring to realities, as he thought that his soul is detachable from body in sleep. In classical literature we find that Gods made use of dreams for communicating with men. When the Greek Army was smitten by a pestilence, Achilles suggested to seek guidance from dreams as 'dreams descend from Zeus'.

In modern times there are many theories of dreams, popular and scientific; Physiological theory of dreams, Reminiscence theories and Premonitions theories are important. Psycho-analysis has attempted to throw a flood of light on dream analysis as wish-fulfillment and dreams as archetypal on the basis of depth psychology.

II. In ancient India study of dreams was recognised as an important science. They called it *Swapna Sastra*. The science of dreams has been described in *Matsyapurana* and *Agnipurana*. References to science of dreams also occur in *Lalitavistara*. It is said that Budhisattva distinguished himself in the science of dreams. There was a class of people whose vocation seems to have been the interpretation of dreams styled as "Svapnadvayai pathaka".¹ And in ancient Jaina literature we get ample evidence for the analysis and interpretations of dreams. There were experts who were adept in interpreting dreams. They (Suvina padhaga or Suvina Lakkhana padhaga) were respected by all men including the king. Once a beggar dreamt that he swallowed the moon and an expert interpreted that he would be a king.² When Ksatriyani Trisala devi, the mother of Vardhamana Mahavira, the twenty fourth Tirthankar got fourteen dreams, king Siddharth called the instructor of the signs of dreams who knew the great science and listened to his interpretations.³ At that time there was a general belief that the mothers of Tirthankaras or Cakrvartins, Vasudevas, Baladevas and Mandalikas got fourteen, seven, four and one of the following great dreams just after the birth of embryo in their wombs viz. elephant, bull, lion, consecration of Lakshmi, flower-garland, the moon,

1. 'Lalitavistara' sh. 6 and 12.

2. 'Abhidhana Rajendra.' Vol. VII, pp. 1009

3. Sraman Bhagavana Mahavira. Vol. II, Part I, Ch. 3.

the sun, flag, water, jar (kumbha), lotus-lake, sea, heavenly palace, heap of gems and burning fire.⁴

This account of the fourteen great dreams is also corroborated by the evidence of the *Kalpa Sutra*⁵ which also gives the same list of fourteen dreams.

According to the 'Svetambara tradition there are fourteen great dreams, but the Digambaras⁶ mention sixteen great dreams by adding two more objects, viz. a royal seat marked with a lion's head (Simhasana), and a palace of snakes or of the king of snakes (Nagabhavana)⁷. Queen Prabhavati Devi of Hastinapur saw a beautiful lion in a dream and experts in interpreting dreams said that the queen would give birth to a son who would later become a king or a monk.⁸ In the *Kalpa Sutra* it is stated the mother of Mahavira, the twenty fourth Tirthankar dreamt fourteen great dreams.⁹ This story reminds us of the birth of Gautam the Buddha in the womb of his mother, Maya by entering into it in the form of a white elephant.¹⁰ King Pesanandi took precautions to avert the efforts of his sixteen bad dreams, as the Brahmanas indicated that great dangers would befall his kingdom.¹¹

III. In the *Bhagavati Sutra*¹² the principle of dream has been explained by mentioning five kinds of dreams : (i) yathatathyā : dream-vision in accordance with truth or reality : (ii) cintasvapna : dream based on mental construction on the basis of experiences in the waking state. These two types agree with the theories presented by Adler and Jung, "as they are the results of the process of thought to deal with the present and future problems of life.¹³ (iii) Pratana : is ramified dream vision.

4. 'Bhs,' 16, 6, 579.

5. 'Kalpa Sutra 4.

6. See 'Mahapurana' of Puspadanta Vol. I, Notes III, 5 pp. 40-41; 600-601; See also Skt. 'Mahapurana, First part-twelfth parva. LL. 148-152.

(Gajendramavadasatanga.... Jvalanam, prajvaladdyutim" (151), Drstvaitan sodasa-svapnan athadarsam mahipate.... (152).

7. Dr. Jogendra Chandra Sikdar : 'Studies in the Bhagavati 'Sutra' (Prakrt) Jaina Institute Research Publication Series I. 1964 pp. 197.

8. Ibid 11-428.

9. 'Kalpa Sutra pp. 66-87.

10. 'Nidana Kath I.

11. Mahasupina Jataka. I. 77.

12. 'Bhagavati Sutra' 16.6 578-81.

13. Studies in the 'Bhagavati Sutra' : pp. 583.

(iv) Tadviparita gives the dream image opposite to reality. (v) Indistinct and imprecise dream vision.

These are associated with some desires repressed by thought and appear in disguised form. In this sense the analysis of the three types mentioned here may be compared to the Freudian analysis of dreams as wish-fulfillment expressing the repressed wishes in disguised form.

These broad principles of dreams as embodied in the *Bhagavati Sutra* touch upon all the combined theories on dream, propounded by Freud, Jung, Adler and other scholars. According to Freud dream is the fulfilment of the repressed desires which do not leave the organism but sink to a level of unconscious state in which they are still active and apt to appear in disguised and symbolic ways. Abnormal worry, queer idea, hysterical paralysis, or blindness etc. sometimes are the effects of this disguise. In the case of a normal man a dream is the main venue of repressed desires which do not present themselves even in dreams in their true shape and colour but come up to in garb of an innocent looking symbolism. So all dreams, whether adult or child, are the fulfilments of repressed desires.¹⁴

The *Svapna-sastra* mentions seventy two dreams—forty two ordinary dreams and twenty great dreams. The mother of Arhat or Cakravartin wakes up after seeing fourteen great dreams. The mother Vasudeva sees seven out of these fourteen dreams, the mother of Baladeva sees four and the mother of Mandalika sees one.¹⁵

IV. The etiology and the effects of dream vision have been the factors of dream analysis in ancient Jaina literature.

People have dreams in any of the nine ways. 1. They see, in a dream, things experienced. 2. They see things heard of. 3. They see things seen in a wakeful state. 4. They see dreams produced by a disease of Vata (Wind), Pitta, (Bile) and Kapha, (Phlegm), in a body. 5. They see dreams without any visible cause. 6. They see dreams caused by a series of anxieties. 7. They see dreams under the influence of a God. 8. They see dreams caused by the brilliancy of their religious actions, and 9. They see dreams caused by the excess of their evil actions.

Out of these kinds of dreams, the first six, either good or bad, are fruitless. The last three bear good or evil fruits.

14. Dr. J. C. Sikdar : "Some aspects of Jaina Psychology as revealed in the *Bhagavati Sutra*" (1965) pp. 80-81.

The dream, seen during the four Yamas (periods of three hours) of night gives fruit during twelve months, six months, three months and one month respectively.

The dream seen during the last two Ghatikas (period of forty-eight minutes) of the night, positively gives fruit during ten days; and the dream seen at the rising time of the Sun, assuredly gives fruit immediately.

A series of dreams seen continuously one after the other, a dream seen during day time, a dream caused by mental affliction or bodily pain, and a dream caused by suppressing the desire to defecate or to urinate are all fruitless.

The dream occurring to a man, who is devoted to his religion, who has humours of his body well-balanced, who is steady-minded, who has subdued his senses, and who is compassionate, mostly accomplishes his desired object.

The one who sees in a dream decorated article, a horse, an elephant and a white bull, attains glory.¹⁶

Avasyaka Curni refers to the dream of an ascetic in which a stranger drank milk kept in a bowl. It was interpreted that some one would come to him for learning.¹⁷ If in a dream music is heard it should mean that it would bring sorrow. Similarly misery will befall a person who laughs in a dream.

Effects of dream have also been enumerated—The man, who goes, in a dream, riding a chariot yoked to a man, or a lion, or a horse, or a bull or to a lioness, becomes a king.

If a man sees, in a dream, forcible abduction of his horse, elephant, vehicle, seat, house, and clothes, the dream becomes the cause of a fear or apprehension from his king, of sorrow, of hostilities with his relatives, and of pecuniary loss to himself.

The man who, in a dream, eats the head of a man, obtains a kingdom; the man who eats the feet of a man in a dream obtains one thousand gold mohurs; and the man who eats the arms of a man in a dream obtains five hundred gold mohurs.

The man who, in a dream, sees the breaking of his door-bar, of his bed, of his swinging-board, of his shoes, and of his house, is to lose his wife.

16. *Uttaradhyana Sutra* 8, 13.

17. *Avasyaka Curni* (*Rulam* 1928) p. 274.

Persons laughing in a dream, become sorry in a short time; persons dancing in a dream are either killed or sent to jail; persons studying in a dream, suffer from quarrels. It should be known by wisemen.

All black things, except a cow, a bull, a horse, a king, an elephant, and a God, seen in a dream indicate a bad dream. All white things except cotton-seeds and salt seen in a dream, indicate a good dream.

On getting a bad dream, one should worship one's favourite God and preceptor, and should practice penance according to his own bodily power, because a bad dream to persons who are constantly devoted to their religious duty, turns out to be a good dream.

We may here give a picture of the analysis of dreams by theosophists. They classify dreams into seven types :—¹⁸

1. Prophetic dreams. These are impressed on our memory by the Higher Self, and are generally plain and clear : either a voice heard or the coming event foreseen.

2. Allegorical dreams, or hazy glimpses of realities caught by the brain and distorted by our fancy. These are generally only half true.

3. Dreams sent by adepts, good or bad, by mesmerisers, or by the thoughts of very powerful minds bent on making us do their will.

4. Retrospective; dreams of events belonging to past incarnations.

5. Warning dreams for others who are unable to be impressed themselves.

6. Confused dreams, the causes of which have been discussed above.

7. Dreams which are mere fancies and chaotic pictures, owing to digestion, some mental trouble, or similar other external causes.

V. So far we have analysed the psychology of dreams as we find in ancient Jaina texts. It is difficult to present a comparative picture of the Svapnasastrā and the modern analysis of the empirical Psychologists. Their equipment and approaches were different. Psychology in the present-day is an empirical science. It analyses the contents of the minds and is backward looking in its interpretation. The Psycho-analysis of Freud unearthed the dungheap of the unconscious and tried

18. 'Dreams' by H. P. Blavatsky and W. Q. Judge. Bombay (1937) p. 2.

to find the roots of the mental life in the repressed wishes in the unconscious mostly sexual in nature struggling to come up to the conscious level atleast during sleep very often in a disguised form. For Jung, dream is associated with the present difficulties and presents solution of the problem sometimes in the form of primordial images of the collective unconscious. For Adler dream is not a revival or reappearance of the repressed wishes in the unconscious, but a rehearsal for some impending action of an individual. It reveals the characteristic mode of dealing with a new problem. And we have in the classification of dreams mentioned in the *Bhagvati Sutra* the broad principles which combine the theories of Freud, Jung and Adler.

The Jaina thinkers were aware of the unconscious, although a clear scientific formulation was not possible on the basis of experimental investigation. The *Nandi Sutra*¹⁹ gives a picture of the unconscious in the Mallaka Dristanta, example of the earthen pot. A man takes an earthen pot and pours drops of water into it ; for some time the water is absorbed. But after the saturation point is reached the water becomes visible. This gives a clear picture of the vast depth of the unconscious which absorbs our stimulation and experience.

The Buddhist analysis of consciousness has also mentioned the state of unconscious experience. It is called Vidhimutta, while Vidhicitta is waking consciousness. The two are divided by a threshold called manodvara. Similarly, bhavanga, subjectively viewed, is subconscious existence, though objectively it is to mean nirvana²⁰. Mrs. Rhys Davids says that consciousness is only an intermittent series of psychic throbs associated with the living organism beating out their coming to know through one brief span of life²¹. The rest is unconscious.

But that is not all. In the interpretation of the fruits of dreams, we enter a new field of Psychology which transcends the unconscious, the conscious and leads us to the Supraliminal consciousness.

Prophetic dreams are a fact. They do present a problem to the empirical psychologists of today. Depth psychology has no access for the solution of these problems. A re-orientation of our outlook towards

19. *Nandisutra*—34.

20. Radhakrishnan (S.) 'Indian Philosophy Vol-1 IIEd. p. 408.

21. Rhys Davids 'Buddhist Psychology' (1936) p. 160,

the study of dreams is necessary, and faith in ancient lore of dreams would perhaps help us.

The experts of the science of dream were respected by the high and low in ancient India. It has been stated that one should not see a king, a God, a preceptor and an interpreter of dreams with empty hands²².

22. 'Sramana Bhagvan Mahavira' Vol. II Part I Ch. IV. p. 70 'Rikta panirna
pasyecca Rajanam Daivatam Gurum nimittajnam visesana'.

PROFESSOR BLACK ON HUME'S GUILLOTINE

D. Y. DESHPANDE

The principle that an "ought" is never entailed by an "is" has generally been held to be one of the basic principles of moral reasoning, and a famous passage in Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*¹ is often quoted as a classical statement of this principle. In recent years, however, the confining effect of this principle (like that of Hume's doubts about induction) has been felt to be too oppressive, and attempts are being made to refute (at least to discredit) it. One such attempt is contained in Professor Max Black's paper "The Gap between 'Is' and 'Should'",² and in it Black claims to have discredited this principle (which he christens picturesquely "Hume's Guillotine"). I am afraid, however, that this paper, though excellent in many ways, fails in its main object, viz of bridging the gap between "is" and "should", and in what follows I shall try to say why I think so.

I

I shall begin by summarising Black's argument. To those who claim the existence of an unbridgeable gap between "should" and "is" he offers for consideration the following counter-example :

Fischer wants to mate Botwinnik.

The one and only way to mate Botwinnik is for Fischer to move the Queen.

Therefore, Fischer should move the Queen.

And he makes the following observations about it. (1) The premises of this argument are clear statements of fact. A first-person utterance by Fischer himself, viz "I want to mate Botwinnik", might have been taken to be expressing only a resolution and so making no truth-claim. But the third-person statement is a straight-forward statement of fact. (2) The conclusion of this argument is not factual. It might be held that the "should"-statement which is the conclusion is really a disguised factual statement to the effect that the one and only way in which Fischer can win is by moving the Queen. This is what Von Wright does in his paper "Practical Inference".³ The conclusion of his practical inference, viz "A must heat the hut", is understood by him to mean

1. Everyman's edition, Vol. II, pp. 177-78.
2. 'The Philosophical Review' April 1964, pp. 165-181.
3. Philosophical Review, April 1963, pp. 159-179.

the same as "There is something A wants but will not get unless he heats the hut". Black points out that "must", "should" and similar words used in practical inferences have a normative force on account of which statements in which these words occur cannot mean the same thing as any merely factual statement. In particular Black wishes to stress "the distinctively performative aspect" of the utterance "Fischer should move the Queen". A speaker who uses a "should"-statement counts, he says, as doing something more than, or something other than, saying something having truth value. He points out that the second-person use of a "should"-formula, viz "You should do such and such" is primary and that the first and third-person uses are to be explained in terms of their relations to the second-person use. "The prime function of the second-person formula" he says, "is to urge the hearer to adopt a course of action selected by the speaker as preferable, optimal correct" (171);⁴ it "has the practical function of 'advising' (prodding, or whatever you may choose to call it)" (173). And in order to render prominent the performative aspect of the conclusion of his counter-example, he switches over to a second-person variant of it:

You want to achieve E.

Doing M is the one and only way to achieve E.

Therefore, you should do M.

In this version, he says, the conclusion is clearly intended to express advice. (3) The conclusion "You should do M", understood as having a performative aspect and so counting as urging or inciting or prodding the addressee, does follow with logical necessity from the premises (which have already been shown to be purely factual). He says : "Given that my interlocutor is playing chess and solicits advice about the game, the fact, if it is a fact, that he can mate the opponent only by moving the Queen provides me with a *conclusive* reason for urging him to do that rather than anything else" (176). Black is a little uncertain whether to say that the premises of his argument *entail* the conclusion. In favour of the view that the factual premises *entail* the practical conclusion he argues that his argument does satisfy what he regards as a criterion of entailment, viz that if anybody uttered the premises, understood them, and yet said "You should not move the Queen" we could make no sense of it. This test parallels a test we might apply to an argument with factual premises and a factual conclusion. "Given a simple argument, patently invalid, say of the form 'P, if

4. Figures in brackets refer to pp. of Black's paper.

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P then Q, therefore not-Q', we could make no sense of the supposition that somebody might utter it, understand what he was saying, and mean what he seemed to be saying (177). But against the view that the factual premises entail the practical conclusion he mentions the possibility that a person might not be willing to engage in the activity of advising at all. This leaves a gap between the factual premises and the practical conclusion, a gap which can be bridged only by an agent's willingness to engage in the activity of advising. For this reason Black suggests that the necessity with which the practical conclusion follows from the factual premises should be called "latent" or "virtual" necessity. But if the agent is willing to make some second-person "should"—statement, then in the example we are considering he must say "You should do M". The truth of the premises restricts the performance to a single possibility (179). Nobody who understands the premises and knows the rules for the proper use of "should" can honestly offer any other "should"—conclusion. (179) (4) It is therefore proved that some non-factual conclusions do follow and can be shown to follow from factual premises. (180) (6). This is enough to discredit Hume's Guillotine. When this has been done, we may hope to find more important arguments containing valid transitions from "is" to "ought".

II

I shall now proceed to examine the foregoing argument in detail.

1. I shall first consider Black's contention that the performative conclusion "You should do M" follows logically from the premises.

In Austin's terminology "You should do M" is a "primary" or a "primitive" or an "implicit" performativ.⁵ When made fully explicit it would assume the form "I advise you to do M". Black is, therefore, quite right to maintain that the conclusion of his counter-example is a performative. To utter the words "You should do M" is not simply to say something, but to do something, viz the act of advising. But as soon as this is conceded a problem arises, which it is not easy to solve. To say that a performative is the conclusion of an inference is to hold that an *act* is the conclusion of an inference, and it is certainly a most perplexing question how this is to be understood and whether it can be understood at all. In theoretical inference the premises and the conclusion are supposed to be *propositions*. It is true that there are philosophers who repudiate

⁵. 'How to Do Things with Words' pp. 32-3, 69, 71, 2, 83.

propositions and speak of statements instead. But even they have to distinguish between the verbal structure (sentence), the utterance of it (action) and the content of the statement or what the statement states. If we discard the Platonic metaphysics which regarded propositions as subsistent entities, there is no reason we might not continue to use the word "proposition" for what is stated. Now, in a theoretical inference such as, "If p then q , and p ; therefore q ", we can distinguish, on the one hand, a certain series of events consisting of three assertions (or rather assertings), and, on the other, a logical structure consisting of three propositions. The assertions follow each other temporally; they might be connected causally perhaps; but they are certainly not logically connected, for the simple reason that events are not the kind of things which can stand to one another in logical relations. The propositions, on the other hand, are not events and are not temporally related. They are related logically as premises and conclusion, as entailing and following from. It is true that for an inference to take place, the premises and the conclusion must be asserted, thus involving the performance of two (or more) actions, viz the assertion of the premises and the assertion of the conclusion. But it is not these actions, but the propositions which they assert, which stand to each other in the relations of entailing and following from. When we now turn to practical inference, and in particular to Black's claim about his counter-example that its conclusion is a performatives, we find ourselves faced with the conception of an *action* following from premises. Can we make sense of this suggestion? No doubt the doctrine has a hoary and most respectable ancestry. Aristotle held that the conclusion of a practical syllogism is an action. And some recent logicians have made more bizarre claims. G. H. Von Wright, for example, says that in the practical inference in the first person the premises are a *want* and a *state of knowing or believing*, and the conclusion is an *act*. These are all dread names — Black, Von Wright, and above all Aristotle. And it is certainly foolish to suppose them capable of committing so gross an error. Yet what sense can we attach to the statement that an *action follows logically* from a *want* and a *state of mind*, or confining ourselves to Black, from *factual premises*? It is surely clear that the expression "*logically follows*" is not being used here in its usual sense. But if so, then in what sense is it being used?

I think that there is here a confusion between an inference (or the

process of finding out what a given proposition entails) and a quite different process, viz giving reasons why a particular action was done or should be done. Consider the following examples :

I misappropriated the cash because I needed money badly and there was no other way to get it.

Or to make it look like an inference :

I wanted money.

Misappropriation was the only means of getting it.

Therefore, I misappropriated it.

Is this argument to be called an inference ? No doubt, it explains or accounts for an action. It tells us how an action came to be performed. But can we say that the last statement follows logically from the first two ? I think that the difference between the two processes is patent. In an inference we try to find out what is logically involved in a set of statements, whereas in an explanation of conduct we try to find out the motives and the circumstances which led to the performance of an action. Motives are related to actions as causes to effects. At least they are not related as premises and conclusion. The description of the phenomenon of a motive leading up to an action is no more to be called an inference than is the following description of a causal connection :

The house caught fire because there was a leaking wire in it.

I do not know how exactly to distinguish the two procedures beyond the characterisations I have given. But in any case the distinction is too patent to require a complete analysis before one can accept it. I am, therefore, inclined to say that the whole conception of an action being the conclusion of an inference is a mistake.

Now it is true that in an earlier part of his paper Black specifically mentions the view that only propositions can serve as premises and conclusions in inferences and gives his reasons for rejecting it. "I take it as certain", he says, "that we can reason, for example, from expressed to unstated orders, which I choose as undoubtedly having a primary function other than that of making a truth-claim. From the order 'Answer questions on every page' and 'Initial page on which questions are answered', can we infer the unstated order 'Initial every page'? The conjunction of the first two orders logically implies the third in the

sense that it would be impossible to obey the first two orders and not to behave *as if* one were obeying the third, unstated order." (168) Don't we have here a valid inference which has for premises and conclusion not propositions but orders? No doubt we apparently have. But, a closer look shows this to be a mistake. Indeed a suggestion for the refutation of this view is to be found in Black's own words. For he says that the implication of an order by another order is to be understood by reference to the obedience of those orders. From each order we obtain an indicative sentence of the form "Such and such an action (viz the one ordered) is done", and then we proceed to investigate the logical relationships between the indicative sentences thus obtained. Without such a reduction it is difficult to see how the logical relations of orders be understood.

The same point may be put in the following manner. Just as in the case of statements we distinguished between the action of stating or asserting and what is stated or asserted, so in the case of orders too we must distinguish between the ordering and what is ordered. And just as it is not the assertings that stand in logical relations to one another, so it is not the various orderings which are related by logical relations. What is ordered is the doing of something by someone; and it is this which entails or is entailed by something.

I, therefore, conclude that Black's insistence upon the performative aspect of the conclusion "You should do M" and the consequent implication that it is the action of advising which follows from the premises is a mistake.

2. Black's contention that the conclusion of a practical inference has the double aspect of being a performative and following from premises raises another interesting problem. This contention implies that in the self-same act I do two things, viz drawing a conclusion and advising. It is clear that these are two acts, not one. I can advise without inferring and infer without advising. Now is it possible that these two acts can be fused into one single act? It is clear that it is not. The counter-example offered by Black contains in fact two arguments and these belong to two entirely different kinds, viz those which we have earlier distinguished as inferring and giving reasons for an action. The theoretical inference informs me that there is something (viz E) which you want, but will not get unless you do M. Thereafter I proceed to advise you to do M. This is an action and cannot

follow from any premises. But I can have reasons for doing it, reason in the sense of motives. I might be interested in seeing you win either because I like you or because I have betted heavily on you or for some other reason. This will give me a reason (motive) for advising you to do that which will help you to win. But unless this reason exists I shall not advise you. So the argument will have to be reconstructed as follows :

(1) I want you to win.

You can't win unless you move the Queen.

Therefore I shall (must) advise you to move the Queen.

This argument is prospective. It is parallel to the following retrospective argument :

(2) I wanted him to win.

He could not have won without my advising him to do X.

Therefore I advised him to do X.

The latter argument tells us why a certain action (viz. advising) was done, what led me to do it; the former, likewise, simply explains why I intend to do it, what leads me to do it. I am not quite clear what Black means by the phrase "conclusive" reason in the passage quoted earlier. They are certainly not conclusive reasons in the sense of premises entailing a conclusion. But if "conclusive reason" means "decisive reason for doing some action", then my wanting A to win, etc. are certainly conclusive reasons for my advising him to do something. But then Black is quite wrong to think that the facts that my interlocutor wants to win, and that he can mate his opponent only by moving the Queen, provide me with a conclusive reason for urging him to do that. They do nothing of the sort. They need not move me to action at all unless I wanted him to win; and they would move me to give some entirely different advice if I did not want him to win. Incidentally Black speaks clearly of "a reason for urging him to do that"; and even he will admit that a reason for doing an action (viz. urging) is very different from a premise which entails a conclusion.

I, therefore, conclude that Black has not been successful in proving that some non-factual conclusions can be shown to follow from factual premises.

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ATTITUDE IN SANKARA VEDANTA

RAMAKANT SINARI

There is a point beyond which a philosopher's faith in the routine affairs of the earthly life does not last unimpaired. There may be no rules as regards the transition in a philosophical mind from the commonsense conviction that the world as we experience it is real to the suspicion that it may perhaps be otherwise or not be there at all. When Martin Heidegger said that "Why are there essents, why is there anything at all, rather than nothing?"¹ is the foremost of all questions, he, in a way, signalled all those who take for granted that philosophical thinking has to start from an unquestionable acceptance of the world, not to trust even the most obvious beliefs. Indeed Descartes, with his remarkable aspiration for attaining clearness and distinctness in all ideas, remains the first radical doubter and, looking at the whole panorama of philosophy after him, can be credited with having foreshadowed a profoundly searching intellectual attitude that has succeeded him. ".....and so I felt that I must one day rid myself of all the opinions I have hitherto adopted," writes Descartes, "and start the whole work of construction again from the very foundation, if I aspire to make some solid and lasting contribution to knowledge."² However, his program of ridding himself of all existence could not go very far, for the simple reason that his persistence was exhausted as soon as he thought of the "indubitability" of mathematical phenomena. "We may reasonably conclude," he says, "that physics, astronomy, medicine, and all other sciences which have composite objects, are indeed of a doubtful character, but that arithmetic, geometry, and those sciences which have the simplest and most general objects, without much regard to their real existence, have in them something that is at once certain and indubitable."³ But the man who prolonged the Cartesian program further, with a defiance of his own mathematical training and through a period when scientists' confidence in the objectivity of the knowledge of the universe was almost complete, is Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology.

Husserl's genius finds its full expression on the perennial philosophical problem that he engaged himself to solve : how and from where one could obtain absolute certainty in knowledge? The aim of the present article is to show that the method of doubting the existence

of the world and searching for its foundation in knowledge, as intense as, and in a sense more intense than, Husserl's phenomenological method, is prevalent in the Vedanta school⁴ of Indian philosophy, and that the success which Husserl wanted his method to achieve as a "Science of Essential Being"⁵ is of a type that was already claimed by Sankara⁶ to what can be called the Vedanta method. It is true that the Vedanta method has never planned anything like a systematic re-examination of the basic theories and principles of knowledge, as Husserlians have done. Moreover, the dimensions of the Vedanta method do not extend to the fields of logic, methodology of sciences, psycho-analysis, anthropology, etc. where phenomenology has concrete goals to achieve. The concern of the Vedanta thinkers, and of Sankara in particular, for man's unsuccessful act of living in an essentially hostile and suffering-infested universe being never secondary to anything, they could hardly think of shifting their attention from the question of salvation or ultimate liberation (moksha) to that of empirical knowledge. But this need not becloud the fact that both Sankara and the Husserlian phenomenologists belong to the same set of metaphysical thinkers inasmuch as they all represent a mistrust in the world of sense-perception and a profound desire for self-exploration and transcendence.

A phenomenologist begins with the total suspension (*epoché*) of all the presuppositions about the nature of the world. The "suspension" or "bracketing" of our natural awareness with regard to phenomena is a deliberately chosen attitude. Although such an attitude, psychologically speaking, amounts to a reversion of the act of experiencing, its purpose is clearly to carry consciousness to its pre-experiencing state and to examine the emergence of experience itself. The "epoché" is not a logical activity; it is rather an inward practice directed towards seeking the pre-logical threshold of logic. For a phenomenologist, this is the *eidetic* or essential operation from which a new vision of existence would evolve.

The *eidos* (essences) or the *eidetic* axioms denote the true forms of things. One of the distinctions which Husserl has built his philosophy upon is between a "fact" and an "essence". A particular spatio-temporal position is not necessary for a fact. That is to say, though a fact is usually definable in terms of its spatio-temporal nature, such a definition has nothing necessary about it. "...every fact," Husserl

says, "could be 'essentially' other than it is....it belongs to the meaning of everything contingent that it should have essential being and therein an *Eidos* to be apprehended in all its purity."⁷ The very notion of contingency (*Tatsachlichkeit*) is derived from the accidental nature of facts and implies the sense of *it is thus, but could be otherwise*. Our consciousness of the contingency of the entire world-phenomenon is itself due to our innately *Eidos*-oriented being. For all phenomenologists and existentialists, as for Husserl, man is the only being that refuses to stay contained within the realm of facts, or approve of them as *the necessary forms of Reality*.

What is true of the world-phenomenon is also true of the conventional norms of thought and knowledge. Their suspension comprises their rejection until the time one develops conviction in them. What Husserl seems to suggest is that once we have begun to bracket whatever is given to awareness, we would not come to the cessation of this process unless we generate a certitude, which, since its very origin, settles itself as unbracketable. He describes the state of mind under certitude as the experience of "apodeictic self-evidence" or "in-seeing of an essence."⁸

The evidence and the certitude Husserl speaks about has its origin in the domain of what he calls the "transcendental-phenomenological self-experience."⁹ Any evidence, phenomenologists argue, is a grasping of something whose certainty excludes all doubt, all suspicion about its possible falsity, at least at the moment when the evidence is present to the mind. There is some sort of identity between the perceiver and the perceived in apodeictic evidence. The term "apodeictic" is intended by Husserl to suggest that there is such a thing as the evidence of evidence and that it is established by means of mind's immediate and direct act, a "seeing" (*begründen*), which, though possibly different in the case of different individuals, entails an absolute inward guarantee.

Man's day-to-day view of the world is conditioned by numerous presuppositions, interests, motives and dogmas. We are constantly influenced by our socio-cultural habitat, logical and linguistic inheritance, intellectual and emotional commitments and, in general, by the entire inner and outer *milieu* in which we live. The rules of meaning and expression, of selection and elimination in perception and understanding, the act of interpretation and valuation, totally govern our contact with the world. Some sustained reflection would convince us

that though our full being is involved in this contact there is nothing necessary about the nature of the contact itself. Not only is it modifiable, but even its *raison d'être* can be revised. The phenomenological attitude would spring up as soon as we focus our attention on the ordinary view of the world, and disconnect ourselves from this view by withdrawing from within us the complete bulk of world-impressions.

The phenomenological attitude, in the Husserlian sense, has the single purpose of re-establishing the world within experience. Analytically oriented as it is, ordinarily the phenomenological movement does not entertain questions of extra-epistemic character. To look upon the world phenomenologically, is to posit it in one's consciousness in an uninhibitedly one's own way, to generate a *Weltanschaung* from within oneself, to penetrate through the diverse furniture of knowledge with a view to "seeing" its fundamentals. While defining the task of phenomenological philosophy Marvin Farber writes : "The phenomenological method requires a well-defined *attitude*, for which all mundane beliefs are not merely suspended temporarily, but for always as a matter of principle....This attitude is fundamentally different from the *natural* attitude, which is the attitude of all of us, including the phenomenologist when he is not engaged in his investigations, in our normal living and thinking."¹⁰ Therefore it is not unlikely that to a phenomenological attitude the world would signify something other than what it signifies to a commonsense attitude. At the same time, the relevance of the commonsense attitude cannot be overlooked. In so far as a phenomenologist has to begin his method of *epoché* in the empirically given world, he must yield at least provisionally to the commonsense attitude, before he takes a flight to the essential or *eidetic* domain. For the phenomenological attitude and method, the ordinarily understood reality would be necessary as a field of operation. It is in this sense that the main objective that the phenomenologists have before their mind, is an epistemologically complete reorganization of the cognitive consciousness based on the direct intuition of one's own ego.

That the Sankara Vedanta, the most influential metaphysical system in the Orient, has recommended a severe intellectual discipline of the withdrawal of one's consciousness from the empirically experienceable world is universally known. A cessation of the discontentment which all of us experience with our being *here* and *now*, is the fundamental motivation of the Sankara Vedanta. Surely, the unfavourable and often adverse circumstances, human aspirations invariably ending in

futility, absurdity of living in the face of disease, pain and death, might have led ancient Indian thinkers to look upon the world as a place not worth living in. The Sankara Vedanta reflects a temperament that is wholly attracted towards the otherworldly. And since nothing in the realm of mundane existence has been able to appease it, this temperament has inevitably evolved into a subjective engagement with transcendence. A totally unrestrained and world-denying transcendentalism, where the highest constitutive background of all experience is grasped, is the professed goal of the entire tradition of Indian thinking.

The Sankara Vedanta defines its objective quite unambiguously when it says that the highest human ideal (*parama-purusartha*) is to attain that knowledge (*jnana, viveka*) which would help man to free himself from the cycle of births and deaths (*samsara*). So the Vedanta attitude figures not as a dispassionate endeavour to reach the foundation of consciousness for its own sake but as an internally generated urgent need to find an exit to the wearisome fact of man's worldly being. The valuation of any activity in terms of its significance to man's salvation (*moksha*) has always remained central to Indian philosophisation. And the Sankara Vedanta, since its unregistered ancient followers to its most ardent modern exponents, has ever endured, more than any other school of Indian philosophy, not only as an ideal embodiment of this valuation but also as a view of life, a philosophy of existence, a solution to the riddle of consciousness. Far from having any constructive knowledge-building plan, and far from even indirectly suggesting that their intellectual enterprise might possess immense value to the "transcendental spelaeology"¹¹ Husserlians aim at in their investigation, what Sankara is bent on achieving is the reduction of human self to its formless (*nirguna*) bottom. For formlessness, Sankara argues, is the genesis of everything and hence the sole end of life's activity.

The phenomenological method of *epoché*, like the Cartesian method of doubt, has for its subject-matter the empirical world and its impressions on the cognitive consciousness. Of course, both Descartes and Husserl have made no secret of the fact that at the start of the philosophical inquiry we can attribute contingency not only to the external world as it is given to our senses but also to the fact of our awareness of our own being. However, with an indomitable impulse to gain intellectual confidence primarily in the reality of the universe, they might have thought it wise to expect from their methods a temporary suspension, but a permanent affirmation, of the worldly experiences.

But this is not what Sankara would have intended to do. The single purpose of his philosophic search is the mapping-out of the structure of the self with a view to determining its exact transcendental reach. As a matter of fact, at no time has Sankara heeded the physical correlates of experience or prepared a back-ground for any scientific and factual study of the universe. That in the process of concentrated inward observation, he has given the world *jnanamarga* (the way of knowledge) — one of the most arduous disciplines human consciousness can ever practise upon itself — is a fact that indicates pretty clearly that physical realities did not enter into the domain of his intellectual prying. It is mostly as a result of this anti-empirical and anti-natural pursuits and interests that he has set forth in his method a kind of one-way passage, from the outward to the inward, from the dubitable to the certain, from the contingent to the necessary, with no insistence on the recession therefrom whatsoever.

According to Sankara—by any measure, the greatest transcendentalist in the world—the natural, as it is known to our commonsense, arises from a superimposition (*adhyasa*) of the attributes of the knowing consciousness on the known object. Sankara wants us to believe that our recognition of the phenomenal existence (*vyavaharikasatta*) gives us only the empirical and pragmatic reality. The standpoint to which we are accustomed in our ordinary life originates not from our essential being or pure consciousness (*atman* or *Brahman*) but from a misguiding and deluding agency, called *avidya* or ignorance, operating in us. *Avidya* is of the nature of nescience. It distorts knowledge by causing a wrong apprehension of the "given." Indeed the very emergence of the "given" in experience, the entire world-experience binding consciousness to it, is due to the influence of *avidya* on the otherwise pure and absolutely free self. *Avidya* veils the real shape of things from us. "... it is a universal sleep," states Sankara, "in which are lying the transmigrating souls destitute for the time of the consciousness of their individual character."¹² So, although Sankara has not gone to the extent of contending that the spatio-temporal world is not *there* at all he argues that it springs up in consciousness because of a naive commonsense outlook on the part of man. Man remains a victim to this outlook as long as he continues to be in contact of the duality of subjects, and has attained no intellectual equipment to transcend it.

It must be said here that of the various senses one can draw from the theory of *avidya* in Sankara Vedanta that which suits our thesis best

is that *avidya* is at the bottom of man's phenomenal or pragmatic (*vyavaharika*) reading of the universe. Sankara has clearly pronounced his phenomenological attitude by consistently maintaining that what normally appears to be real is ultimately dubitable, and that the only course for surmounting this dubitability is to cause an inner conversion, a reformation of one's own subject, by achieving an absolute assurance of oneself. As phenomenologists to-day admit, the expression "phenomeno-logical attitude" must stay confined to a philosophical view emanating from a kind of concentrated inward perception, an ego-exploration, whose verdict about the nature of the world is invariably divergent from that of the commonsense man's outer-directed perception.¹³ Before the persistent exercise of the phenomenological attitude, the everyday state of objects would perhaps fade away as having deceptively and temporarily sprung up and a transcendental realm of primordial consciousness would emerge as *the explanation of all being*. And although this transition from the obviously experienceable world to the original and essential foundation of the self entails neither a plan nor a chance Husserl aptly equates it to the "radical alteration of the natural point of view."¹⁴

As soon as the ordinary conception of the world gives way to an enlightened "seeing".... a vision of existence from the beyond.... one would realise the naive and false (*mithya*) character of the former and the authentic character of the latter. The spirit with which phenomenologists contrast the ordinary with the phenomenological, or the natural with the transcendental attitudes, and characterise them as "unreal" and "real" respectively, is inherent in the Sankara Vedanta. Sankara indicates that the phenomenal or pragmatic (*vyavaharika*) and the absolute or transcendental (*paramarthika*) truths are in a gradation. It is the transcendental truth alone that would provide the highest and the most reliable knowledge (*brahmanubhava*). What is available as the phenomenal (*vyavaharika*) truth is a mistaken image of the real. Its locus, though veridical to the senses, springs up from our distraction from the transcendental. There is no necessity whatsoever about the type of the universe, the type of the explanation for it, amenable to the pragmatic intellect. Sankara argues that the world-phenomenon arises out of an element of error (*bhranti* or *bhrama*) in our mind; it would vanish as soon as consciousness grasps its own ground in the Universal Being (*Brahman*), and transforms itself

into a new outlook. The *paramarthika* outlook, like the phenomenological one, is the outlook of a person who has, by dint of hard concentration and directedness of attention, pierced through the mask of the immediately given, and settled within the innermost region of ego-consciousness. It is in this ego-consciousness that Sankara, like Husserl, located the genesis of absolute certainty.

Actually, Sankara is only a systematiser of the practical-transcendental theory of experience already suggested by famous Gaudapada. Gaudapada, a Vedantin who preceded Sankara by about three hundred years and is said to have taught Sankara's teacher Govinda, is respectably known for his exposition of the dichotomy between the practical and the real. The world spread around us, he remarks, is wrongly imagined, like an appearance (*abhava*) or an error (*viparyaya*).¹⁵ So the reality of the world, as opposed to the absolutely real (*paramarth-satya*), is relative or empirical (*samvrti* or *vyavaharika*).¹⁶ Such a world would have a place in our consciousness so long as we do not throw a deep and intense glance at the source of the consciousness itself and figure out its genealogy, as it were. In order to do this and posit oneself as a contemplator on the transcendental (*paramarthacintaka*)—that is, one who proclaims the supreme truth of the illusoriness of creation—, Gaudapada recommends a specific form of psychic discipline, called *asparsayoga*.¹⁷ That what Sankara describes as *atmavidya* (the knowledge of the self) is his version of *asparsayoga*, and that he prescribes it to one for the same ultimate arrest of mind as that suggested by Gaudapada, needs no treatment in the present context.

In his commentary on the *Vedanta Sutra*, Sankara exhibits a highly phenomenological inquisitiveness in the question of the intuitive basis of knowledge (*vidya*). Although the real aim of such an inquisitiveness is to come upon a clear solution to the eternal riddle of suffering in life, the intellectual procedure that he adopts is largely oriented in his disciplined analysis of the elements of knowledge. He has demonstrated with utmost poignancy that in order to be instrumental to salvation (*moksha*) knowledge must be free from a mingling of the subject and the object and must attain a depth at which one's own transcendental being is grasped as the source of everything in experience. But how does this mingling occur? "It is a matter not requiring any proof," says Sankara, "that the object and the subject whose respective spheres are

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the notion of the 'Thou' (the non-ego) and the 'ego' and which are opposed to each other as much as darkness and light are, cannot be identified.... In spite of this it is on the part of man a natural procedure —which has its cause in wrong knowledge—not to distinguish the two entities (object and subject) and their respective attributes, although they are absolutely distinct, but to superimpose upon each the characteristic nature and the attributes of the other, and thus, coupling the real and the unreal....”¹⁸ Clearly, the *atman* or the individual pure consciousness, which is an absolute distinctionless spirit (*nirvisesacaitanya*), has no reason to participate in the superimposition. The superimposition is caused by the fact that a mysterious veil of nescience (*avidya*) works on the subject and twists his image with regard to the objective world. The world encountered by us is there, Sankara holds, in the only sense that the influence of nescience (*avidya*) makes us to be aware of it, to posit it as spatio-temporal, and to be subject to its vicissitudes. The phenomenon of superimposition and the nescience (*avidya*) are only designations of one and the same confusion that invariably accompanies instances of knowledge in the empirical universe.

While under the sway of the nescient agency, the *atman* is yoked as if to such processes like mind (*manas*), intellect (*buddhi*), ego (*ahamkara*), body (*sarira*) and senses (*indriyas*). These processes have no direct bearing on the essential and eternal constitution of *atman*. They are not *atman*'s manifestations. And yet, when viewed from the mundane level of existence, they appear to pervade through *atman*, putting it in contact with the contingent and opaque reality of the universe. The entire experience of living-in-the-world is a kind of veil (*kosa*) on pure consciousness. This veil is not glued to pure consciousness, for the latter is able to throw it off when it reaches the apex of self-realization. Man misled by superimposition, argues Sankara, is under an error “founded on the non-apprehension of the difference of that which is superimposed from that on which it is superimposed.... Extra-personal attributes are superimposed on the Self, if a man considers (his self) as stout, lean, fair, as standing, walking, or jumping.... Attributes of the internal organ when he considers himself subject to desire, intention, doubt determination, and so on. Thus the producer of the notion of the Ego (i.e. the internal organ) is superimposed on the interior Self, which, in reality, is the witness of all the modifications of the internal organ, and vice versa the interior Self, which is the witness of everything, is

superimposed on the internal organ, the senses and so on."¹⁹ Indeed the dissolution of the elements of superimposition and the disconnection of consciousness from the knower-known or the subject-object duality should amount to the total cessation of what we acknowledge as the process of living-in-the-world. And, according to Sankara, since the ethical significance of freeing oneself from the superimposition is the only thing that matters in the ultimate analysis, the abolition of negligence and the subsequent cessation of one's involvement in the world must be looked upon as constituting *the ideal* life must tend towards, rather than as having a purely contingent and impersonal standing. Sankara heavily draws upon the Upanisads when he points out that the course from the sphere of ignorance to that of supreme knowledge (*brahmanubhava*) is imperative on account of the fact that the individual consciousness, though actually wedded to the mundane layers of existence, is forever in search of its internal rhyme (*antahkarana*). Except his fundamental Being, man has to be sceptical about everything and to cancel it sometime or other.

The phenomenological attitude comprises a manner of dissension, a presevered scepticism, a penetration into the genesis of essences in consciousness, and a persistent analysis of the "given" from the stand-point of one's own subjectivity. Sankara furnishes the unique instance of this attitude in the Orient. He, like Husserl, displays a scepticism towards the phenomenal world which is not abandoned before he intuitively perceives the primordial flow of experience itself. For Sankara, the assurance by which confusion and uncertainty would give way to absolute indubitability in knowledge, is not born in any other region than that of subjective inwardness. Thus what Sankara describes as *svayamprakasha* (a spontaneously and unambiguously generated knowledge) is the central quest of phenomenologists. There is indeed no way of achieving this knowledge except by a *breakthrough* in normalcy....that is, by a self-generated presuppositionless *Weltanschauung*....to which the phenomenal and the transcendental are posited as the lower and the higher, or as the inauthentic and the authentic, respectively, and intensification of one's attention onto the latter is accomplished *sine qua non*. What is discovered by the intensification of attention is found to be the limit of analysis, for there is nothing that analysis can do the moment the trans-analytical realm of life is thrown open to it. The analytical phase of phenomenology, therefore, would end as soon as it lands on the subjectivity of the living ego .."the wonder

of all wonders," "the pure ego and pure consciousness,"²⁰ "the self luminous witness (saksin) of self-consciousness".²¹ However, the descent into this core of the living phenomenon is no easy task. One's adherence to the phenomenal world is apparently so complete that a permanent shift from it to the formless and unfathomable transcendence necessitates a fundamental change in one's perspective. As Maurice Natanson puts it : "The central and most cunning feature of the taken-for-granted everyday world is that it is taken for granted. As common-sense men living in the mundane world, we tacitly assume that, of course, there is this world all of us share as the public domain within which we communicate, work, and live our lives".²² And for Sankara, as for Husserlians, the departure from the world and the chainelling of mind towards the region of subjectivity figure as a transition consciously brought about within "I" by mind's spectacular advance towards eternity. Thus Sankara argues that so long as the individual self does not surmount nescience (a condensed form of what phenomenologists, after Husserl, call naivete), and does not rise to the essential level, it cannot realise the true being of itself. There is something uncompromisingly mystical and solipsistic in Sankara's philosophising which phenomenologists have shown little hesitation to share.

Notes and References :

1. Martin Heidegger, 'An Introduction to Metaphysics,' Ralph Manheim, trans. (New York : Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1961), p. 1.
2. Descartes, 'Discourse on Method,' Arthur Wollaston, trans. (London : Penguin Books, 1960), p. 101.
3. 'Ibid.' p. 104,
4. This school has sprung up from a set of ideas appearing in the concluding sections of the Vedas. It represents the principal tenor of Indian thought and has prevailed through nearly 2500 years now. The first recorded founder of the school is Badarayana (200 A.D.)
5. Edmund Husserl, 'Ideas', W. R. Boyce Gibson, trans. (New York : Collier Books, 1962), p. 41.
6. The most respected commentator on the Vedanta. According to Max Muller, Sankara died about 650 A.D. Gifted with extraordinary mental zeal and creativeness, he has left for posterity numerous treatises of philosophical significance.
7. Husserl, 'Ideas', p. 47.
8. 'Ibid.', p. 253.

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9. Edmund Husserl, 'Cartesian Meditations', Dorion Cairns, trans. (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), p. 26.
10. Marvin Farber, "Phenomenology" in 'Living Schools of Philosophy', D.D. Runes, ed. (New Jersey : Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1962), p. 309.
11. See J. N. Findlay. The Discipline of the Cave (London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966), p. 25. Professor Findlay, a Husserlian, analogically defines the task of a transcendental spelaeologist. It is "to acknowledge the presence in the cave (of the Ego) of gaps and emptiness, of fragments of things not capable of existence nor even of making complete sense as they stand, of things poised on the verge of being but not as yet actually there, of things incapable of enumeration and utterance and definite only in their essential indefiniteness, of things without a precise local habitation and incapable of having any, and so on and so forth."
12. Sankaracarya, 'Commentary on the Vedanta-Sutras', George Thibaut, trans. The Sacred Books of The East, Vol. XXXIV (Delhi : Motilal Banarsi das, 1962) p. 243.
13. See Marvin Farber, 'The Foundation of Phenomenology' (New York : Paine—Whitman Publishers, 1962) pp. 522-23. Also see Herbert Spiegelberg's "A Phenomenological Approach to the Ego," 'The Monist, Vol. 49, No. 1 (1965) p. 15.
14. Marvin Farber, 'Naturalism and Subjectivism' (Illinois : Charles C Thomas. Publisher, 1959) p. 85.
15. T.M.P. Mahadevan, 'Gaudapada' (Madras : University of Madras, 1954) p. 150.
16. 'Ibid.', p. 151.
17. 'Asparsayoga', meaning literally "the yoga in which there is no contact, or the faculty of perception by touch." is the procedure of completely suppressing one's psychical dispositions, and consequently of ceasing to be affected by external and internal sensations. The goal of 'asparsayoga' is identical with that of yoga. See Ramakant Sinari's "The Method of Phenomenological Reduction and Yoga," 'Philosophy East and West', Vol. XV, Nos. 3 & 4 (1965) pp. 225-27.
18. Sankaracarya, 'Commentary on the Vedanta-Sutras', pp. 3-5.
19. 'Ibid.', pp. 5-9.
20. Quoted by Herbert Spiegelberg in his 'The Phenomenological Movement,' Vol. I (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1965) p. 87.
21. Sankaracarya, 'Commentary on the Vedanta-Sutras', p. 37.
22. Alfred Schutz, 'Collected Papers,' Vol. I, Maurice Natanson, ed. and intr. (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. XXVI.

ON CONSERVATISM IN PHILOSOPHY

BASANT KUMAR LAL

The word 'conservatism' stands for the opinions and principles of a conservative. A conservative normally is supposed to be a person who is averse to change, who has a positive dislike for innovations. But that is not the only meaning of the word 'conservative'. It, at times, derives its meaning from the word 'conserve' which means 'to retain' or 'to preserve'. In this sense a conservative is one who somehow has the power to conserve. Sometimes the word 'conservative' is used somewhat loosely also ; when we tend to underestimate a man, or atleast when we make a moderate estimate of a person we call him 'a conservative'.

In philosophical thinking one does come across examples of conservatism in all the three senses. There are certain philosophies that are positively averse to any change or innovations. There are certain other philosophies that, in spite of their progressive character, can not shake off some of the basic notions of the old philosophy, they somehow preserve some of the tenets of tradition. Likewise, on some occasions certain philosophies are called conservative only in an attitude of neglect or indifference.

This paper seeks to show that conservatism is a defect of philosophical thinking if it is taken in the first sense and that it becomes a merit of philosophical thought when it is used in the second sense. The third sense of the word 'conservatism' is too superficial to deserve any serious consideration.

II

Being rigidly averse to changes and innovations means being insensitive to the demands of the time. There can not be any idea or notion that can hold good for all times to come. It is a scientific truism that no notion can be absolutely valid or true. Every idea has its own range of application ; beyond that range it at once feels the need of re-adjustment. If an idea continues to live through ages, it means that it has been successful in reshaping and adjusting itself in accordance with the needs and the demands of the changing times. An idea that rigidly tries to keep its structure intact and brushes aside all influences and communications may save itself from external contamination, but will die out of suffocation.

In India philosophy has led itself to its own annihilation in some such manner. Indian Philosophy is conservative because it is self-centred, because it is all the time afraid of getting contaminated by

catching infections from outside. In the ancient period of its history Indian Philosophy had exercised a tremendous influence on all aspects of life and culture. But, in course of time a peculiar tendency developed among the Indian Philosophers. They refused to grow with time. They came to feel that their ancient scriptures were not only the reservoirs of all knowledge, but also that the truths contained in them were eternal. Now, scholarship came to mean 'being acquainted with those truths.' There was nothing very wrong in that, but what followed made Indian Philosophy conservative in the first sense.

Once the ancient Indian scriptures were taken to be the 'ready store-house' of all kinds of knowledge, the natural corollary was to shun all attempts to go beyond them. Now, if any novel idea was brought to light the Indian philosopher exhausted his energy in trying to show that there was no novelty in that and that that idea was already contained in some of the ancient Indian texts. In this context most often the spirit of the new idea was somehow killed and similarity merely of the verbal sort was emphasised. The philosopher felt the joy of discovery when he came across a line or two looking similar to the statement describing the new idea. Invariably this kind of comparison was like comparing the 'living' with the 'dead'. For example, there are many scholars who would at once discover the tenets of Existentialism in Vedantic or Buddhist thought. Not that it is impossible to discover existentialistic assertions or ideas in the Vedantic or Buddhist thought, but the philosophy of Existentialism has emerged in a particular context of man — in awareness of certain existential conditions in which the *modern* man is living today. Apart from these conditions existentialism does not have any meaning or significance. These conditions did not obtain at the time Indian Philosophy grew and flourished. Therefore, to say that there are tenets of existentialism in ancient Indian Philosophy is either to kill the spirit of existentialism or to say nothing at all. Such scholars do not care to realise that a thought develops only when it is *pushed ahead ; pulling back* invariably makes a thought — system a closed affair. Indian Philosophy is rigidly conservative in this sense.

It is interesting to find that whenever Indian philosophy allowed even a little freedom for original thinking, brilliant philosophies resulted, even freedom of interpretation gave birth to fresh and novel ideas. For example, Shankara's Advaitism is only a commentary on the Brahma—Sutra, and yet it is one of the most original philosophies of the world; that is so only because, in it there is sufficient scope for free

interpretation. The originality of later Buddhism also can be explained in some such manner. These thinkers were *orthodox* but not *conservative*, they were faithful to tradition but not dogmatic. That was why, in the ancient times, Indian philosophy remained very much alive and always on the ascending side. It was only later when the Indian philosopher became merely a *historian*, when scholarship came to mean 'a mere cramming of the ancient texts', when all the doors and shutters of the structure of Indian philosophy was closed that Indian philosophy became hopelessly conservative.

It is not so with Indian philosophy alone, we come across similar examples of conservatism in philosophy even in the west. For example, the medieval period of western philosophy is often described as its dark period. The medieval philosopher was essentially a Christian, he was somehow convinced that *ultimate truths* were once for all revealed in the Christian texts and that any idea that drifted astray or went against or beyond the Christian truths was to be dismissed as dangerous and false. That made medieval philosophy stale and even dogmatic. It is interesting to find that, even in scholastic philosophy, whenever a little freedom within the Christian framework was allowed, certain very illuminating philosophies came to light. St. Thomas Aquinas was a very good example of 'originality within very well-defined limits'. But, on the whole, the medieval philosophy of the west was conservative in the very strict sense of the word 'conservative'. That was the reason why the modern period of the history of western philosophy opened (more or less as a reaction against the conservative attitude of the medieval thinkers) with an emphasis on 'clear and distinct perception' as the only criterion of philosophical thinking.

III

But this should not lead one to believe that significant philosophy must break away from tradition. A blind clinging to the forces of tradition is conservatism in the undesirable sense, but an unreasonable rejection of tradition is fanaticism. A thought must have its roots in its own soil. A thought that claims to have no connections whatsoever with the ideas, beliefs and traditions of the place to which it belongs will, in the long run, become artificial and contrived. What is required, then, is to pick up ideas from the past and to carry them along by making necessary modifications and adding novelties. The forces of tradition have to be preserved and developed, of course

they ought to be reconciled with the demands and needs of the advancing time. Such a reconciliation is very necessary because an idea that worked thousands of years ago would not work today. The present-day scientific frame of mind does not relish fanciful speculation, the wonderful metaphysical theories of the ancient Greeks would appear fantastic to the modern mind—atleast when viewed as explanations of the physical world. But that does not prove the worthlessness of tradition. In fact, many of the scientific notions of today are nothing but modified versions of some of the ideas that Plato and Aristotle had speculated about. Therefore, it is possible to develop significant philosophy by *conserving* the ideas of the past. This kind of 'conservatism' is not undesirable, on the other hand, it helps and facilitates philosophical growth, and at the same time, preserves the distinctive character of particular philosophies.

This can be shown both in a positive way and in a negative way. The negative demonstration consists in showing that no philosophical idea is completely new having no relation whatsoever with the forces of tradition. And this can be done by raising a question : Why is it that in order to understand a particular thought we have invariably to consider its background and history ? Is it not a fact that any philosophical idea conceived apart from its historical setting becomes rootless and even unintelligible ? It requires no reflection to see that every significant philosophy erects its philosophical structure on the foundation-stones supplied by the previous philosophies. A survey of the history of thought will show that there is a necessary relation between the thoughts of a successor and those of his predecessor. Aristotle's comprehensive system of thought is based on a criticism of Plato's theory of Ideas, Spinoza's Monism is an improvement on Descartes' Dualism, and the secret of Hegel is obviously Kant. Recent western philosophy is based positively or negatively on the thoughts of Hegel and the post-Hegelians.

This clearly brings to light the inevitability of tradition and history, it proves that thought has to feed on the ideas of the past. But then, if *conserving* of the ideas of the past is inevitable, if every new phase has to derive its raw-materials from what has gone before, then there is no sense in suggesting that significant philosophy can be developed on ideas derived from the past. In this sense every philosophy is necessarily conservative because every philosophy preserves the ideas of the past in it.

Even so, there is a sense in making the recommendation that new and significant philosophy can be developed by modifying the 'old' ideas and by re-adjusting them to the demands of changing times. In fact, the element of inevitability mentioned above tends to produce a particular kind of reaction which is harmful to philosophical growth. It makes people cling almost dogmatically to tradition and thus causes stagnation of thought. Therefore, there is the need to emphasise that past ideas can be reshaped and modified in accordance with changing needs and demands of time and age. The positive demonstration of the fact under consideration would consist in showing and establishing this.

In what precisely does the newness or freshness of a thought consist? It consists either in giving a new meaning to an old idea, or in saying something entirely different on the basis of certain defects or discrepancies discovered in the old notions. The first is often called *Interpretation* and the second *Modification*. But, the processes of interpretation and modification can proceed in two ways; they may move inside a thought — system or they may even adopt other measuring rods by borrowing the models of other thought-systems which may appear to be relevant. The former sets up a rigid limit around a particular system of thought and thus forces thought to keep itself confined within the limits determined from before. This kind of interpretation of ideas of the past can not push thought ahead. For the emergence of new ideas and for philosophical growth it is very essential that the processes of interpretation and modification are allowed to breathe in fresh air.

An example taken from the history of western thought will make the point clear. One very clear example of a philosophy that has remained, almost through out its history, both conservative and progressive is British Philosophy. Locke, who is considered to be the father of systematic British Philosophy, had initiated the empirical movement by making *experience* the basis of philosophical thinking. That, through Berkeley and Hume, came to represent the philosophical tradition of Great Britain.

Since then British Philosophy has tried continuously and persistently to keep its empirical tradition alive, in spite of the fact that it has given birth to various and even conflicting kinds of thought. It has allowed every kind of philosophy to flourish on its soil, and every such philosophy has succeeded in occupying a place of prominence in the history of western thought. On its scene have appeared prominent

thinkers of all kinds—Idealists and Realists, Agnostics and Pragmatists, Logical Positivists and Logical Atomists, Common-sense Philosophers and Analysts. But they are all, in a sense, very conservative because they all, somehow or other, try to be true to the empirical tradition of British Philosophy. They all emphasise the ultimacy and the primacy of *experience*. Experience which was the basic principle of Locke's philosophy, has continued to remain the touchstone of every kind of British Philosophy. Reality, according to Bradley is of the nature of experience, the realistic common-sense approach of Moore presupposes experience as its standard, the atomic units of Russell's Logical Atomism are experiential, Ayer's analysis of the positivistic principles make him a Logical Empiricist, and the analyses of ordinary language as done by the British analysts are rooted in considerations that are empirical. This survey of British Philosophy, thus, clearly demonstrates that it is possible to build up entirely new, up-to-date and significant philosophical structure by preserving, interpreting and modifying elements taken from tradition. Even tradition can be made to evolve and grow. Conservatism in this sense is a merit of philosophical thinking.

INDIVIDUALS AND WORLDS

DEBI PRASAD CHATTOPADHYAYA

Philosophy has suffered most perhaps from philosophers' refusal to learn from others' mistakes, to pursue others' ways of understanding and misundersanding, and finally to see how much they owe to others. In a sense it is correct that every man, lay or expert, has his own philosophy, and in a sense it is equally correct that conditions of philosophising are social and impersonal, i. e. more or less, independent of the individuals who philosophise. The will to philosophise without listening to what others have said and reasons thereof tends to result in not only unsocial but also unethical philosophies. Since our existence is historical, i. e., feeding and fed by time, and all forms of our activity including those of philosophy are being continuously lightened and shadowed by others, to claim to be more original than we can really afford to be is not certainly ethical, i. e. an act in good faith. Even for our own identity we owe very much to others. My experience is mine but for its organisation and communication I do depend upon others, some definite social institutions, and the world at large. This dependence is not of course one-sided, and, therefore, the character and media of the organisation and communication of our experience is influenced by our experience (of). Our experience is essentially intentional and active. It is even when it is not verbalised or externalised in other ways. Our philosophies are like our lives always enjoying and suffering relation and solitude. In utter loneliness, in absolute void we cannot act : action, if it is not to degenerate into mere reaction, needs some social parameter, however varying it might be. And if, per contra, all the relations into which I am 'obliged' to enter are quite independent of me I cannot act either, at any rate not as an ethical agent. The needs and constraints under which individuals can act *significantly* are not quantifiable except in a loose statistical sense with a wide margin of error on the either side, for there is an existential reciprocity between the individuals and *their* needs and constraints. Individual is not a fixed and widnowless social unit, an integer, or a receptacle of quantifiable needs and constraints. To act significantly and to be ethical man must be social, i.e. one among others and not, as Kant taught us, absolutely autonomous.

Of all social institutions to which man belongs most intimately language is most important. Language is a changing set of signs related by some changing rules of connection. It may be viewed

also as an ill-defined system of significant activities. I say *ill-defined* because human participation in language continuously changes its boundaries. *Strict* definitions are result of human decision and made deliberately impervious to experience.

The necessity of definition (and perhaps construction too) seems to be largely due to a basic distrust towards bodily experience and a 'rootless' desire to transcend experience on the basis of experience. Human experience is naturally significant; to signify is its very nature: one might almost say that human experience is naturally embodied in some related signs which form an ill-defined system. An act of experience is an act of signifying but not of signalling. To give signal is to make an agreed decision public; but to signify is both an act of seeing and an attempt of showing the relation (at least) between two things (taking *things* in the broadest sense). Almost always I see more than I can show: there is a persistent gap between seeing and showing. The empiricist's agony over ostensive definition is instructive. To be aware of the gap between seeing and showing is not to bridge it over. The relation between signal and significatum is conventional, and that between sign and *designatum* is determined by active experiences. Consequently, while the former is stable, the latter is not. To signify mind needs signs. In signless world it is not only that mind cannot signify but, what is more important to note, there cannot be any mind at all. To say this is *not* to define mental being but to offer perhaps the most basic description of the most basic human activities. Mental beings are the only sign-using animal known in natural history. But for their symbolic and significant acts individuals could not be social. Individuals are paradigm being. It is in language they live and live socially and do, among other things, philosophy. Language is literally a form of life; it is the essence, and not an instrument, of living. I reject the instrumentalist theory which supposes, and wrongly so, that we can experience (the world) without language and that it is only to convey or communicate experience that we need and *use* language.

It is in language that individual identifies reality both generically and specifically and holds it (and its objects) before his mind. Individual experiences the necessity of identifying the world and its objects because he is *not* the world, i. e. different from or other than it. He can identify the objects of the world because he is *in* the world.

Although he necessarily belongs to the world, individual is not identified with it. Unless he dies or is killed he cannot be identified with it. Man's distinction from the world enables him to encounter it significantly and recreate it anew for himself and others. The identity of the world is in man—in his language. No two individuals living in a language can use it identically. For every individual is a unique actor. The same form of life may be, in fact is, lived differently. We live, rather we are obliged to live, in changing and *different worlds*: one world is our dream or dogma. In the dream of uncritical sleep active experience somehow asserts itself, and therefore, even our dreams of one world are so different. Even in dreaming individuals are not unanimous.

Individuals are inescapably affiliated to a language (or family of languages); language presupposes a society, and society a world. Note, the world is unknown to us. The worlds that we encounter are pre-conditioned by language and society. This does not imply linguistic solipsism any more than my inability to jump out of my own skin implies the non-existence of everything outside my body. Like other individuals I am an embodied intentional agent in the world. My body is an immediate condition of my knowledge. Others, bodies are also condition of my knowledge, but not immediately. I can move my body easily and immediately but not so yours or hers. If my body moves and I do not move it, then it is mine only in a derivative sense, the changing sense. The changing states of my mind also condition my knowledge and do so more or less immediately. I know whatever I know always as one-among-others. The conditions (or the conceptual apparatus) of our knowledge are conserved (more or less abstractly) in our language. There is no universal language; but, as Wittgenstein says, there are different language-games woven in different sets of actions. Like one world, universal language or *universal mathesis* is a dream or dogma. The dream has been destroyed by Gödel and Tarski who have shown the intrinsic incompleteness of every language; but the dogma persists.

When I say 'I know the tree', it is to be interpreted neither in the solipsistic (or Cartesian) fashion as 'I am conscious of the tree' nor in the impersonal (or Sartrean) fashion as 'There is consciousness of the tree', but as 'The tree is for us (insofar as we share a common form of life including language). This does not deny in any way the objectivity of the tree, but merely shows the *active relevance* of the subject

in knowing. Knowledge is a joint act of designation and affirmation; knowing act is free but its direction presupposes some non-quantifiable social parameter. The critical greatness of Kant consists in pointing out that the central question to be asked about thought and action is : 'what are the conditions under which thought is true and action ethical ?' and *not* : 'what is true thought or ethical action ?' But Kant's answer to the effect that the conditions of true thought and ethical action are strictly universal and necessary betrays an anti-historical and pro-transcendental quest for sterile certainty. Kant took Hume's mistakes but not his strictures very seriously. Committed as he was to the Cartesian-Newtonian view that human body, subject to the law of causation, is external to the self which thinks and acts, Kant goes on insisting on the notions of transcendental subjectivity : man has nothing to learn from history of others' mistakes and failures, and what he has to learn he must learn from the structure of his pure reason, which, rightly understood, reveals *a priori* not only the structure of the world but also that of all knowing minds.

The hope raised by Kant's critical question has been belied by his dogmatic answer. I endorse Wittgenstein's view that every answer must stop somewhere, and agree with Popper that every answer is questionable by self-critical reason. I agree that every *transcendental regress* must stop somewhere for some practical reason, but I do not see quite why some categories or Ideas presumed to be the end of the regress must be regarded as final and unquestionable. To contend either that the categories progressively establish their credentials, or are confirmed by empirical application or that the Ideas are self-authenticated is to forestall possible criticism of the retreat to the commitments, i.e., categories or Ideas. When the questionable commitments are credited with the power to define and constitute the objective world, their massive confirmation (or self-authentication) is spurious and paradoxical.

Analysis reveals that the commitments are in fact hypothetical and fallible, and not categorical. If the gods (i.e. commitments) are allowed to face the real world, they too start sailing for the real world is undivine (i.e., unpredictable). The real world is human and, therefore, not one. Man is not equipped with *oculis rationis* — any *a priori* and infallible insight into the structure of the world. The structure of the world is a *regulative ideal*; we are obliged to study and probe into the world which is not our own idea or creation. The more we know

the objective structure (s) of the world the more we realise their endless complexity and the hollowness of the rationalist's claim to grasp them rightly.

The real world is Copernican, i. e. anthropocentric. It is by man that the true identity of the world is disclosed and it is in man — as scientist, historian and philosopher — that the true identity is realised. Reality is as it is realised or lived. It would be rash to think that anthropocentric philosophy degenerates into psychologism. To fight back the bogey of psychologism and achieve a pseudo-objectivity (a) some rationalists (e. g. Spinoza) have tried to see the World from the standpoint of GOD under the aspect of eternity and (b) some others (e. g. Kant) from that of UNIVERSAL MAN, and (c) the empiricists (from Poincare and Duhem to Nagel and Quine e. g.), suspicious of the above two strategies, take *no risk* and resort to different forms of instrumentalism. The above philosophers of widely different persuasions have curiously enough two very important characteristics in common : (i) negatively, they are not ready to take seriously *historical* individuals from whose *actual* thoughts, feelings, hopes and actions they were expected to develop a concrete and comprehensive philosophy ; and (ii) positively, nothing short of infallibility will satisfy them. The negative point results in anti-historism and abstractionism and the positive one in dogmatism or instrumentalism.

To defend the negative point (*ia*) the rationalists (e. g. Vico and Kant) say that Man as the agent of God in the World makes history possible and, therefore, all possible histories can be known by intuition into Man's *essential* nature, and (*ib*) the empiricists say that since man is shaped by his circumstances let us concentrate better into *his* circumstances and not on himself in *vacuo*. Here again one common point stands out in relief : both of them fail to see the truth about human existence in the world, viz., man's active participation in the world (both natural and social) brings about change both in the conditions of his knowledge and action and therefore, also in the world he lives in under those conditions. It is not like a squirrel chasing its own tail in a locked cage. It is a creative dialogue, or progressive dialectic, between man and other men, societies and the worlds. Since philosophy is self-critical expression of his experience of other men, societies, etc., i. e. self-in-other, the philosopher (and even the layman in his philosophical moments) lives reality most deeply, goes out of himself, and returns enriched to himself.

Before I end I shall counter one main (i.e. anti-historical) argument proffered by the rationalist, viz., the diversity of the so-called independent and real worlds can be rationally shown to be different manifestations of, or approximations to, one Real (as distinguished from dream) World. In defence of this view it has been said that different historical and cultural configurations are converging consciously or unconsciously towards one universal end, and that while 'primitive' societies are still far away from it the 'developed' ones are getting close to it. Empirical findings reveal that languages of many primitive societies contain highly complex concepts which could be ordinarily accepted as true index to the high mental development of the users of those language. Paul Radin writes : "It may seem strange to many readers, but it would be easy to demonstrate that the languages of aboriginal peoples are frequently more complex structurally than our own, that the vocabularies are just as large, sometimes even larger, that words with abstract or generalized connotations are as frequent, indeed, in some native idioms more frequent than in our own, and that the abstract connotation of a word quite commonly is expressed formally by affixes. Kant....had to coin the term *das-Ding-an-sich*.... He would have been saved that necessity had he written in Achomawi, an Indian language of northern California, spoken by a tribe with the simplest of civilizations. In that idiom every noun, pronoun and verb appears in two forms, an absolute—abstract form and a relative—concrete form. (*Primitive Man as Philosopher*, p. xxiiixiii)."

Philosophical causes have suffered more from their defenders than from their critics. Defenders of philosophy in their eagerness to defend it against *all possible* criticism convert it into a closed (i.e. reinforced dogmatic) system. It is in this way that the critical dialogue between man and man, philosopher and philosopher, breaks down. This breakdown is then rationalised by arguing that this or that *particular* man by his *essential* rationality can create (Fichte); or form (Kant), or grasp (Hegel) the Universal truth of the world. These philosophers fail to see that actively free and irreducible individuals cannot form or create a world in the constitution of which they themselves do not exist. An individual cannot think and act himself out of his thought and action. The (dream) Universe is a lived 'universe'.

A false demarcation between the universal and the individual, form and matter, or structure and stuff, simplicity and complexity, and over-emphasis of either the one or the other underlie the untenable division between rationalism and empiricism,

MAYA, THOUGHT AND SUBJECTIVITY

KALYAN KUMAR BAGCHI

The purpose of this paper is to establish that Maya is another name for viewing the world from the point of view of *Thought* and that freedom from Maya, suggested by the never-ending attempt of thought to grasp reality by producing ever-bigger syntheses is the transcendence of thought in *Subjectivity*. By way of developing the contrast between thought and Subjectivity, we shall bring out the categorial difference between the Idealism of Hegel and that of Sankara, it being understood that they are representative respectively of the characteristic Western and Indian attitudes to philosophising.

The theory of Maya is developed by Sankara in order to explain the ultimate illusory character of the world of ordinary experience. Ordinary experience is viewed by Sankara as rooted in Superimposition or adhyasa upon Brahman. The introduction of the theory of superimposition is preceded by the distinction that Sankara draws between the Subject and the object whose illegitimate commingling is just what the much-talked-of Maya is. The question arises : What is the implication of Sankara's initial emphasis upon the point of view of 'Jnanam'? Transcribing 'Jnanam' in the language of Western Rationalism and, to some extent also of Kantianism (in so far as Kant formulated his critical problem, viz., 'whether concept *per se* can devour up a reality foreign to it', on the basis of the legacy of Rationalism), we may say that '*Jnanam*' is verily that unity of concept and experience which Kant failed to achieve. It is revelational unity which devours up the apparent alien-hood of the object. For the doctrine of Maya, the Spiritual lesson of the revelational Unity of Jnanam is that till the outsideness or foreign character of the object lasts, Maya reigns supreme, there is no getting away from it.

It will not be out of place here to remind ourselves that Kant's 'Criticism of Cognition' verily consisted in asking whether Knowledge in reference to an *independent* object was possible. Thereby, Kant was questioning the traditional Realism of Western Philosophy. In modern language, Kant was taking away from the metaphysical predilections of Knowledge. In modern language, again, Kant implied that the word 'Knowledge' could not be understood in a metaphysical reference. 'Just this—nothing more, nothing short—is what is in Sankara's mind.

Sankara begins his epistemology with the analysis of experience. Experience is a two-stemmed affair, involving the subject and the

object. The point of view of Knowledge as the revelational Unity of object with concept is consequent upon viewing experience subjectively; It is the point of view of the subject, of the 'Drasta' that regards everything as meant'. Experience — analysis, in fact, presupposes subjectivity; or rather—to be more precise—it is Subjectivity that takes the whole of experience as meant, and so achieves that Kantian ideal of philosophy as Critical reflection on experience. Because this ultimate point of experience is not usually disclosed, because object is not ordinarily, i.e., *realistically* regarded as 'meant' by subjectivity, it appears, in a genuine sense, to be *distant*, to be thus *undevoured*. The spiritual demand, however, remains, viz., that it must be devoured up, must be owned, its foreign appearance must be demolished.

Can such devouring up of object, such containment of object be possible by means of Thought ? Hegel attempted to demonstrate such possibility. Kant had attempted an *immanent* i.e., Subjective criticism of thought and showed that thought is rid of its malady to produce ever-bigger conceptual syntheses *ad infinitum* by being anchored to its intrinsic Subjectivity. Kant had the insight to translate the *rationalist* problem of concept vis-a-vis object into the *transcendental* problem of subject vis-a-vis object. The concept 'means' experience and such *a priori* meaning is, to Kant, an affair of pure subjectivity. *Only the subject brings out the notion of experience as what is intended by itself;* and so the concept, Kant discovered, is released from its privation only in subjectivity. To Kant, Rationalists were not critical because they did not *probe* into what lies behind the notion of experience itself.

Let us, now, go back to the notion of Maya vis-a-vis thought. We saw that Maya arises out of the inveterate tendency of *thought* to devour up *reality* by trying to formulate the highest synthesis. But such attempt, as Kant has amply demonstrated, is fated to failure. Kant has further told us that the failure of thought is made up in subjectivity as transcending thought. *Thought has to acquiesce in the presented definite-indefinite character of its content.* Here, then, lies the clue to our understanding of the various descriptions of Maya viz., as 'Anirvacya' or indeterminable, as what cannot be described either as real or as unreal, as the unreal etc, etc. The main point in all these descriptions is two-fold : (a) the

privation of thought, its inability to contain the foreign appearance and (2) the transcendence of thought.

The emphasis on the concept of 'Maya' in Sankarite Idealism brings out its *fundamental difference* from Western Idealism. The former is based upon 'thought' or 'reason' as its ultimate category, the latter upon 'Self' or Subjectivity. Nor is this all : it is implied that *the point of view of Self arises by way of the self-explosion of thought*. Accordingly, the two systems of Idealism have to be characterised in fundamentally different ways ; Western Idealism is objective, whereas Indian (i.e. Sankarite) Idealism is transcendental. To the former thought yields an objective content that yet is appearance; to the latter, objective appearance is demolished when, from the standpoint of the Self, we can transcend 'meaning' and see that meaning-relation ensues from subjectivity in which alone all 'meaning' finds its home.

Some consequences follow. Detection of the unstable character of thought, of its self-explosive character is possible because of the *immanence of Self in thought*. But for such immanence, the idea that objectivity itself is appearance could not be suggested at all. For example, we have the Buddhist theory of illusion as 'Niralamvapratiti' according to which the illusory content is a base-less content, i. e., has no basis in reality. That objectivity appears only to be nullified or dissipated could not occur to the Buddhist. Appearance of objectivity or objective appearance is necessary, if for nothing, at least for appreciating it as illusory in the ultimate reference. The Buddhist, however, does not admit, in their scheme objective appearance.

A step farther than the Buddhistic one is taken by Bradley. That appearance shows the reality beyond is what Bradley heartily accepts and the Buddhist fails to appreciate. Thought, as Bradley tells us, is armed with a criterion of Reality, though reality goes beyond thought. Though thought fails to give us a detailed picture of reality, yet the formal structure of reality — its freedom from contradiction — is, after all, suggested by thought itself.

But why it is that Bradley, after all, ended in Agnosticism ? Though Bradley was called "more a rebel against Hegel than a Hegelian", yet the fact remains that Bradley himself failed to see the full *implications* of his revolt. The implication, in short, was the transcendence of thought, of *meaning*. As long as meaning remains, reality must appear at a distance. Not until the home of meaning, viz., the self, is seized upon, can reality forsake unto its objective,

undevoured and recalcitrant character, its 'Mayikasattva'. That thought is essentially meaning and that it fails to grasp reality because of its meaning-mode — would represent the essential points of Bradley's idealistic theory of Judgment. Yet, Bradley does not know that it is only in the direction of the Self that the privation of thought inherent in its meaning-mode can be got rid of. As meaning, i. e., as *not* image, thought is divorced from space-time context: it means through generality (i. e., concept), and this leads it nowhere. In so far as thought means through the vehicle of concepts, it is as much a loss as a gain,—gain because of the *width* of its application but loss because it becomes a 'wandering adjective'. Loosend from space-time context, it means anything in general but nothing in particular. Thought may, of course, be regarded—in the manner of the Psychological Empiricists (e. g., Berkeley and Hume)—as mere associational passage, but Bradley quite rightly (from our point of view) and quite in conformity with the Rationalist tradition, emphasises the generality of thought.

Now, the attempt of thought to devour up reality through ever-bigger but never-ending conceptual synthesis will go on if the subjectivity behind objective synthesis is not probed into. This was precisely the point that Kant made against Hume's theory of natural science as built up on empirical or associational Synthesis. In modern language, Kant's view was that *unless objective synthesis is phenomenologically understood*, the foreign character of the object could not be contained.* Kant thought that the concept per se cannot contain object if it does not give up its conceptual character. Hegel, on the contrary, pins all faith on the concept. The concept, he believes, contains objectivity, and as the concept comes from the subject, Hegel hails the construction of progressively bigger conceptual systems as the progressive containment of object by subjectivity. But Hegel does not seem to have appreciated the significance of the concept for the subject. For he does not take into consideration the inner or subjective dimension of the concept. The concept is a "rule of synthesis" for Kant, in the sense that the very objectivity of the object is constituted by subjectivity.

* It may indeed be legitimately asked whether Kant did not himself hold on to his belief in the independent Thing-in-Itself. But that was because he tried to 'validate' subjectivity in and through the same world of 'meaning', the world of 'construction' which subjectivity had constructed. Subjectivity is free from all 'theoretic construction, as Husserl would say. Here lies one of the fundamental points of difference between Kant and Husserl. Here lies, too, Husserl's similarity with Sankara.

When Kant said that in natural science objective synthesis is never-ending and when he prescribed the spiritual remedy in subjectivity, what he intended was that as the concept 'means' through subjectivity, '*meaning itself as a phenomenological datum should be rid of its apparent foreign-hood*'. It is quite another matter that Kant could not himself accomplish what his philosophy demanded of him, viz., the demolition of the foreign character of 'meaning'.

Credit must be given to Kant for having pointed out that objectivity is 'meant'. The Neo-Hegelians expressed the same view when they held that objectivity is judgmental. But then, they did not go to the farthest length of deciphering subjectivity behind judgment.

To turn, now, to Sankara's doctrine of Maya. It may be regarded as objective appearance, the recalcitrant Thing-in-Itself that, when phenomenologically, i. e., subjectively viewed, is demolished. Such an interpretation of Maya would perfectly accord with the Vedantic description of it as 'anirvacya', as that which can not be determined by 'Thought' (and what, therefore, transcends the Laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle). It is indeed in this sense that Sankarite Idealism is genuinely *transcendental idealism*: *to Sankara, the lesson of Transcendental Idealism is transcendence of 'meaning'*.

We may now make a brief resume of the points of difference between Rationalistic or objective Idealism and Vedantic Idealism :—

(1) That thought can do justice to Reality is what the Western Idealist accepts and the Vedantic Idealist rejects., (2) the Western Idealist believes that the content of thought is definite ; the Vedantic Idealist finds and heartily accepts the presented definite-indefinite character in the content. He does not at all shrink from acquiescing in the contradiction that, according to him, is *presented to thought*. Such presented contradiction is not to be despised of, it is an opportunity towards the subjective fulfilment of the content of thought. (3) With some of the Western Idealists, e. g., Bradley, the Vedantic Idealist will accept that thought is 'meaning'. He, however, advances beyond them by releasing thought or meaning from its privation in a phenomenological or subjective over-hauling of thought. (4) Phenomenological transmutation of 'meaning' enables the Vedantic Idealist to discover the Self as the home of all meaning.

REALITY AS ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE IN MONISTIC PHILOSOPHY

H. M. JOSHI

Present century has witnessed the spectacle of Idealistic Metaphysics as culminating in abstract absolutistic or concrete individualistic nature of the Ultimate Reality. The former view is explicitly stated in the Metaphysics of F. H. Bradley where the Absolute is conceived as immutable and immobile. The Perfect does not move for movement presupposes certain object to be achieved which, Bradley holds to be the characteristic of the imperfect. The later view of the Concrete individualistic nature of Reality has been articulated in the metaphysical systems of Bosanquet, Alexander, Whitehead, in the West and that of Sri Aurobindo in the East. I propose to consider the relevance of each aspect or status of Reality and examine the value of each towards philosophical problems of one and many and ignorance and knowledge. In monistic philosophy ignorance has been compared with darkness and darkness is said to be the absence of knowledge. But I have felt that this is not an adequate explanation, for darkness is not merely the absence of light, but also the presence of something that at least seems to be opposed to light. Similarly ignorance is not merely the absence of knowledge but also the presence of something that seems to be opposed to knowledge. Take a concrete example. A seer who has complete knowledge of the essence of the Reality says, "All here is Divine". An ignorant person does not merely deny the existence of the Divine, but asserts that all here is else than the Divine, i.e. he says that everything is essentially material. Thus the ignorant person not only denies the Divine but asserts something else than the Divine also. In this sense, technically speaking, ignorance is not merely privative, but it is also projective. Or ignorance does not merely hide the Reality, but creates something else than Reality. This clearly indicates that ignorance which is a projection can totally hide what is truly Real. This is not accepted unfortunately by certain monistic philosophers. Those who maintain that there are degrees in knowledge hold ignorance to be part of true knowledge and therefore that of Reality. One of the consequences that follows from such a position is that there is nothing like falsehood which limits Reality and that which is said to be appearance remains as it is a part of Reality. Such a consequence is both fatal and ill-conceived for a healthy and perfect monism.

Owing to such an ill-conceived view of the nature of ignorance

and its relationship with Reality thinkers such as Bradley and Russell believe that Man is but a part of the whole Reality and therefore, since he can never become the whole, he can never know the whole Reality. And if this is so, to aspire for the complete knowledge and to destroy all ignorance completely is unjustified. Inspite of such a view the fact remains that persons do aspire for complete knowledge. Bradley holds that every human being has a tendency to become the whole wholly. Bradley may pronounce that this is an unjustified aspiration since there cannot be any approximation between part which is a person and the whole which is the Absolute. But a person seeks Knowledge, Existence and Bliss and he cannot seek them unless he is already, in essence, in possession of these qualities. Man is always at every moment cutting ignorance bit by bit, and enlarging his knowledge. If ignorance were endless, this cutting of it bit by bit would have been impossible. Thus ignorance can be destroyed and man's aspiration is not unjustified. Now a question may be asked whether the Reality which is Absolute can conceal or veil itself. This is quite pertinent in the philosophy of Sankara as he maintains that the Ultimate Reality is luminous and that it is capable of being hidden. Here there are two possibilities. Either the Luminous Being can be capable of being hidden or cannot be so capable. Suppose that the Luminous being is not so capable. Then man could never have been ignorant. He would have been constantly aware that he is the Absolute. But this is not a fact. Although man is essentially the Reality which is Absolute he is outwardly a creature of suffering, death and ignorance. But if ignorance is regarded as illusory we can hold that the Luminous being is incapable of being concealed. When that illusion is taken away the luminosity is experienced as always present and to have been darkened. When it is experienced, it is experienced as ever luminous and it is realized that it is incapable of being concealed, when that illusion is taken away the luminosity is experienced as always present and to have been darkened. When it is experienced, it is experienced, it is experience, it is experienced as ever-luminous and it is realized that it is incapable of being concealed.

We can, however, ponder here over the meaning of illusion and further think whether ignorance can be regarded as illusory. Illusion may be either existing or be non-existing. If it does not exist, we could never have thought of illusion, for, that which does not exist we never think of. We do think of a golden mountain although it

does not exist in the physical world. But we do think of it because both gold and mountain do exist in the physical world, and the golden mountain does exist in the mental world. Thus that which does not exist at all either in the physical world or in the mental world, can never be made an object of judgment. Thus illusion must exist. But if the illusion does exist, it must really exist. For nothing can illusorily exist. Even in the example of the rope-snake illusion, the snake that is perceived, is perceived because the snake really did exist in the mental world. If you had never seen any snake at all, you could have never perceived snake in the place of rope. Thus if the illusion does really exist, it ceases to be an illusion. For something can be regarded to be illusory, if it has no place in Reality at all. But if Reality is Existence, and that which we regard as illusory really does exist, it must have some place in Reality. And thus what we regarded as illusory cannot be regarded as illusory, and therefore, if ignorance is there, it cannot be regarded as illusory.

Of course, there may still be an important suggestion that ignorance is in its very nature unintelligible. But we may ask whether it is unintelligible to a person only or to the Reality which is a Luminous being. We may also insist on the view that philosophy is an inquiry into the nature of world not only from a person's standpoint but from the point of view of the Ultimate Reality. Therefore, if it is contended that ignorance is unintelligible from a person's standpoint, it may not be accepted as a philosophical proposition. In philosophy we cannot accept anything as unintelligible unless it is unintelligible to the Ultimate Reality also.

But to the Ultimate Reality, ignorance cannot be unintelligible for the Ultimate Reality must be itself luminous. And for complete luminosity and complete knowledge, there cannot be anything unintelligible. Hence ignorance is neither illusory nor unintelligible. Thus if ignorance is a fact the way in which it can remain consistent with Reality which is luminous is the capacity of the Reality to conceal itself.

There is still another ground upon which this can be shown to be so. If you grant that Luminous being is omnipotent, you cannot say that it is incapable of concealing itself for that incapacity would be inconsistent with its omnipotence. Indeed it is true that such capacity to conceal itself should not be such that by the exercise of which it becomes less potent.

The consideration of potency carries us to the question as to whether Reality which is one without the second and is luminous can ever change. For if it changes, it can never be regarded as the ultimate fact. The ultimate fact must be permanent, and if that is so luminosity cannot be regarded as being concealed if by such concealment it ceases to be luminous.

Here we should not be misled by the term 'One'. What do we mean when we say that the Ultimate Reality is One. Do we mean that it is one of many? If one is not many, and if many is a fact, the many must, in some way, be included in the One, if the Ultimate Reality is one. If One is understood as inclusive of many, can it not be maintained that One must have of necessity many aspects?

The difference between the proposition that the One Reality must have many statuses and the proposition of the pluralists that the Reality is not one but many should be clearly borne out at this stage. The pluralists hold that many are independent reals and irreducible to one single principle, while according to the view here propounded, the many are essentially one, they are dependent upon the One-reducible to the One.

Now, if Reality is held as one having many statuses the question of the relation between One and Many requires to be elucidated and I should immediately take into consideration the criticism of Bradley and Sankara against the reality of Relation. Relation implies that the two terms are related. But when two terms are related, there are no more two terms, but three, the two terms related, and the third being the relation itself. Now again there must be the relation between the first term and the third term. And that can be related by the fourth term. But then there must be relation between the third term and the fourth term, and that would require a fifth term; and so on indefinitely. Thus one can never explain the notion of relation and it is to be condemned as unintelligible. But if Reality is intelligible then relation cannot be regarded as real.

I will here attempt to show the mistake in this argument. If two terms are related to each other, they can be related only when there is something common between the two. It is this common point that explains the relation between the two. But now, this common point that explains the relation between the two must be inclusive of both, for otherwise, it cannot explain the relation between the two.

Thus this third term which is inclusive, should be regarded as the one final truth and the first two terms as the expressions of this final truth. Thus, we may say that Relation does not require an infinite explanation, since one of the terms in relation, is not only self-explaining, but also other-explaining. Hence, relation is real because it is intelligible.

Thus we see that Ultimate Reality is one and has many statuses and that it is variously one and that essentially it can never change, and yet it can have relation with the Many, that there is no incompatibility between having relations with the many and still remaining always identical with itself.

In essence, we have seen that the Ultimate Reality is one without the second. There is always identity. And if this is so, it is the sole independent entity. Thus this essence is independent of any relation whatsoever. And when it is so independent of any relation, it is independent of any dynamism or movement. Thus this ultimate Reality is static. For by static we mean that which is never capable of change, and that which is independent of movement. Thus we prove that the Ultimate Reality is static. This static Reality, in philosophy, is known as the Absolute, it is also known as the Impersonal.

We have shown that the Ultimate Reality is also related to many. And I showed that this relation is the relation of immediacy and is real. This relation is dynamic, moving. Thus we come to the view that the Ultimate Reality is also dynamic. In philosophy, the dynamic Reality is known as the dynamic God, or the personal God. Hence I have shown that the Ultimate Reality is at once static and dynamic, impersonal and personal.

BEING AND NON-BEING

S. S. SHARMA

The problem of Being and Non-Being is an old problem of Philosophy. It has engaged the attention of the philosophers right from the early Greek period. It is also basically ambiguous and has therefore been interpreted in a number of different ways. For a proper understanding of the problem, it is necessary to approach it in the proper historical perspective.

According to Parmenides and his disciples of the Eleatic school, every thing real belongs to the category of Being, as the only possible object of thought. Parmenides maintained that whatever exists 'must be absolutely, or not at all'. To exist in an 'absolute' way meant for Parmenides that whatever is, simply is. We can never admit, he said, that 'anything should come into Being....out of Non-Being. He regarded the concept of 'coming into Being or Becoming' as absurd for he maintained that something either is or is not. The conception behind the concept of change is just this that something changes from Non-Being to Being or from Being to Being. But this assumption made no sense, according to him. His reason, as it seems to me, was as follows. If one says that something arises out of Being as Thales and other Milesians did, there cannot then be any coming into Being for, if it arises out of Being, it already is. Similarly, if something is said to arise out of Non-Being, one assumes that Non-Being is something. But to say that Non-Being is something is clearly a contradiction since every something has Being.

Leucippus and Democritus formulated a theory about the nature of things that bears a striking resemblance to some twentieth-century scientific views.

According to Leucippus and Democritus, the nature of things consists of an infinite number of particles or units called atoms. To these atoms both Leucippus and Democritus ascribe the characteristics that Parmenides had ascribed to the One, namely, indestructibility and therefore, eternity. Thus whereas Parmenides had said that reality consisted of a single One, the atomists now say that there are an infinite number of atoms. These atoms exist in space and differ from each other in shape and size.

Coming to Plato, we find, that he accepted the first part of Parmenides' argument, namely that referring to thought as distinct

from matter and maintained that though Becoming is indeed an apparent characteristic of everything sensory, the true and ultimate reality, that of ideas, is changeless and of the nature of Being. It may be remembered here that Ideas, according to Plato, are those changeless, eternal and non-material essences of which the actual visible objects are only copies. According to him, 'Ideas' alone are truly real. They embody Being. Plato holds that Ideas are separate from concrete things. They exist apart from the things we see. Plato also develops a theory of non-being by giving to 'Matter' a status in his metaphysical scheme. But, this matter, having no imprint of ideas upon it is the principle of nothing. It is pure abstraction because it is arrived at by carrying the process of abstraction to its maximum limit.

Aristotle probably believed that no useful purpose could be served by assuming the separate existence of Ideas. He was convinced that Plato had confused 'reality' with existence and, therefore, he felt that a logical discrepancy was inherent in Plato's theory of Ideas. He tried to achieve a compromise among all the prevalent notions of Parmenides and Plato and contended that though Being, as the essence of things, is eternal in itself, it manifests itself only in change in so far as Ideas or Forms have no existence independent of and transcendent to the reality of things and minds.

The medieval thinkers never revived the controversy as a whole though, at times, they emphasised Being (as in Neo-Platonism), and at other times, Becoming (as in Aristotelianism). But, with the rise of new interest in Nature, the problem once more grew in importance. Spinoza regarded change as a characteristic of 'model' existence and assumed, in this connection, a position very much similar to that of Plato. It may be remembered here that Spinoza offered a strikingly unique conception of God in which he identified God with the whole of cosmos. According to him the words, God and Nature, are interchangeable. Spinoza thus stripped the idea of God of earlier meanings by emphasising not the relation between God and man but a basic unit between them. "Whatever is", he said, "is in God and nothing can exist or be conceived without God".

Hegel gave a new direction to the problem. To appreciate Hegel's notion of Being and Non-Being it is necessary to understand properly the general background of his philosophy. Hegel looked upon the world as an organic whole. For him the truly real is what he called the

Absolute. Nothing, said Hegel, is unrelated. According to him, whatever we experience as separate things will, upon careful reflection, lead us to other things to which they are related until at last the process of dialectical thought will end in the knowledge of the Absolute.

Thus Hegel neither accepts the premise of materialism, which holds that there are separate, finite particles of hard matter nor does he accept the extreme alternative (of essential unity of everything) put forward in the ancient world by Parmenides and more recently by Spinoza. Hegel describes the Absolute as a dynamic process, as an organism having parts but nevertheless unified into a complex system. The Absolute is therefore not some entity separate from the world. Hegel believed that the inner essence of the Absolute can be reached by human reason because the Absolute is disclosed in nature as well as in the working of the human mind. What connects these three — the Absolute, Nature and mind is thought itself.

Let us understand the triadic movement of Being, Nothing and Becoming more fully. Hegel holds that the mind always moves from the more general and abstract to the specific and concrete. The most general concept we can form about things is that they *are*. Although various things have specific and different qualities, they all have one thing in common, namely, their Being. Being then is the most general concept the mind can formulate. Also, Being must be logically prior to any specific thing. Hegel's system begins, therefore, with the concept of Being. Such Being has in it no determinations whatever, for we have abstracted from it all determinations. It is therefore absolutely indeterminate and featureless, completely empty and vacant, a pure vacuum. This vacuum, this utter emptiness, is not anything. It is the absence of everything, of all determinations, quality and character. But such absence of everything is simply nothing. Being, therefore, is the same thing as Nothing, for the thought of Nothing is the thought of Emptiness and this Emptiness is pure Being. Thus the thought of Being and the thought of Nothing become, in a sense, identical. They pass into each other. Being passes into Nothing and Nothing passes back into Being. The two, being identical, are like the two sides of the same equation.

But the assertion that Nothing passes back into Being may appear puzzling to some although there may be no difficulty in understanding that Being passes into Nothing. This is because the idea of 'passage' brings time-factor into the mind. But it must be remembered here,

that the 'passage' is only a logical or equational transition. It means only that the thought of Being is identical with the thought of Nothing. This passage of Being into Nothing and Nothing into Being is Becoming. Becoming thus comprehends and sublimates the distinction of Being and Nothing.

It may also be mentioned in this connection that Being and Nothing taken apart from each other are both abstractions. Each is a false abstraction, a one-sided half-truth, which cannot stand alone. Only when they are taken together do we get the concrete truth of Becoming. Thus, according to Hegel, Being and Non-Being are different 'moments' of the same cosmic process.

This Becoming, according to Hegel, in a new form, becomes the thesis of a new triad and will be opposed by an anti-thesis. This opposition will be again superceded in a further synthesis. Thus as logic advances, the categories become more and more concrete, and thus the final category becomes the most concrete category of all.

It seems to us that Hegel's philosophy of Being and Not-Being is no doubt very simple and illuminating, but it is far too abstract and very far removed from the world of concrete and personal experiences. Hegel never gets beyond the logical formulation of Not-Being so as to relate it to human reality. Besides, instead of viewing Not-Being as logically dependent upon Being, Hegel has made the notion of Being and Not-Being contemporary. Further, Hegel has inadvertently bestowed a Being upon Non-Being.

That makes it almost necessary for us to re-view the problem in the human context. Martin Heidegger and Jean Paul Sartre have thought upon the problem in some such manner. The originality of Heidegger consists in his claim that a proper analysis of Being necessarily involves an analysis of Nothing as well, for 'Being and Nothing hang together and 'Nothing', conceived as the pure 'other' than what is, is the veil of Being. Sartre holds that Heidegger has made considerable progress by removing Being from Nothingness and by seeing both Being and Not-Being as a tension of opposing forces. He is also commended for discussing Nothingness as a part of human experience and not merely as an abstraction as we find in Hegel.

The central problem of Heidegger's philosophy is the problem of Being. He considers the problem in its temporal and historical character as focussed in the life and existence of man. He analyses the individual

man in his relation to himself, to his environment, and to other men. The existence of the individual is finite and temporal and it is man's awareness of his finitude and transience which gives his existence its peculiar character. According to Heidegger, the entire existence of man is permeated by a tragic anxiety or anguish, induced by the sense of the inevitability of death. The individual envisages his own death and is thus confronted by absolute Nothingness, a Nothingness which is not mere absence of existence but a primodial reality. This is the import of his assertion that man's existence is a 'being for death'.

Although Heidegger has made some improvement upon Hegel's concept of Being and Non-Being, his own theory also, suffers from serious defects. Heidegger, by causing the world to be suspended in Nothingness, has taken away all possibility of accounting for any origin for nihilations. Moreover, Heidegger explains the experience of Nothingness in and through a sense of dread only. But to our mind, this does not fully explain the sense of Nothingness which we experience in very many little acts of life. It cannot account for the Non-Being which is involved in every question, in every negative judgment, in prohibitions etc. Again Heidegger talks about Nothingness without providing a Being in which this Nothingness is founded. In short, it neglects the structure of the human mind or consciousness.

It may be pointed out that whereas Heidegger was concerned chiefly with Being and with the existence of the person only as a means for understanding Being, Sartre became pre-occupied almost solely with the existence of the individual. In the very introduction of his massive work, '*Being and Nothingness*', Sartre contrasts his position with that of realism and idealism, rejects any idea of a noumenal world behind the phenomenon and explains his own idea of the 'transphenomenality of Being'. His philosophy is not idealism because Being in no way creates consciousness or is in any way dependent on consciousness for its existence. Being is already there, without reason or justifications. It is not exhausted by any or by all of its appearances though it is fully there in each of its appearances. It always overflows whatever knowledge we have of it. It is pre-supposed by all our questions and by consciousness itself. This 'transphenomenality of Being' means that the object of consciousness is always outside and transcendent, that there is for-ever a resistance, a limit offered to consciousness, an external something which must be taken into consideration. Without consciousness Being does not exist either as a

totality (in the sense of the world) or with differentiated parts. It is a fullness of existence, a plentitude which cannot possibly isolate one part so as to contrast it with another or conceive a 'nothing' in opposition to which it is 'everything'. It is simply undifferentiated, meaningless massivity. Without consciousness there would not be a world, mountains, rivers, chairs etc., there would be only Being. In this sense, there is nothing without consciousness, but there is not nothing. Consciousness causes these to be things because it is itself nothing. To make this point more clear, it may also be pointed out that, according to Sartre, Nothing has no meaning without Being, for it is that which is other than Being. If there were somehow no Being, Nothing would concomitantly disappear. As the emptiness of particular Being, every negation (by a reversal of Spinoza's famous statement) is a determination. Nothing takes on a kind of borrowed being. In itself it is not, but it gets its efficacy concretely from Being. Sartre says 'Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of Being, like a worm'.

Sartre's examination of Nothingness present in man shows that Non-Being is the condition of any transience towards Being. He holds that Nothingness is revealed to us most fully in anguish. Man generally tries to escape from this state of anguish. Being a representative of atheistic existentialism, Sartre denies the existence of God and believes in, what Heidegger calls, 'human relativity'. To begin with, man is nothing. He first of all exists. Sartre's famous thesis is that existence precedes essence. A man first of all exists, encounters himself, emerges in the world and defines himself afterwards. According to Sartre, man is capable of making himself. By saying that 'man primarily exists' Sartre means that man is, before all else, something which propels itself toward future and is aware that it is doing so. Man thus possesses a subjective life instead of being a kind of moss or a fungus or cauliflower. The thesis that existence precedes essence implies that man is responsible for what he is. According to Sartre, man is responsible not only for his own individuality but he is responsible for all men. In choosing for himself man chooses for others.

It may be remembered in this connection that Sartre makes a distinction between unconscious Being (Being-in-itself) and conscious Being (Being-for-itself) and he makes it quite clear that Being-in-itself is logically prior to Being-for-itself, that the latter is dependent on the former both for its origin and in its continued history. Applying this

distinction to man, one can say that man shares both of these two modes of being, the en-soi indicating that he is (the way a stone is) and the pour-soi indicating that he is a conscious subject (which therefore differentiates him from a stone). To be a conscious subject is to stand constantly before a future. The most important consequence of placing existence before essence in human nature is that man not only creates himself but that man is responsible for what he is. Existentialism, Sartre holds, puts the entire responsibility for everything squarely upon each man, and this causes anguish and anxiety. This anxiety is for one-knows-not-what, for "*nothing*". The awareness of nothingness, therefore, characterises the being of man.

CAN METAPHYSICS SURVIVE ?

B. S. SANYAL

In other and figurative words : 'Can Plato's beard be uprooted by Occam's razor ?' The answer is : 'No. The utmost the razor can do is to shave it; it can never destroy the beard.'

The antimetaphysical movement has assumed different forms at different times. In old or classical philosophy, we discern, for example, commonsensical and scientific, materialistic and humanistic, empiricist and marxist antimetaphysics. Each is a kind of metaphysics since each has a criterion of *reality*; but each calls itself antimetaphysical on the ground of its *narrow* criterion of the real.

In new, i.e. recent philosophy, we may discern three generic forms of antimetaphysics : linguistic analysis, phenomenologism, and extensional pragmatics. Each becomes antimetaphysical by way of a solipsistic evasion of correlating expression, intention and extension. This co-ordination alone can answer questions about the real and the unreal in a satisfactory manner. Solipsism is a dogmatic denial of this.

Metaphysics has survived and will survive the onslaught of the anti-metaphysical movement. The reason is that each trend of thought in this movement asserts its crierion of the real dogmatically; none tries to apply the test of coherence; so, even if all mankind turns antimetaphysical under duress or fashionable thinking, there will always remain the possibility of metaphysics. Secondly, if the definition (i. e. the constant idea) of the word 'metaphysics' is discovered and fixed in the sense of ontology, there can be no antimetaphysics without one's stating a criterion of reality, that is to say, without one's doing a bit of metaphysical thinking. Thirdly, if it is a question of historical, i. e. synthetic empirical, prediction, both the answers affirmative and negative are unpredictable : neither answer to the question : 'Can metaphysics survive ?' would be either true or false.

But then, the question 'Can metaphysics survive ?' is a philosophical one, to be exact, a metaphysical one; it is not a scientific question, one of prediction of the sociological kind : A time may come when there will be no metaphysics; even as there was a time in the life of mankind when there was no metaphysics : this does not concern us here.

As a philosophical question, it may be re-worded thus : Can we say that metaphysical sentences are meaningful and true, and if so, how do they become so ? This is an age-old question, a timeless one : this is

the question of justification of metaphysics as such. I'll answer the first part of the question in the affirmative : Yes, some metaphysical sentences are meaningful and true. How they become so needs a careful and sustained analysis.

Put in the logical form, our problem is to test whether the sentence 'Some metaphysical sentences are meaningful and true' is meaningful and true and then to examine whether the tests themselves are sound or not. My answers are : some metaphysical sentences are meaningful and true and they become so in a logical manner which is a systematic unity of the analytic *a priori* and the synthetic empirical manners and which is yet to develop fully and crystalize formally into what can be called the synthetic *a priori* decision procedure.

To defend this, I will develop a fivefold argument : (i) metaphysical expressions are a species of the synthetic *a priori*. It is possible and sometimes necessary to have synthetic *a priori* sentences; in other words, some synthetic *a priori* sentences are meaningful and true. We can clearly define the synthetic *a priori*; we can clearly state the tests of meaninglessness, meaningfulness, truth and falsity of the SA sentences. (ii) The notion of categorial contradiction, which is the logical core of the synthetic *a priori* metaphysical, is at least as clear as the notion of self-contradiction, which is the logical core of the analytic *a priori*, and as clear as the notion of factual contradiction, which is the logical core of the synthetic empirical. (iii) The definition of the word 'category' and the inventory or tests of categories are not just a matter of arbitrary decision or convention but necessary though synthetic *a priori* necessary. (iv) The synthetic *a priori* proof as a decision procedure is possible. It has been in the making : this can be discerned in the many attempts of logicians in the fields of modal and deontic logic and existential pragmatics. (v) The word 'metaphysics' has a constant intension as well as a number of variable intensions. In other words, the word is definable and there are many criteria of the metaphysical. In the definable sense of metaphysics, metaphysics is inevitable and it casts its many shadows that are antimetaphysics and that produce the many criteria of the metaphysical. I will clarify each of these points.

II

Metaphysical expressions are a species of the synthetic *a priori* expressions. Ethical, aesthetic, epistemological statements are some other species of the SA¹.

Empiricists, one kind of the so called antimetaphysicians, hold the dogma that no synthetic sentences are *apriori*. This is also stated in alternative forms : All S.A. sentences are meaningless; No S.A. sentences are meaningful.

Now this anti-S. A. position of some contemporary philosophers (neo-Humeans and Wittgensteinians) can be easily refuted. The simplest refutation is as follows. The sentence 'No synthetic sentence is *apriori*' is itself a synthetic *apriori* sentence ; so, at least one S. A. sentence is held by empiricists to be meaningful and true ; for them there is no S. A. meaningfulness and truth ; so the statement is held to be meaningful and true either *apriori* analytically or synthetic empirically; so the same sentence is both S.A. and A.A. or S.E. : this is a case of categorial contradiction ; hence the sentence is S. A. meaningless.

The statement 'No synthetic sentences are *apriori*' follows from the Humean division of propositions into the analytic and the empirical. This does away with the dichotomies analytic and synthetic, and empirical and *apriori* : it obliterates the distinction (which is categorial) between analytic and *apriori* on the one hand and between synthetic and empirical on the other. This oversimplification results from an inability to see or clarify the distinction between intension and extension and to have divisions of sentences on the two principles of division — the method of knowing the intension and the method of knowing the extension.

The statement 'All S.A. sentences are meaningless' results from an over-simplified theory of meaning : An expression is said to be meaningful if and only if the intension is known by the extension being known or the extension is known by the intension being known : This ignores the third possibility of expressions becoming meaningful when the two are independently known (as the S.A. ones do).

The statement 'No SA sentences are meaningful' is a variant of the above. All synthetic being empirical and all *apriori* being analytic, and the division of sentences into the empirical and the analytic being dichotomous, no SA expressions are possible, i. e. meaningful. Such sentences are found meaningless in an empirical manner : their affirmation leads to factual contradiction ; they are found false in an analytic manner : their denial leads to no self-contradiction.

Now this can be refuted : some of these sentences are meaningful in an *apriori* manner : their affirmation leads to no categorial contradiction ; they are also found to be true in a synthetic manner : their denial leads to categorial contradiction ; e. g. 'Socrates is not 9' ; 'It is not the case that Monday is five feet high' ; 'some synthetic sentences are *apriori* meaningful'. A longer process of refutation needs a set of clearcut definitions and divisions and clarification of interpretative principles.

The function of expressions is to express—to express meaning. Psychologically, meaning is feeling, wish and information about reality. Logically, meaning is synonym or use—syntactic use, semantic use, pragmatic use. Semantic use is reference to thought and reality. Reference to thought is called intension. Reference to reality is called extension.

Now expressions can be functionally divided on the principles of divisions, such as independence of intension or extension. If the intension of an expression is independent of its extension, we call it *apriori*; if not, we call it empirical. If the extension of an expression is independent of its intension, it is synthetic; if not, analytic. Each expression is to be of one kind or the other on each division. This gives us four kinds : one of them is the SA. So the SA is as clearly definable as any other kind. And this neo-Kantian division is more reasonable than the Humean dichotomy.

The tests of meaninglessness, meaningfulness, truth and falsity are given in terms of contradiction. Contradiction is of three kinds : self-contradiction, categorial contradiction, factual contradiction. The law of logic works in all fields (AA-e.g. mathematical, SA-e.g. philosophical, SE-e.g. scientific) If the law is ignored, the kind of contradiction or meaninglessness that arises is : (i) *Self-contradiction* in the field of the AA; (ii) *categorial contradiction* in the field of the SA; or (iii) *factual Contradiction* in the SE field, according as the inconsistency lies between (i) definitions (constant intensions, fixed uses); (ii) the categories (constant extensions, ultimate or tertiary forms of being); or (iii) the facts (constant extensions, primary-perceptual or secondary-scientific forms of being), of the elements of expressions.

The tests can now be clearly stated. If on affirming a given sentence, the result is contradiction, then, the sentence is meaningless :

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self-contradiction giving AA meaningfulness; categorial contradiction giving SA meaningfulness; no factual contradiction giving SE meaningfulness. If on affirming the given sentence, the result is no contradiction then the sentence is meaningful: no self-contradiction giving AA meaningful; no categorial contradiction giving SA meaningful; no factual contradiction giving SE meaningful. If on denying the given sentence, the result is contradiction, the given sentence is true: s.c. giving AA true; c.c. giving SA true; and f.c. giving SE true. Lastly, if on denying the given sentence is no contradiction (s.c., c.c., f.c.), the given sentence is false (AA, SA, SE). (F.c. meaning non-occurrence leaves the truth-value undetermined). So, the tests of the logical values of the SA sentences are as clear as those for the AA or the SE sentences.

So, like AA or SE, some SA sentences can be meaningless, some can be meaningful and true; some can be meaningful and false. For example, 'Socrates is 9', 'The last day of the week is five feet long', 'Space and Time take tea without sugar', 'Her mind is made up of alluvium'— these are SA meaningless, 'Some synthetic sentences are a priori', 'Socrates is not 9'. 'It is not the case that Saturday is 5 ft. long', 'A sentence is said to be a proposition if and only if it is either true or false' — these are SA meaningful and true sentences. 'Saturday is the last day of the week', 'A sentence is said to be a proposition if and only if it is true or false or probable' — these are examples of SA meaningful but false sentences.

So, there is nothing in the definitions of the words, 'synthetic' and 'a priori', or in their categorial character, or in empirical facts, that makes the SA impossible: it is possible to have a sentence of which we know the intension independently of its extension and know its extension independently of its intension.

III

The notion of categorial contradiction is the logical core of the SA metaphysical. This notion is at least as clear as the notion of self-contradiction, which is the logical core of the analytic a priori, and as clear as the notion of factual contradiction, which is the logical core of the synthetic empirical. Thus ' $2+2=5$ ' is self-contradictory: here the two constituents of the sentence are of the same category; both are numbers; and the inconsistency arises because of the definition of

'4'; '4' is '4', not '5'. 'Socrates is 9' is categorically contradictory : here the two constituents 'Socrates' and '9' are of two different categories : one is a concrete individual, the other an abstract number; abstract and concrete are ultimate polar opposites; a concrete individual cannot be identical with an abstract number; the number can be applied to him for some purposes, while enumerating, for example, or in measuring his height or weight; in such cases the number becomes a concrete number. 'Socrates is a pencil' is a factual contradiction : both the constituents are of the same, i. e. empirical, category and then of different empirical kinds; and a thing of one kind cannot be a thing of another kind.

'Category' has been a controversial word. But if we persist, we may find it a fixed intension and then we may agree upon a fixed inventory of categories. From Aristotle to Kant and from Kant to Gilbert Ryle, the attempt has not been altogether futile. At any rate the fixing of these is not a matter of arbitrary decision or convention : it is necessary, though not necessary.

The categories are types of predicates, concepts and beings—ultimate, philosophical, valuational, tertiary in character as opposed to the intermediate, scientific-perceptual, factual, secondary-primary types. In Aristotle's list, ten categories have been distinguished : substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, situation, state, action and passion. Later philosophers have dropped the last four and added cause and effect, ground and consequence, and subject and object.

'A category is one of the ultimate forms of being. If men asked what a table was, the answer might be *an article of furniture*. If we asked what that was, the answer might be *a material thing*. If we asked what that was, the answer might be *a substance*. If we asked what substance was, there was no answer; we had reached the dead end. Substance is an ultimate form of being in the sense that it is like no other and has no genus but being itself.'

'Take another example, what is Wednesday ? It is a day. What is a day ? It is a stretch of time. What is time ? Here again we are at the dead end. Time is a unique and ultimate form of being. We see it when we try to define it. We can define it only by itself, that is, in a circular way. If we say, e. g., that it is the form of being whose parts exist successively, the 'successively' means in time.'

'To confuse any of these ultimate forms of being with another, to say, for example, that a place or a stretch of time is a thing, is to commit a category mistake....(Brand Blanshard, REASON and ANALYSIS). Kant's table of categories shows an advance. Categories are extended to include the relations between terms, to belong to judgments and to characterize, not terms, but the relations between terms or propositions. Ryle extends the list to what he calls *sentence factors*, such as 'I', 'the man who', 'who wrote this paper', 'wrote this paper', etc. Types of categories as constituents of propositions also determine the forms of proposition. He holds that there are an indefinite number of categories and that terms appoint their relations with a complexity and firmness².

IV

The SA proof as a decision procedure is in the making. Whatever passes as critical analysis and systematic construction in philosophy is SA argument; warrants and all possible backing of warrants are piled up in SA arguments : the cumulative effect of these, the suggestiveness of analogical and imaginative reasoning, discursive reasoning to resolve differences and disagreement, realizations by way of feeling and reasoning of all sorts : all these characterize the SA proof; but none seems to yield a decision procedure — a mechanical and conclusive technique. In establishing a particular system in philosophy we follow the following method : i) make interpretative principles clear; ii) then show that they provide genuine illumination when applied to the detailed facts; iii) elaborate a theoretical structure in accordance with a basic insight but with all kinds of reason; iv) compare it with other systems to show that it is the most comprehensive and coherent : the test of comparative incompleteness decides the false system.

Empiricist do accept the AA as well as the SE arguments which become parts of an SA discourse; they reject the SA aspect. The rationalists of to-day have gone far in their explorations of the SE and AA aspects of the SA and in having devised decision procedures for these aspects. The syntactic and semantic systems developed for modal and ethical expressions and systems of extensional pragmatics indicate what way the SA proof may be constructed as a decision procedure. We can try to make it foolproof by eliminating all intuitive residues.

Here I suggest a few interpretative principles which may be used as SA copulas : i) inclusion and supersession (SA implication); ii) the relation of partial independence and partial dependence (SA bi-implication); iii) categorial contradiction (SA negation). The constituents for these copulas are of course categorial which include (and supersede) the factual and the definitional.

The SA decision procedure may then consist of reasoning of all sorts sustained in a systematic manner by means of the above copulas. The longest chain giving the most comprehensive and coherent is then said to be the SA meaningful and true. (Coherence as the philosophical test of truth includes and supersedes the scientific test of workability and the definition of truth as accordance with reality).

V

Now my opponent (the dogmatic empiricist antimetaphysician) may accept that some SA sentences are meaningful and true and yet raise doubts about the species of the SA that are metaphysical sentences. The SA, he may hold, as a genus may still be available as meaningful and true but it cannot include the metaphysical as a species; it might include others, that is to say, the ethical, the aesthetic and the epistemological.

We may therefore now ask 'What is metaphysics ?'. The question is a demand for two things—the definition or constant intension of the word 'metaphysics' and the criteria of the metaphysical. The constant intension of the word is to be discovered by looking for a common element in all the current pragmatic uses (variable subjective intensions) of the word 'metaphysics' and its categorial correlative 'antimetaphysics' (and some further conceivable uses). And if we look into the many different criteria,³ we do discover a common element. This may be expressed as a definition. I hold that such a definition is found in the use of the word in the sense of ontology.

'Ontology' is the name of that branch of philosophy which deals with the nature of reality. It looks into and for the definition of the word 'real' and many different criteria of reality. It compares these and finds out which one is the coherent, that is, most comprehensively consistent. The use of the word 'metaphysics' in the sense of ontology seems to be its constant intension or definition. Now, it is obvious that no amount of arguing can show that this branch of philosophy has atrophied or that it ought to be cut out altogether. The question of

real and unreal will be discussed and rediscussed by every new generation; and even if such discussions seem futile in a particular epoch or in a particular cultural system, this will only mean its continued existence or survival in the form of presuppositions on the part of antimetaphysicians.

In a wider sense, however, metaphysics is the study of reality and knowledge, i. e. both ontology and epistemology. And in the widest sense it is identical with philosophy as a whole. There are still wider senses. The word is used equivocally over a fairly wide range.

The whole gamut of experience as we face reality may be called the field of the ontological. This is divided in a dichotomous division : the logical and the pre-logical. The pre-logical is subdivided into the reflex-active stage and the instinctual stage. The logical is divided into the commonsense objective, scientific inter-objective, philosophical objective-subjective. The philosophical stage is subdivided into the natural, the social and the spiritual. Now, if we take these in a graded manner on the principle of inclusion and supersession (which is nothing but S.A. implication), a thinker at an earlier stage can call himself an anti-metaphysician in relation to a thinker at a later stage and call him or condemn him as a metaphysician. Thus, a pre-logicalist would call a logicalist a metaphysician. If reflex-activism is antimetaphysical, instinctualism is metaphysical. To commonsense attitude, science and philosophy seem metaphysical. To a scientific philosopher, metaphysics is the product of trans-scientific thinking : so, philosophical attitude as such is metaphysical. (The logical positivist and the popular rationalist may be located here). To a materialist, both humanism and idealism are metaphysical ; and to humanists, the idealist is a metaphysician. (The marxists can be located here, as also the pragmatists). And even within idealism, if the first stage viz. ascetic or cynical idealism seems antimetaphysical, the second stage i. e. prophetic messianic idealism and the third stage viz. absolute idealism seem metaphysical ; if messianic in its turn is held as antimetaphysics, then, absolute idealism is metaphysical.⁴

We thus find the clue to the antimetaphysical attitude. It is rooted in a fixation of feeling for experience on a particular level of existence or a particular stage of experience ; then, the higher levels or later stages (which include and supersede the earlier or lower ones) are said to be metaphysical.

In classical philosophy, idealism is deemed metaphysical from all other standpoints than idealism. The idealist never grudges the label. For all the rest, there can be a claim for the label of antimetaphysical. This is one extreme. The other extreme is the idealist calling all others metaphysicians of one kind or another.

In contemporary and recent philosophy, however, we find a complex dichotomy in the socalled antimetaphysical attitudes of neo-empiricists (linguistic analysis, intensionalist phenomenologism, extensionalist pragmatism) and the socalled metaphysical attitudes of neo-rationalists (co-ordination of expressionism, intensionalism and extensionalism).

Three generic brands of antimetaphysics can be discerned : linguistic analysis, phenomenologism, and extensional pragmatics. Each is a kind of solipsism. Linguistic analysis involves analysis of conventions of language : conventions are ultimately real : so linguistic analysis may be called *expressionist solipsism*. Phenomenologism is based on sense perception : perceptual experience by itself, that is to say, in its irreducible and unconstructed character is reality : so phenomenologism can be said to be *intensional solipsism*. Pragmatics is based on the successful making of computers and robots, decision procedures and social institutions, that is to say, successful objective control of nature and society and of thought about them : so this may be called *extensional solipsism*.

All these forms of antimetaphysics try to eschew metaphysics by way of a solipsistic evasion of co-ordination of the three aspects. This is an oversimplification. The co-ordination of expression, intension and extension alone can answer questions about the real and the unreal in a satisfactory manner : solipsism is a dogmatic denial of this.

From the standpoint of linguistic analysis and other brands of neo-empiricism, all classical philosophies are metaphysical as well as the neo-rationalist co-ordination of three recent varieties of solipsism. But from the standpoint of neo-rationalism, each antimetaphysical stand may be seen as an aspect of the metaphysical : here, the clue to antimetaphysics lies in solipsism — an aspect being declared as the whole and the ultimate, the incomplete being declared as the complete. The co-ordination of the three aspects, which severally yields three solipsisms (expressionist, intensional and extensional) yields the complete metaphysical system. The more perfect is the co-ordination the more

coherent and comprehensive would be the metaphysical system. Furthermore, from the standpoint of classical philosophy, each of these antimetaphysical dispositions is humanistic in character, and therefore, in the wide sense of 'metaphysics', each is metaphysical.

My feeling is that we are heading for a highly systematic noncontroversial metaphysics — which will just ultimately and ostensibly define the universe as the perfect individual. The present experiments in fragmentary antimetaphysics will add up to a neat metaphysical system. What is crumbling may be seen to be the first and crude attempts at metaphysics and antimetaphysics.

As it is, any antimetaphysics does state its own criterion of reality, though a narrow criterion and that in the manner of a definition of the word 'real'. A sector or aspect of reality is excluded by it; reality is thus bifurcated : one grasped by the philosopher, the other remaining beyond his comprehension : hence the division into the metaphysical and the antimetaphysical. The application of the criterion leads to an easy rejection of the right definition of 'real'. Furthermore, any antimetaphysics does share with metaphysics the same SA method of reasoning.

So, the antimetaphysician is a metaphysician to the metaphysician and to another kind of antimetaphysician. He is a person who deludes himself that he has eschewed metayhysics : he is an Occam who shaves Plato's beard and thinks it won't grow again.

Notes and Bibliography

1. The abbreviations used here are listed below :
 SA — synthetic 'apriori' : c. c. — categorial contradiction
 SE — synthetic empirical : f. c. — factual contradiction
 AA — analytic 'apriori' : s. c. — self-contradiction
 For clarification of these see pp. 17, 26, 34 of LOGIC : General and Analytic by B. S. Sanyal.
2. p. 22 of TEACH YOURSELF LOGIC by A. A. Luce
 pp. 344-45 of REASON and ANALYSIS by Brand Blanshard
 'Categories' by G. Ryle, in LOGIC and LANGUAGE, 2nd series, p. 74.
3. Let me list some of them here :
 A thing is said to be real if and only if

- (i) it is reducible to material atoms (atomistic materialism);
- (ii) " " " a mechanism (mechanistic materialism);
- (iii) it is spatio-temporally extended (mathematical materialism);
- (iv) it is perceptible by (and useful to) individual man representing himself alone (egoistic humanism);
- (v) it is perceptible by (and useful to) man representing a particular congregation (pragmatic humanism);
- (vi) it is perceptible by (and useful to) mankind as such (radical humanism);
- (vii) it is analyzable in terms of moral detachment from natural and social life (cynical idealism);
- (viii) it is analyzable in terms of moral organism (ethical idealism);
- (ix) it is an individuation of the absolute (absolute idealism);
- (x) it agrees to the conventional use of the word 'real' (linguistic analysis);
- (xi) it is reducible to sensa (phenomenologism);
- (xii) it is amenable to pragmatic control-institutional, mechanical, decision-procedural (pragmatic extensionalism).

Ne. (ix) seems the most comprehensive and coherent hence qualifying as the definition of 'the real'.

4. vide CULTURE : An Introduction by B. S. Sanyal.

CAN METAPHYSICS SURVIVE ?

G. C. NAYAK

The topic for the symposium is "Can metaphysics survive?" How are we to set about answering this question? What exactly is expected from us? Supposing the question is answered in the affirmative, with a yes, or in the negative, with a no, what verification procedure can be specified by us by the help of which one may ascertain the validity of the answer? This again leads us to another problem. Are the question and the answer to be understood as empirical so that some verification procedure may be relevant to the determination of the truth and falsity of the answer? Or, is the question merely analytic in character? How are we to understand this question? Supposing some one asks the physician "Do you think that the patient can survive this third heart-attack?" This is a specific question put to an expert in the field and it is expected of him that he should be able to give a prognosis of the disease and predict the longevity of the patient on the basis of medical reports available in the field and the observation of the present condition of the patient. The answer would comprise the following consideration. Under similar circumstances 99% of the patients do not survive, and it is therefore very unlikely that the patient under consideration would survive this severe stroke. The line of answer will follow, more or less, a definite pattern and can also be verified in future. The question regarding the survival of metaphysics is not of course of this sort for here the problem is not to determine whether 99% of metaphysics have already survived under certain specific circumstance or not. How then are we to understand the question?

Let us take another example. Supposing some one who believed that a certain person was responsible for the able functioning of democracy in a country poses the following question "Can democracy in India survive after the death of Indira?" The answer to the above question would comprise the consideration whether the dependence of democracy in India on a certain Prime Minister is an unconditional one or not. The answer would be controversial no doubt but the line of answer should follow, more or less, a regular pattern; the answer can also be verified in future. The problem of the survival of metaphysics is not of this sort either, for here we are not concerned with determining the probability of the survival of metaphysics in the eventuality of the removal of one of the conditions supposed to be vital for its survival.

The line of answer in the case under consideration is not clear at the first sight nor do we seem to know of any verification procedure through which we may be able to determine the validity of the answer. What then are we looking for ?

Let us consider another example. Supposing we were asked "Can mankind survive the atomic age?" How are we to respond to such a question ? The atomic age poses a constant threat for the survival of mankind in general; the question to consider is whether mankind can outlive the atomic age. The question regarding the survival of metaphysics may be understood in a similar manner. It may be taken to mean "Can metaphysics survive the age of science and technology", "Can metaphysics survive the onslaughts of logical positivism or linguistic philosophy?" or something of the sort. But how are we to set about answering the question ? How are we going to answer the question "Can mankind survive the atomic age ?" When there is a threat to one's existence from extraneous circumstances certain precautionary measures are prescribed for escape. It is thus that in the example mentioned above we are told that mankind can survive if and only if certain precautionary measures, such as strong steps towards world-peace, are taken in time. Similarly one may say that metaphysics can survive in the age of science and technology if and only if it is practised with certain precautions such as clarity and precision in expression and the like.. But then the matter does not end here, for the next question that arises is whether clarity and precision in expression and other conceivable precautions are not incompatible with metaphysics as such, a question which has its counterpart in the question "Is mankind because of its deep-rooted selfishness and aggressive instinct not inherently incapable of living in peace for ever". In all such cases what is suspected is that metaphysics is intrinsically incapable of modification necessary for its survival in the age of science and technology just as it is suspected by the pessimist that humanity is inherently incapable of taking strong steps towards world-peace which alone can save it in the atomic age. In order to be able to pass any judgment on this issue it will be, therefore, necessary to determine what exactly is the defining characteristic of metaphysics.

But whatever may be the difficulty in arriving at an agreed definition of metaphysics, it is not the only problem before us nor do I think it to be the most puzzling either. For the concept of survival in the case of a patient, a form of Government or of mankind in general is

not as vague as it is in the case of metaphysics, and it is rather this concept which needs elucidation at first. What exactly are we to understand by the death of metaphysics? Survival can only be understood by contrasting it with death. The death of a patient, of a form of Government, or of mankind in general seems intelligible quite in a straightforward manner. But is it so in case of the death of metaphysics? It seems not, for metaphysics may be said to have been dead in one sense whereas in another sense and from another consideration it may be said to be invincible." Can metaphysics survive?" is thus not a straightforward question and is at least as vague as the question "Can Democracy survive?" Democracy may be said to have been dead as a form of Government in a country and yet the spirit of democracy may be the uppermost in the minds of the people of the same country. In that case what should we say? Survival in one sense is quite compatible with death in another sense, and democracy can therefore survive in a certain sense and yet be stone-dead in another sense. The state-of-affairs in the case of metaphysics may well be a very similar one and we will be moving in a blind maze if we do not analyse the different senses in which the survival of metaphysics can be talked of.

In one sense it has been evident, at least to me and to scholars of similar conviction, that in recent years metaphysics has shown sufficient stamina in facing the onslaughts of antimetaphysical theories which have tried to prove it to be something meaningless. The different criteria of meaning taken resort to in order to get rid of metaphysics as nonsense as distinguished from science and commonsense have all proved useless for the purpose. If by the death of metaphysics one is to understand that metaphysics is shown to be meaningless nonsense then metaphysics is not yet dead and it has already shown sufficient strength to survive onslaughts of the antimetaphysical schools not only of the hoary past but also of the contemporary age. In the process it has of course undergone tremendous modifications and has grown more cautious in its dealings but it has not been dead as yet if by death of metaphysics we mean that metaphysics is proved to be something nonsensical. It should be pertinent in this connection to examine whether metaphysics can survive the contemporary positivistic and empiricistic onslaughts on it. The logical positivistic attack on metaphysics deserves a special mention in view of the fact that the attack is a recent one and also because it has certain far-reaching

significance even if it may be true that most of what we may call its fundamental dogmas are no longer taken seriously.

Without going into details of the attack it will be enough for our purpose if we point out in this connection that the verifiability criterion of meaning on which the attack is mainly based turns out to be itself an instrument belonging to the enemy's camp. That this is so is the opinion of a number of eminent philosophers working in this field.¹ The verifiability theory turns out to be metaphysical and nonsense according to the positivist criterion itself. To suggest, as Wittgenstein does, that though nonsense, the verification theory is an important and useful piece of nonsense, is to make "a vain attempt to have it both ways. No doubt some pieces of nonsense are more suggestive than others, but this does not give them any logical force. If the verification principle really is nonsensical, it states nothing; and if one holds that it states nothing, than one can not also maintain that what it states is true"² On the other hand it has been suggested that the verification principle be considered not as an empirical hypothesis but as a definition, so that though not verifiable it may not for that reason be denounced as meaningless.³ If the principle is to be taken as a definition of 'meaning' then of course the criterion of verifiability simply does not apply, but what sort of a definition, it may in that case be asked, is the present definition of 'meaning'? Does 'meaning' mean 'the method of verification of the sentence concerned', so that by exclusively attending to the meaning of 'meaning' we shall be able to determine the truth of the statement, 'The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification'? It seems not. Ayer thinks that the positivist definition "is not....entirely arbitrary" and it may well be not so, but whether it is so or not, the question 'still remains why should we accept this definition of 'meaning' as *the* definition? If somebody is a brother, he must also be a male sibling of the family because 'brother' is by definition 'a male offspring of the same parent'. To assert, therefore, that somebody is a brother and to deny at the same time that he is a male member of the family would be self-contradictory. But there seems no such self-contradiction involved in asserting that I understand the

1. c. f. J. Wisdom, "Metaphysics and Verification".

2. A. J. Ayer (ed.) "Logical Positivism" (Glencoe, Illinois : The Free Press, 1959), Editor's Introduction, p. 15.

3. C. f. Ayer, "Language, Truth and Logic (London, 1954), Introduction, p. 16,

'meaning' of a sentence while I do not know the method of its verification. If the positivist offers us a theory of meaning in his verifiability criterion, then it is itself meaningless on his own criterion of meaning in view of the fact that it is itself not verifiable. If, on the other hand, he is not prepared to regard it as a hypothesis or a theory, he is merely offering us what Stevenson calls 'a "persuasive" definition' of 'meaning' in which case we are not logically coerced to accept *his* definition of 'meaning'. There is the same lack of logical coercion if the verification theory is regarded as prescriptive or as a methodological assumption. The difficulty, on any view we take of the positivist criterion of meaning, seems insuperable. What the positivist has been able to achieve, after all, is to bring home to us, albeit in a strikingly provocative and misleading manner, the distinction between metaphysical enterprise on the one hand and empirical propositions, formal logic, and mathematics on the other — a distinction which, though not strictly maintained at times in practice, was in theory rarely, if at all, disputed in the history of philosophy. The positivist's original aim, in any case, of overthrowing the whole of metaphysics as meaningless remains unfulfilled.

Next we must briefly consider the falsifiability criterion as propounded by Popper. This criterion, as Popper himself points out so often, was proposed by him as a principle of demarcation between science and non-scientific theories but never as a theory of meaning. Nevertheless, it has been regarded as a criterion of meaning by a number of empiricist philosophers who felt dissatisfied with the rigid verifiability principle and who thought that they had found an alternative criterion of meaning in Popper's principle. Popper is no doubt anxious to retain his criterion as a principle of demarcation only, but whatever his own intention might have been, in view of the fact that his falsifiability principle has been applied as a criterion of meaning by philosophers like Flew, it is incumbent upon us to consider whether it may serve as an adequate criterion of meaning as well. A universal statement cannot be verified, whereas it can be falsified, and this asymmetry between verifiability and falsifiability led Popper to substitute falsifiability for verifiability. But it is to be noted that "there is a compensating difficulty in Popper's view. For just as universal propositions are conclusively falsifiable but not conclusively verifiable, so existential propositions are conclusively verifiable but not falsifiable...." The sentence, 'A mermaid exists' cannot be falsified because we can never be sure of the non-existence of a mermaid, no matter how often

we fail to find one, even after making as thorough a search for it as possible. But the sentence is evidently meaningful, and this shows that the falsifiability principle is not adequate as a criterion of meaning. It must further be pointed out that "some scientifically recognized sentences contain a combination of the peculiarities of universal and existential sentences (they contain both a universal and an existential quantifier) and, accordingly, can be neither verified nor falsified. This applies, for example, to statements concerning the limit of the relative frequency of a certain event in a series of events; that is, concerning probability-statements according to a commonly held view".⁴ It is now evident that neither 'verifiability' nor 'falsifiability' can serve as an adequate criterion of meaning.

The problem now takes another turn. Has metaphysics been left completely unscathed and unharmed by these attacks? We are now led from the question "Can metaphysics survive?" to the more specific question "How, if at all, does metaphysics survive?", What does this survival really amount to?" Mankind may survive the atomic age, and yet may remain as a completely invalid and useless creature on earth because of the atomic war. Similar is the case, it may be contended, with metaphysics in general. That this is so is the contention of a number of contemporary thinkers who have had an overdose of later Wittgensteinian philosophy. Metaphysics though no longer rejected as meaningless is never-the-less considered to be a piece of linguistic confusion and therefore a worthless pursuit. The result, however, is not very much different. There is no readymade principle to declare metaphysics as nonsensical and yet metaphysics is no more welcome than it used to be at the hands of the positivists. Waismann, for example, in one of his recent publications speaks of metaphysics in the following manner :—" it is various analogies, springing up from the depth of language, which, unperceived, hold our thought in thrall. Such an analogy is, for instance, already embodied in the use of the substantives 'meaning', 'truth', etc. When we deal with a substantive, we involuntarily think of the case in which the word is correlated with an object, in the same way that the name of a person is connected with the person. And we are tempted to look upon, a word like 'meaning' analogously. We look for a 'being' which will fit the word in question, we people the world with aetherial beings

4. J. Jorgensen, "The Development of Logical Empiricism" (Chicago, 1951)

to be the shadow-like companions of substantives. Typical examples of entities of this sort are such substantives as 'being', 'soul' the 'ego', etc. Even verbs do not escape this treatment; for instance, such a verb as 'to exist', which seems to refer to a sort of shadow-like activity characteristic of every thing. The science which deals with these pseudo-beings can rightly be called metaphysics⁵. It is because we are not carefully attentive to the functioning of language and are misled by certain analogies between the forms of expressions in different regions of language that metaphysical problems arise. Philosophical or linguistic analysis is supposed to dispel this illusion created by language. "Philosophy", as Wittgenstein remarks in *Philosophical Investigations*, "is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language". "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it can not give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is". No room is thus left for metaphysical speculations in this recent trend in philosophy; the only difference is that while the positivists were engaged in the rejection of metaphysics on the whole as nonsensical, the later Wittgenstein and his followers are interested in the examination of particular metaphysical doctrines pointing out that they arise due to misuse of language. Now regarding this particular attack on metaphysics it may be admitted with all fairness that much of what passes as metaphysics can be easily shown to be the product of linguistic muddles in a certain sense. Examples can be cited from both Indian and Western philosophical systems of such obvious linguistic confusion. But the point to consider is whether we can discard metaphysical activity in its entirety to be nothing but a product of linguistic confusion. It is no doubt true that what we may call obvious cases of linguistic confusion do not pose any problem for us. But it is not very clear to me how the linguistic analyst is going to demonstrate beyond doubt and how seriously we should take the claim that a particular metaphysical assertion is nothing but a piece of linguistic confusion if by confusion it is only meant that ordinary linguistic usage is not strictly adhered to, that it is a deviation from the ordinary linguistic usage. Is ordinary linguistic usage so very definite as the present-day linguistic analyst makes it out to be? If it is itself mostly indefinite, vague, and unrestricted in its scope, how can we glibly go on talking about the violation of the

5. The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy by F. Waismann, (ed.) R. Hare, (New York, 1965), pp. 81-82

rules of a particular language-game with a view to anathematize the language of metaphysics? "When philosophers", says Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations*, "use a word — "knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "propositians", "name" — and try to grasp the *essence* of the thing, one must always ask one self; is the word ever actually used in this way in the language — game which is its original home? What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysieal to their everyday use". Now it may be true that metaphysicians of the past have committed a grave error in trying to search for the *essence* of things and of concepts and that the search is initiated by their carelessness regarding the way certain words are actually used in our lenguage, but from this it will be wrong to conclude that any stretch and strain put on what we consider to be the ordinary language should also for that very reason be inadmissible. If it is said that the objection is not to any stretch and strain put on ordinary language but only to the *metaphysical* stretch, what, it may be asked, is exactly to be meant by *metaphysical* in this connection? Where exactly does *commonsense* or *scientific* stretch or strain on language come to an end and *metaphysical* stretch begin? Is there always such a clear-cut and definite demarcation, as is supposed by these analytical philosophers, between what we call the language of metaphysics and the language of common-sense, considering it only from the linguistic point of view. Is there no criss-crossing, no interpenetration at all? If such an interpenetration is admitted can the analyst always mark out his prey, viz, metaphysics, without mistake. Even admitting that it will be always possible to detect and condemn the language of metaphysics even when it has penetrated (trespassed?) in to the regions of common-sense and science, can the analyst be sure that the spirit of metaphysics, to use a metaphysical term, is still not pervading the entire region of common-sense and science, and that metaphysics will not survive in its subtle body (*Suksma Sarira*), to use another metaphysical term, throughout our social, cultural, and intellectual life? It is a peculiar tendency with present-day analysts who are opposed to metaphysical activity as such to regard anything that turns out to be objectionable to be metaphysics while taking those portions of traditional metaphysics that remain unscathed and unharmed by analysis to be something other than metaphysics proper. It is no wonder therefore that the fate of metaphysics under such circumstances is sealed once for all. But if we are not very much sentimentally biassed either in favour of or against whatever is traditionally regarded as metaphysics, we can

easily ascertain, at least for our purposes, which portions of what we call 'metaphysics' can survive and which portions cannot. I do not find any reason why the designation of 'metaphysics proper' should be reserved for those parts of traditional metaphysics only which are already dead or are moribund while those vital parts that seem to have the utmost power of resistance should be regarded as something other than metaphysics. If it is stated that metaphysical stretch of ordinary language makes nonsense of it because of framing symbols analogous to certain uses in a particular language-game when they have no use⁶, I can only point out that metaphysical symbols do have a use of their own and they are understood in their own context; i.e. within their specific frame-work or system. It is of course another matter if a particular use is considered a form of misuse and if a particular understanding is considered misunderstanding from the point of view of the analyst.

From the above remarks it should not be concluded, however, that I am in favour of the survival of metaphysics in its entirety or that it is my considered opinion that traditional metaphysics does not contain any instance of misuse or misunderstanding of language. It will be absolutely clear to any one who has made a study of traditional metaphysics that much of it is misguided and misleadingly framed. If, as Ryle thinks, "what is commonly expected of a metaphysician is that he should assert the existence or occurrence of things unseen and give for these assertions purely philosophical or conceptual reasons", then the entire mission of metaphysics must be fairly admitted to be a misguided and misleading one. But, if metaphysics in this sense and of this sort dies or shows sure signs of death, are we to conclude therefrom that metaphysics cannot survive? Attempts to prove an ontological thesis demonstratively no doubt constitute an important part of the traditional metaphysics and it may be true that there is little hope for the resurrection of metaphysics of this type, but this is not, I am inclined to believe, the whole story about metaphysics. Whatever in metaphysics cannot stand up to criticism is not worth having and that means a great deal, but it does not mean everything. Among the things that remain is the *vision (darsana)* which is the soul of metaphysics.

But what exactly are we to understand by this vision? How is

6. cf. G. E. Moore, "Wittgenstein's lectures in 1930-33" Mind, 1954.

7. G. Ryle, "Final Discussion", The Nature of metaphysics, ed., D. F. Pears (London, 57), p. 144,

any such vision to be distinguished from subjective vagaries on the one hand and the vision of saints, religious persons, artists on the other? Vision of course is the vision of Reality (Tattva-Darsana) but what is this Reality of which the metaphysician has the vision and which he is so keen to advertise? How can we account for diverse visions of *Reality*? It is well-known that every metaphysician claims his notion of Reality to be the most adequate in comparison with all other notions available in the field and every metaphysician adopts certain criteria of adequacy such as comprehensiveness, power of explanation, and so on for establishing his theory. And it is precisely through the application of these criteria of adequacy that a metaphysical view is distinguished from subjective fancies. The demand that it should be possible to order the entire universe from that particular perspective, and that when it is so ordered, light is thrown on aspects of life and experience other than the experience from which the metaphysical world-view develops is what makes a metaphysical vision differentiated from mere subjective hallucination. The vision in question is meant to function as a guide, a map, a beacon-light for the life of every man who at least cares to take note of it, and this, I think, is the actual significance of the emphasis on 'Reality' as against 'appearances' in the great metaphysical literatures of the world. It is this invaluable guidance which is most lamentably missed by the lay man in the present-day linguistic philosophy. So long as the need for such a guidance remains and so long as metaphysics continues to give this to us, there can be no doubt about the survival of metaphysics at least in this sense and in this respect and we cannot avoid considering a good metaphysics as distinguished from a bad one in terms of its actual significance for life and the world as a whole. But do we not get an adequate guidance in our life from visions of saints, artists, poets, and the like? How then is the guidance provided by metaphysical vision different from what we get from other types of vision? The only difference, to my mind, lies in the metaphysician's conscious and consistent effort to examine if his vision is an adequate one and to see how far it is satisfactory. There is of course no barrier in a poet or a saint examining his own vision according to certain criterion of adequacy as all-comprehensiveness, but in doing this he will be doing the job of a metaphysical philosopher. It is the peculiarity of the metaphysician that he puts his vision and the vision of his fellow-workers to the test of critical reflection so as to see how far it is satisfactory and adequate, and this is how a number of metaphysical world-views are undermined, if not totally rejected, when it is found that they are not satisfactory.

A metaphysical theory, for example, which leads to obvious distortions of empirical propositions in their own shpere is declared unsatisfactory.⁸ We cannot of-course expect here to arrive at an absolutely certain conclusion which is the characteristic feature of disciplines like Formal Logic of mathematics, and it is no doubt true that a number of metaphysicians of the past were mistaken in so far as they aspired for logical certainty in metaphysical discussions, but from all this it does not follow that we cannot have reasoning in metaphysics. Metaphysics is not Logic and metaphysical reasoning therefore cannot follow strictly in the footsteps of Formal Logic, but I fail to understand why metaphysics may not have its own standards of reasoning. It is of this type of metaphysics and of metaphysics in this sense that we can hope a very long life, at least a life as long as the need to arrive at a reasonable world-view guiding us in our life remains. To quote a passage from Strawson with which I find myself in agreement :—"It is surely over-puritanical to hold that, just because the claims made for such new ways were too large, we should be concerned solely with preventing ourselves from seeing the world afresh. We might make room for a purged kind of metaphysics, with more modest and less disputable claims than the old"⁹. For my part at least I do not find any implausibility or inconsistency in continuing to have such "a purged kind of metaphysics".

Vision in metaphysics must be the vision of the Real but metaphysics is the vision of the Real in a sense somewhat similar to that in which a map is a representation of a real place. A map has to ignore certain details while making some other details appear prominent; it is, therefore, possible that we may have a number of alternative maps representing the same place. And yet each map is valuable so far as it goes; one map may be undermined by another for certain purposes but there is no reason why it should be considered totally useless unless it so happens that a map obviously distorts the fact and is positively misleading. Similar is the case with metaphysics. Rival metaphysical systems flourish side by side, and yet we cannot say that any one is completely worthless. The worth of each

8. cf. D.M. Emmet, 'The Nature of metaphysical Thinking'. (London, 1945), p. 202.

9. P.F. Strawson, "Critical Notice of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigation", H. Morick (ed), "Wittgenstein and the Problem of Other Minds" (New York, 1967). p. 15.

lies in its being a guide for us as far as it goes on illuminating certain area of our experience which was hitherto in the dark, and yet metaphysical aspiration, as is expected, must always be to arrive at an all-comprehensive vision of the world as a whole in which we live, move, and have our being.

But what about the truth claim in metaphysics ? Regarding this point, I am, I must confess, a bit hesitant to give any opinion. Vision in metaphysics is of course expressed in the form of assertions and for my part I do not find any thing wrong in expressing them in this form so long as it is borne in mind that they are different from scientific and commonsense assertions. A map, afterall, can be asserted to be a faithful representation of the fact although it is impossible that it should do justice to all the details available. There is, however, a difference between a metaphysical theory and a map ; a metaphysical theory can not be verified exactly in the same sense in which a map can be verified (And yet should we say that verification in *any* sense whatsoever is an absolute impossibility in metaphysics ? How about *anubhava*?) But can an artist's vision be verified in this sense ? It cannot and yet I do not think that there is anything wrong if the artistic vision is expressed in the form of an assertion ; it asserts that something which was hitherto unnoticed is out there. A metaphysical theory may also be said to have an assertive content in the sense that it is verifiable in *anubhava*. A specific training is of course necessary to see things in the manner in which an artist or a metaphysician sees, and the training is worth having in view of the satisfaction and, what is more important especially in the case of metaphysics, the invaluable guidance in life which it gives. Metaphysical world-view is a class by itself and these analogies of a metaphysical view with a map or an artistic vision are pointed out only to show certain similarity without any implication that they are identical pursuits. Those who are enormously impressed by the contrast of a metaphysical theory with what passes ordinarily as factual assertion, whether it be commonsense or scientific assertion, are very understandably opposed to the view that metaphysics may have an assertive content. From this perspective it should be appropriate to speak of metaphysical expressions as linguistic proposals or linguistic penetration or something of this sort, only if it is borne in mind that metaphysical penetration-proposal is not as arbitrary, whimsical, and insignificant as an ordinary linguistic proposal or penetration may be. The linguistic proposal in metaphysics is to be contrasted with an

ordinary proposal in being highly significant in so far as it *affects* our whole being and personality and therefore the course of the history of mankind. A proposal that involves a transformation of the total personality of man is more than a proposal. The proposal is suggested so that certain facts which are out there and yet were hitherto unnoticed may become evident to us, and in this sense a metaphysical theory may be considered to be factual, only it is not factual in the same sense in which an empirical statement is so.

In view of what has been stated above my opinion regarding Dr. Sanyal's paper should have been evident. He seems to be labouring under the idea that survival of metaphysics is necessarily and vitally connected with the Kantian 'issue': "How are synthetic judgements *a priori* possible?" As a matter of fact his whole paper is devoted to a desperate effort to rehabilitate the synthetic *apriori*. It is of course true that if Kantian mission could be shown to have succeeded we could easily boast of a triumphant victory of traditional metaphysics in the war against Logical Positivism or linguistic Philosophy. But the mission, I am inclined to believe, has failed at least in its vital part, and Dr. Sanyal's effort, I am sorry to find, meets the same fate. There is thus no alternative left for us other than subscribing to a form of metaphysics with modest claims. If by *apriori* is meant logical necessity then the expression synthetic *apriori* will be an evident contradiction in terms, for a statement is said to be logically necessary when its negation involves self-contradiction while a synthetic proposition can be denied without self-contradiction. But there is another sense of necessity in which we can speak of synthetic *apriori* and it was Kant's claim that he had discovered synthetic *apriori* principles in this sense. *A priori* in this sense means universality and necessity for thought, especially for scientific thinking. But even in this sense Kant seems to have failed to establish synthetic *apriori* judgements as is evident from the fact that atleast some of the principles which Kant had thought to be the necessary condition for all thinking are actually found to be the presuppositions of Newtonian Physics, not of all Physics or of all thinking. It is therefore proper to speak of *apriori* principles as rules not as judgments in the way Kant had conceived of them.

Any way, I do not understand how else this notion of synthetic *apriori judgements* can be justified. There is ofcourse the possibility of interpreting *apriori* as necessary in the sense of metaphysically necessary

or necessary for the satisfaction of our personality as a whole or something of the sort and in some such sense metaphysical statements may be regarded as synthetic *a priori*, but this strategy will not be of much help to us. In any case the idea of combining in metaphysics the virtues of both empirical and analytical statements, that is, to have absolute certainty combined with factual content seems to me to have been completely mistaken and it is very unlikely that such a mission should succeed at present or in future. We are yet to see how and when the hope of Dr. Sanyal is fulfilled, the hope that metaphysical statement can be proved to be meaningful and true in a logical manner which, as Dr. Sanyal himself puts it, "is yet to develop fully and crystallize formally into, what can be called, the synthetic *a priori* decision procedure". I fail to see, however, how it can ever be possible, Dr. Sanyal has suggested a few interpretative principles in section IV but he has no where shown how these principles could be applied to yield what he calls a decision procedure — a mechanical and conclusive technique — which can be made foolproof by eliminating all intuitive residues. The utmost he has done is to suggest that "The S. A. proof as a decision procedure is in the making". I confess that I fail to see how exactly it is going to materialize.

The next point which I find puzzling is Dr. Sanyal's claim that the tests of meaninglessness, meaningfulness, truth and falsity of the S. A. sentences can be clearly stated. In this connection he brings in the notion of categorial contradiction which he finds to be at least as clear as the notion of self-contradiction. But is category so clear and precise a notion as Dr. Sanyal thinks it to be ? He himself admits that category has been a controversial word but still thinks that "If we persist, we may find it a fixed intension and then we may agree upon a fixed inventory of categories". The Oxford English Dictionary first of all speaks of category as "a term—given to certain general classes of terms, things, or notions ; the use being very different to different authors" and then defines it as "a class, or division, in any general scheme of classification". And yet Dr. Sanyal thinks that there is no arbitrariness involved in the notion of categorial contradiction and that it is atleast as clear as the notions of self-contradiction and factual contradiction. I do not of course mean that the notions of self-contradiction and factual contradiction are absolutely clear and precise but I am of the opinion that Dr. Sanyal's efforts to rehabilitate metaphysics by taking resort to such controversial notions as categorial contradiction are of little avail. He

holds on the one hand that synthetic *a priori* is to be defined and tested in terms of the notion of categorial contradiction while on the other hand he says that the definition and tests of categories are not a matter of arbitrary convention but are synthetic *a priori* necessary. The meaning of synthetic *a priori* is dependent on the notion of category whereas the notion of category, in its turn, itself depends on the notion of synthetic *a priori* necessary. How then can it be consistently maintained that the synthetic *a priori* can be clearly defined in view of the fact that the very definition of synthetic *a priori* involves the application of the notion of synthetic *a priori* itself? There is, I am afraid, circularity in reasoning involved in Dr. Sanyal's defence of synthetic *a priori*.

Finally I find myself in disagreement with Dr. Sanyal when he expresses his feeling that "we are heading for a highly systematic non-controversial metaphysics which will just ultimately and ostensibly define the universe as the perfect individual". "The present experiments in fragmentary antimetaphysics", he continues, "will add up to a grand metaphysical system". What I rather feel is that we are heading for and should arrive at a metaphysical world-view with modest claims. Controversies in metaphysical issues are inevitable as the difference in outlook can never be ultimately abolished, and yet this is not to say that such a world-view is worthless only because its ultimate validity can never be shown beyond doubt. There is no reason why absolute certainty which is a virtue in formal logic or Mathematics must also be a feature of every respectable discipline. The final achievement in metaphysics, therefore, may no longer be as grand as it used to be in the hoary past, yet the loss in the grandeur of system-making is likely to be more than compensated by virtues such as clarity, precision, and caution which belong to metaphysics of the future generation. In any case there seems to be little justification for anxiety in view of the fact that vision which is the soul of metaphysics is not yet dead nor does it show any sign of death.

CAN METAPHYSICS SURVIVE ?

ASHOK KUMAR VERMA

I

Gradual widening of the horizon of empirical sciences has generated gradual distrust of metaphysical knowledge. Even in the past attempts had been made to reject metaphysics, but in the present century this attempt has assumed a new dimension, thinkers today have gone to the extent of stating that metaphysical problems are nonsensical. Russell has perhaps made the most apt summation of the total attitude of the present day critics of metaphysics. 'Whatever knowledge is attainable must be attained by scientific methods and what science cannot discover mankind cannot know'. Comte has pointed out that man has passed through successive stages of religion and metaphysics and that only after the French Revolution mankind could reach the age of Science. In the last stage the theories of metaphysicians would simply become obscure like the myths of primitives at the earlier stage. Influenced by such thoughts many thinkers of the present century have challenged the very genuineness of metaphysics as a rational discipline. The object of my paper is (i) to state briefly the basic reasons for holding the view that metaphysics is impossible; and (ii) to examine the claims of the critics of metaphysics and thereby to determine whether metaphysics can really survive or not.

II

The rejection of metaphysics, as I have pointed out earlier, is not a peculiarity of the present century. Even during the ancient times the sceptics and the empiricists had considered metaphysical knowledge impossible. Such conclusions were chiefly based upon the psychological examination of the capacities of the human minds. They somehow believed that sense experience was the only source of valid knowledge. Limitation of the capacities of the human mind to sense-experience led them to deny the possibility of metaphysical or super-sensible knowledge. The carvaka system of Indian Philosophy also holds, more or less, the same view.

It was Hume who, following the empiricism of Locke, led a systematic attack on metaphysics. He limited rational knowledge to sense-impressions. 'All ideas must be copies of impressions', he said. He tried in vain to find the original impressions of the metaphysical

ideas of soul, Matter and God, and as such came to suspect the validity of all such notions. That was why he came to doubt the possibility of metaphysics.

Kant was influenced by Hume and so he said they metaphysical ideas were at best ideas of reason : according to him they could, at best, be the regulative principles of thought but they could not constitute knowledge. Comte was a thorough going positivist and denied to metaphysical knowledge the status of knowledge. He held the view that metaphysics was nothing but idle speculation.

The ground for the rejection of metaphysics, according to these thinkers is chiefly the belief that we have no means to verify metaphysical assertions. Our knowledge, according to them, is limited to sense-experience and sense-experience cannot afford to go beyond what is experienced.

But, the 'existence' of metaphysics had never been threatened so seriously as in the present century. The ground of the rejection of metaphysics now is a new one. It is believed that metaphysical questions and answers are one and all non-sensical. Metaphysics according to them, is not an idle speculation but a pseudo-speculation. In fact, Hume had anticipated this position, but had not been able to draw such a bold conclusion. The clear-cut distinction between idle speculation and non-sense was not drawn. If, according to Hume, knowledge is limited to sense-experience, it follows that we have no means of verifying the truth of statements containing extra-sensuous objects. But Hume had not been able to foresee this conclusion.

In the present Century Russell and Wittgenstein are the chief sources of anti-metaphysical strains in philosophy. The best way to understand Wittgenstein is to consider some of his anti-metaphysical assertions. He says, "most propositions and questions, that have been written about philosophical matters, are not false, but non-sensical. We cannot answer question of this kind at all, but only state their senselessness. Most questions and propositions of the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language..... And so it is to be wondered at that the deepest problems are really no problems."¹ He states further that 'All philosophy is critique of language'²..... The totality of some propositions

1. Tractatus—4.003

2. Ibid —4.0031

is the total natural science³..... The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a doctrine but an activity.⁴ 'The chief proposition of philosophy is that philosophy is non-sense'. For a long time Wittgenstein's thoughts were regarded as a new brand of metaphysics. But the reaction was otherwise also. Carnap, Schlick and others and Ayer in England took up the hint given by Wittgenstein and worked out a scheme rejecting metaphysical statements as non-sensical. Ayer states in his Language, Truth and Logic, "that we can have the knowledge of a reality which transcends the phenomenal world can be questioned. From what premises his propositions have been deduced. Must not he begin with the evidence of his senses. If so what valid process of reasoning can possibly lead him to the conception of a transcendent reality. From empirical we cannot infer super-empirical. But this may not be a conclusive evidence for rejecting the assertions of the metaphysician. He may say that he is endowed with a faculty of intellectual intuition which of course he may not be able to show. Consequently one cannot overthrow a system of transcendent metaphysics merely by criticising the way in which it comes into being. What is required is rather a criticism of the nature of the actual statements which comprise it. They cannot have possibly any literal significance".⁵

Ayer tells us that all propositions that have meaning may be divided into two classes : those which concern empirical matters of facts and those which philosophers have called a priori, which concern the relation of ideas. The former have meaning if they are verifiable, by which he means that some possible sense-experience should be relevant to the determination of their truth and falsehood. Metaphysical assertions are not theoretically verifiable, so they are meaningless.

Thus, these people do not reject metaphysics on psychological grounds but on the strength of a rule which determines the literal significance of language. Ayer says, "our charge is not that the metaphysicians employ the understanding in a field where it cannot possibly venture but that he produces sentences which fail to confirm the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant. The criterion is verifiability. A sentence is factually significant if, and only if, we know

3. Ibid —4.11

4. Ibid —4.12

5. Ayer, A. J.—Language, Truth and Logic.

how to verify the proposition which we express, i.e., if we know what observations would lead us to accept the proposition as being true or reject it as being false.⁶

It is clear from the accounts given above that the grounds for their rejection of metaphysics are two-fold :

(a) The doctrine of Logical Atomism. According to this doctrine the world is considered to be an assemblage of atomic facts. They are mirrored in language. Between facts and sentences there is similarity of structure. The atomic facts are mirrored in simple sentences and protocol statements. Metaphysical Statements can not be reduced to such elementary statements and therefore by their very nature it is impossible for them to picture facts.

(b) But the most important ground for the rejection of metaphysics is the theory of verification. The meaning of a statement is the method of its verification. Consequently to know the meaning of a statement, to understand it, is to know how to verify it. If there is no way of verifying a proposition at all, it has no meaning. Metaphysical propositions are meaningless because they cannot be verified.

III

The grounds, therefore, of rejecting metaphysics by the old and the new thinkers can broadly be classified as *psychological* and *linguistic*. Traditional anti-metaphysicians deny metaphysics on the basis of an analysis of the capabilities of human mind. The twentieth Century thinkers reject the very problems of metaphysics and hold them as nonsensical on linguistic grounds.

The ancient sceptics held the sensuous alone as real, for ultimately they could not find out any means for the verification of the truth of the super-mundane. For them, too, verification meant verification by observation. But they did not realise that in setting a limit to the human mind and in calling the sensuous alone as real they were 'brother metaphysicians' establishing their own views about reality. Thus the rejection of metaphysics by them could not be a total rejection and metaphysics, instead of being dismissed, claimed their views as one of its own. Therefore, the question 'Can Metaphysics survive?' is not to be considered in the light of the views of the traditional thinkers

⁶, Ibid.

on the matter, because the very fact that this question is being considered today ipso facto established the survival of metaphysics.

Seeing the danger of the inroad of metaphysics even after its rejection, the moderns have attempted to reject it altogether, not on psychological ground but on linguistic ground, i.e., by proving the metaphysical statements, as non-significant or non-sensical. This is done by applying the criterion of verification. This criterion of meaning is the main plank on which their theory stands. Let us, therefore, see how far is their verification theory tenable?

The verification principle started giving trouble to its authors in the late thirties. The positivists found difficulty not only in the exact formulation of the principle but also in determining the status of the principle itself. According to them any scientific use of language must be a tautology or an empirical statement. The verification principle is not an empirical statement. It is not based on sense-experience because it is concerned with the meanings of statements which are not sense-data. It is not even a generalized principle resulting from an exhaustive study of metaphysical statements. It is clear then that the principle has to be claimed as apriori like the principles of logic or mathematics. But that it is not. It is not a tautology also in the customary sense. If the principle is taken as an arbitrary rule, it would be absurd. The only alternative that we can think of is that the principle provides us with a real definition of the philosophical status and function of language. If it is so, it comes under the category of synthetic apriori propositions. But such propositions are held by the Positivists as meaningless. Wisdom has rightly put the question : shall we accept the verification principle ? What is it to accept it ? What is the nature of the theory ? The answer is 'it is a metaphysical theory'.

The question regarding the meaning of experience is also fundamental in understanding the grounds of rejecting metaphysics. According to Ayer 'a proposition is generally factual if any empirical observation would be relevant to its truth or falsehood'. The meaning assigned to empirical is sensory. So by experience the Positivists mean sense-experience. It appears that the non-sensory experiences of the mind are out of court for the purposes of determining the truth or falsehood of empirical propositions. One may legitimately doubt if all intellectual operations are exhaustively analysable in terms of sense-data

or mental images. Have we not non-sensory constituents of Scientific knowledge ? Are electrons and protons sensory? Is the *knowledge* of sensory facts itself a sensory fact ? Even if such doubts are dismissed one has the right to question the Positivists as to the method of arriving at their conclusions. Have they rejected non-sensory experiences on logical grounds ? If not, then their assumptions are dogmatic.

From the brief account that I have given of the status of verification principle and the changing position of the positivists it is clear that the critics of metaphysics are in deep waters now. Ayer's 'settled facts' are not yet settled. There are variations in statement of the verification principle itself among the Logical Positivists. Metaphysicians are busy now in clearing the mud from their thoughts. But whether speculative philosophy is a will-o'-the-wisp or not, my point is that we cannot but pursue it. Bradley has rightly remarked that 'metaphysics may be the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct; but to find these reasons is no less an instinct'. Even if the critics of metaphysics call it meaningless, there is the need for discovering the rational grounds for their saying so. And, how will the reasons offered escape scrutiny themselves ? Can we escape atleast from such a metaphysics ?

CAN METAPHYSICS SURVIVE ?

K. N. UPADHYAYA

Metaphysics has been a time-honoured preoccupation of philosophers both in the East as well as in the West. Ever since Plato described philosopher as 'the spectator of all time and all existence'¹ and Aristotle defined philosophy as "the speculative knowledge of the first principles and causes"² metaphysical problems have continued to occupy the central position in the philosophical deliberations of the West. Almost a similar situation has prevailed throughout the history of Indian Philosophy right from the early days of the Vedas and the Upanishads. But towards the close of the first quarter of the present century a severe attack unprecedented in vehemence has been launched against metaphysics which threatens to wipe it out completely.

It is, no doubt, true that even in the past there have been sporadic attempts to dethrone metaphysics, but despite them it has continued to remain in a complacent ascendancy till the turn of the century. As early as the 6th century B.C., the Buddha tried to denounce metaphysics chiefly on pragmatic grounds. He pointed out the practical futility and intellectual incomprehensibility of metaphysical discussions and even suggested the logical inappropriateness of some of the metaphysical questions.³ Kant also tried to show the impossibility of speculative metaphysics on the ground of inherent limitations of the human reason. The speculative reason of man, according to him, loses itself in insoluble contradiction when it ventures beyond the bounds of phenomenal experience. These attempts to eliminate metaphysics, however, could not succeed because all these philosophers despite their complaint against the knowing apparatus of the use of such knowledge, retained their conviction in a transcendent reality. It, therefore, involved no absurdity if one chose to devote his time and energy in having a peep into the reality by somehow transcending his human limitations. At any rate, the possibility of a factual situation which could be talked and discussed about was not ruled out. But the logical positivists, the innovators of modern attack adopted quite a different strategy. Their ingenuity lay in their making the impossibility of metaphysics depend not upon how something is known but how

1. *The Republic*, trans., by B. Jowett, Vintage Books, New York, p. 217.
2. Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Book I.
3. For a fuller discussion see the author's paper, 'The Significance of Buddha's Silence' in "The Philosophical Quarterly" April 1966, Amalner pp. 65-80.

something is stated. Their charge against the metaphysian was that he breaks the rules which any utterance must satisfy if it is to be literally significant. Metaphysical assertion, thus, they show, bear no relation to facts and are hence meaningless or nonsensical.

This was claimed to be a fatal attack on metaphysics forcing philosophy to take a new turn. Moritz Schlick in his paper, 'The Turning Point in Philosophy' declares in a victorious vein: "Certainly, many will for centuries continue to wander further along the traditional paths. Philosophical writers will long continue to discuss the old pseudo-questions. But in the end they will no longer be listened to; they will come to resemble actors who continue to play for some time before noticing that the audience has slowly departed".⁴

There is no denying the fact that the logical positivism has made its impact felt and has heralded a new trend in philosophy. It forms the core of all the different shades of anti-metaphysical movements, currently dominant in most of the English-speaking countries under the names of analytical, linguistic or radically empirical philosophy. But many other continental countries of Europe including Germany and France are still fascinated by one or the other form of metaphysics like Neo-Thomism, Neo-Kantianism, Neo-Hegelianism or Existentialism. The philosophical world is, thus, curiously divided to-day into the metaphysical and the anti-metaphysical. On the Indian scene also this division is almost obvious. On the one hand there are unqualified admirers of analytical philosophy like Professor R. Prasad and Professor Dayakrishna who maintain that "Philosophy is mainly conceptual analysis,"⁵ and that "the function of the philosopher...qua philosopher is merely to classify certain conceptual confusions in which he finds himself involved when thinking about certain problems;"⁶ and on the other, there are stout defenders of metaphysics like Professor S. N. L. Srivastava and Professor J. N. Chubb who are confident "that metaphysics cannot be done away with....The impulse to metaphysics....is irrepressible. You may deny it with all your might, yet it will

4. Logical Positivism, Edited by A. J. Ayer, The Free Press, New York, 1966, p. 59.

5. Philosophy Today, Seminar, No. 25, Sept. 11, New Delhi, p. 27.

6. The Nature of Philosophy, Daya Krishna, Prachi Prakashan, Calcutta, 1955, p. 232.

make its appearance."⁷ Hence they look upon contemporary anti-metaphysicians as "philosophers who still live in this fool's paradise" and are inclined to think "that the Verification Principle or any other substitute for it... is really the expression, in logical dress, of their anti-metaphysical bias, and not something which can ever provide a logical ground or support for their opposition to metaphysics."⁸

Obviously it is not a conflict in relation to some specific solutions of philosophical problems but with regard to the very subject matter and methods of philosophy. The champions of new movements in view of their radically different approach to the subject are not ready to retain the old metaphysics any longer. Theirs is a determined bid to disqualify and oust metaphysics on factual ground, which the metaphysicians feel to be an impossible task.

David Hume who is hailed as the precursor of modern empiricism had already accused metaphysics of lacking "experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence" and had thought it worthy to be committed to the flames.⁹ With the philosophers of the Vienna Circle coming to the fore, a more massive and sustained attack has been launched and sharper logical tools and technical niceties have been brought to bear upon the problem. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the sharpness of the weapon and see if metaphysics has enough vitality to survive the onslaughts of contemporary attacks.

Of all the various weapons used against metaphysics by contemporary critics, the so-called variability theory of meaning is supposed to be the most trenchant. It, indeed constitutes the bed rock of almost all the other technical niceties and logical tools taken recourse to by modern analytical and linguistic philosophers.

But before we examine the strength of this theory we may not be far wrong in pointing out that the logical positivists while designing this theory, were not trying to approach the problem with an open and

7. The Crusade Against Metaphysics and the Reign of Linguisticism in Contemporary Thought, Dr. S. N. L. Srivastava, Presidential address for the Logic and Metaphysics section of the 40th session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1966, p. 4 and 6.
8. Philosophical Arguments and Disagreement, J. N. Chubh, Presidential address of the 40th session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1966, p. 26.
9. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, P. 165.

unbiased mind. In the words of G. J. Warnock, "Schlick and his followers, were mainly concerned to wage war against metaphysics on behalf of science".¹⁰ A. J. Ayer himself admits that the Viennese positivists were chiefly interested in the formal and the natural sciences. They did not identify philosophy with science, but they believed that it ought to contribute in its own way to the advance of scientific knowledge. They therefore condemned metaphysics because it failed to meet this condition".¹¹

Approaching philosophy with such an interest they took upon themselves the task of determining the criterion of significant or meaningful utterances. If a sentence by which a speaker purports to state a fact is not empirically verifiable, then, they say, it is not a meaningful assertion. Or, as Ayer succinctly puts it : "To indicate the situation which verifies a proposition is to indicate what the proposition means."¹² Or to use a striking epigram by Schlick : "The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification"¹³ Now, metaphysics is said to deal with the transcendent reality having no relation to experience. Hence metaphysical statements are unverifiable and consequently meaningless or nonsensical. Metaphysicians are formulating bogus or pseudo-questions and seeking for pseudo-solutions. We may express the Positivists' position in the form of the following syllogism : All empirically unverifiable statements are meaningless ; all metaphysical statements are empirically unverifiable ; therefore all metaphysical statements are meaningless. In the minor premise, the metaphysical is identified with the non-factual or non-empirical and in the major which is presented here negatively, the meaning is identified with the empirical verification. Now it is not difficult to show that in doing so the positivists are somewhat arbitrarily restricting the meaning of the terms, 'metaphysics', 'meaning' as well as 'verification' and hence even if one of the two premises is accepted as a matter of definition, the conclusion won't follow.

10. 'Verification and the Use of Language' by G. J. Warnock in *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy*, Edited by Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap, The Free Press, New York, 1966, P. 723.

11. *Logical Positivism*, Edited by A. J. Ayer, The Free Press, New York, 1966, P. 17.

12. 'Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics' by A. J. Ayer in *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy*, Edited by Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap, The Free Press, New York, 1966, p. 286.

13. 'Meaning and Verification' in *The Philosophical Review* 1936.

Let us proceed first with the examination of the major premise which, indeed, is the crucial thesis of the logical positivists, viz., 'the meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification'.

We shall not discuss here at any length the verbal inaccuracy of the formulation of the principle which has already been shown by Warnock and others.¹⁴ A proposition is what a sentence means. Hence to speak of the meaning of a proposition is to speak of the meaning of a sentence, which is absurd. We may, therefore, pass on by correcting the above formulation as the meaning of a sentence is the method of its verification. But even then it is difficult to understand how the meanings of an enormous number of sentences used to give orders, to ask questions, to make promises, to offer prayer, to express decision, to pass judgments or to make proposal etc. are to be determined through the method of verification. Obviously the question of verification can arise only in relation to these sentences which admit of being true or false and not with regard to above types of sentences. Logical positivists may try to escape this absurdity by saying that they are concerned only with what they call 'literal' or 'cognitive' meaning. But do not the above types of sentences have literal meanings? Are they not duly understood? It might be said that sentences used to make true or false statements are more important for certain purposes. But other sorts of sentences, even if less important, are not less meaningful.

If the tactical aim of this uncommon and restrictive use of the term, 'meaning' is merely to show that the metaphysical statements do not come within its purview, i.e. they do not have this restrictive meaning, then metaphysics escapes unscathed. Warnock rightly observes : " Thus metaphysics is indeed eliminated, rather than destroyed; it is not exploded, but extruded."¹⁵

But it may be urged from the side of anti-metaphysicians that metaphysical assertions unlike imperative or interrogative sentences purport to make verifiable statements, pose to express proposition capable of being true or false. So they cannot escape with others. They will have to justify their truth-claim on par with other scientific propositions through the method of verification.

14. Warnock, op. cit. pp. 716 ff.; A. C. Ewing on 'Meaninglessness' in A Modern Introduction to Philosophy, Edited by Paul Edwards and Pap; The Free Press, New York, 1966, p. 705.

15. The Nature of Metaphysics, p. 128.

Apparently this demand of anti-metaphysicians seems to be reasonable. But on closer examination it is found that they are unwarrantedly introducing restrictions with regard to the use of both the terms, 'metaphysics' and 'verification' and thereby making it impossible for the metaphysician to present his case fairly. Metaphysics is defined by them "as an enquiry into the nature of the reality underlying or transcending the phenomena which the special sciences are content to study."¹⁶ Obviously this definition precludes the possibility of other than transcendentalist variety of metaphysics. Without attempting to offer another comprehensive definition of metaphysics, we may just draw attention to other varieties of metaphysics like empirical, realistic or naturalistic etc. which the history of philosophy has witnessed. Even if it is admitted that the transcendentalist variety of metaphysics is the only form of metaphysics, why should then they insist for it a non-transcendentalist or empirical variety of verification? After having clearly alienated by definition the field of metaphysics from that of science, they forfeit the right to apply the same sort of verification to both of them. To ascertain the nature of the transcendent reality, it is legitimate to take recourse to a transcendent mode of verification. Is it not a fact that the Buddhists speak of the state of Nirvana as an open invitation to all to come and verify for themselves (ehipassiko)?¹⁷ Of course, the method of verification is not through sense-experience. But there is no reason why should one limit the import of the term, 'verification' to mere sense-experience in this transcendental context.

Even after making both—ways restrictions, the anti-metaphysicians do not seem to achieve their end, for some of the assertions of the transcendentalist metaphysics can be shown to admit of empirical verification. The assertion about rebirth, for example, is a case in point. That 'I shall survive bodily death' is a proposition capable of future empirical verification if it is true. Rather it is its contradictory proposition, 'I shall not survive bodily death' which is

16. 'Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics'. A Modern Introduction of Philosophy Edited by Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap. The Free Press, New York, 1966, p. 685.

17. Nirvana is referred to as "realisable in this life, immediate, inviting to come and verify and to be inwardly felt by the wise", Digha Nikaya, Vol. II Edited by T.W. Rhys Davids and J.E. Carpenter's P.T.S., London, p. 93.

incapable of any future verification, because there are no empirical means available to verify non-survival in future. In fact, the former being the only verifiable and therefore meaningful alternative, the positivists ought to regard it as a logically necessary proposition. But to regard this evidently synthetic proposition as logically necessary would mean collapsing of their basic thesis.

Even the statement that 'the world of sense-experience is altogether unreal', which is taken by Ayer as a good example of a nonsensical utterance, should have been regarded by him as meaningful inasmuch as it is contradicted by our sense-experience and thus found to be false (not meaningless). In case the expression altogether unreal' is meant to be taken metaphorically to indicate, 'relatively incoherent' or 'relatively unimportant'; it claims to be based on the alleged incoherence or defective character of our sense-experience and can accordingly be verified.

As regards other varieties of metaphysics, it is certainly easy to enumerate instances admitting of empirical verification. We may, for example, refer to the law of universal causation or the law of the uniformity of nature expressing two important metaphysical propositions. Similarly the assertion of the materialist or epi-phenomenalist that 'all conscious activities are generated by material process' can clearly admit of empirical verification.

All this exposes the game of logical positivists who by shrinking the range of metaphysics and verification, as also by ignoring cases of metaphysical statements relevant to experience are trying to disqualify all metaphysics.

We may also add here that conclusive verification of something is not always necessary to have a meaningful discourse. Statements can be made and theories can be put forward whether by a scientist or by a metaphysician in the forms of working hypotheses which can well constitute the bases for meaningful scientific or metaphysical discussions. Many eminent contemporary philosophers have already pointed out that the test of verification cannot be made too stringent, lest it would be impossible for any general proposition whether scientific or otherwise to lay claim to truth. Bertrand Russell quite unambiguously observes that "no general proposition can be established on purely empirical

evidence except one applying to a list of particulars all of which have been observed.¹⁸

Critics have argued that the verifiability theory itself cannot be verified. For it is not a tautology; and if it were an empirical proposition, then it would be possible to conceive of meaningful statements which are not empirically verifiable, just as it is possible to conceive of ravens which are not black. But this is a contradiction of the verifiability theory. Thus, if the theory is true and yet not a tautology, it has to be empirical, and then, according to its own criterion, meaningless; or else it would have to be a false theory.

Neither Wittgenstein nor Ayer has been able to meet this charge effectively. Wittgenstein, in fact, has acceded to this charge. Only he seems to look upon it as an useful nonsense. He says : "My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way : any one who understands me eventually recognises them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions and then he will see the world all right."¹⁹ Ayer disapproving this Wittgensteinian line of defence remarks that "this is a vain attempt to have it both ways. No doubt some pieces of nonsense are more suggestive than others, but this does not give them any logical force."²⁰ But what he himself suggests as the remedy is just "to adopt the verification principle as a convention."²¹ Needless to add that to accord this basic principle the status of a mere convention (which has an arbitrary look) does little to vindicate the acclaimed logical rigour of the positivist's theory.

It may not even be possible for the positivist to lay undue emphasis on verification through sense-experience. A. C. Ewing

18. Logic and Knowledge, Edited by Robert C. Marsh, George Allen and Unwin, The Macmillan Company, 1964, p. 376. Similarly A. C. Ewing points out that "a universal proposition.... can never be conclusively established merely by experience", A Modern Introduction to Philosophy, Edited by Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap, The Free Press, New York, 1966, p. 376.

19. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus trans. by D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuinness Kegan Paul, London 1961, p. 157.

20. Logical Positivism, Edited A.J. Ayer, The Free Press, New York, 1966, p. 15.

21. Ibid., p. 15.

wonders "how the positivists could establish the truth of their view even in a single case merely by sense-experience. For how can we ever know by sense-experience that there is not a part of the meaning of a statement that we cannot verify? The fact that we do not have any sense-experience of such a part proves nothing, since the point at issue is whether there is something in what we mean beyond sense-experience; and how can we know by sense-experience that there is not?"²² Thus the possibility of there being something which one may understand or mean and yet may not be able to test or verify in terms of sense-experience is not ruled out.

Limitations of the verifiability theory have been pointed out in relation to statements about past and statements about other minds. Despite much dilution of the apparent rigour of the theory by talking of indirect verification or weak verification or verification in principle, one wonders how to explain the direct meaningfulness of such statement of the speaker as, 'she has warm feelings for me', 'I feel pain in my left hand' or 'a century before men appeared on the earth there was a heavy downpour in a particular region on a particular day'. If such statements (particularly the last one) are meaningful for the positivists without much ado one fails to understand why there should be an objection to the meaningfulness of some of the metaphysical or theological statements similarly inaccessible to sense-experience. It is not difficult for an unbiased observer to notice that the positivists who try to shrink the concept of verifiability for the metaphysician are found to enlarge it when it has to confront with similar statements of commonsense or science.

It seems to me that the positivists have been led to regard verification as the essence of meaning chiefly by owing to their undue bias for sense-experience. But if they are shown the possibility of a source of knowledge other than sense-experience their position would be in jeopardy. That is why Wittgenstein's acceptance of mystical experience in his Tractatus²³ causes disquiet to some members of the Vienna Circle, especially Neurath.²⁴ But it is difficult to discard it outright.

22. A. C. Ewing on 'Meaninglessness' in *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy*, The Free Press, New York, p. 707.

23. *Tractatus—Logico-Philosophicus Trans.* Pears and Mc. Guinness, Kegan Paul, London, 1961, p. 151.

24. *Logical Positivism*, Edited A. J. Ayer, The Free Press, New York, 1966, p. 151.

The positivist's mistake in identifying meaning with the method of verification can be well demonstrated by showing that (i) two propositions having the same method of verification are sometimes found to have different meanings and (ii) the meaning of a proposition may be understood without any method of verification being open to it. For example, the proposition, 'all ravens are black' and 'all ravens that I have met so far are black'; both have exactly identical method of verification: But evidently they cannot be said to have the same meaning or significance. Again if one states that 'the objects of the world look alike to men and animals' one can very well understand what is meant by the statement, but there is hardly any method open to him to verify its truth-claim.

All these criticisms of the verificational theory of meaning, however, does not mean that the contemporary attack altogether falls flat on metaphysics and that the latter remains completely unaffected. Despite some defects, the positivists, pre-occupation with meaningful language goes a long way in making the metaphysician more self-critical than he has ever been before and enables him to avoid muddling with vague and confused concepts. Apart from the intrinsic fascination of the problems of the philosophy of language, this training is a good discipline. No-where perhaps is the temptation to talk nonsense is as great as in philosophy. Some forms of philosophy are not merely pretentious and misguided but even dangerous, though it must be acknowledged at the same time that there are other forms which make valuable contributions to mankind. A careful use of the modern logical tools and techniques may greatly help the present-day philosopher in shifting the wheat from the chaff. But to look upon mere conceptual analysis and hairsplitting of language as the sole purpose of philosophy is to mistake the means for the end and miss the temper and spirit of the age-old philosophical pursuit. There is, on the one hand, a tendency among some modern critics and analysts to dismantle the entire edifice of metaphysics with utter haste and impatience, while on the other, there are some orthodox metaphysicians who complacently ignore their critics thinking them to be delinquents and profane intruders. The former are rash; the latter are asleep. What is needed is a sympathetic mutual understanding of the merit of each side and an active interplay of the two to take philosophy on its onward march.

A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF MORALITY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF MODERN SCIENCE

UMA GUPTA

The scientific or objective study of ethics and religion, as against the normative one, began after the establishment of the theory of evolution by Darwin in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Simpson, a famous modern biologist, rightly points out that through the ages, before the Darwinian revolution, ethical standards responding to the human need for ethics have been supplied mainly from three closely inter-related sources : introspection, authority and convention; and the basis of acceptance has been intuitive¹. Such intuitive systems of ethics claimed eternal and absolute validity on the ground of either the authority of a divine will or of "an introspectively felt sense of moral obligation" as Simpson puts it. The basis for belief in these systems was thoroughly shaken by the discovery that they are highly relative. Their validation by intuition and their introspective origin were found by the psychologists to depend on learning and psychological conditioning mainly in early childhood². Man, as Gordon Childe³ remarks, is born as an individual infant in the society and as such becomes heir to the social custom and tradition. The degree of development of moral standard in the individual and in society, as well as the particular form it will take, are conditioned by learning processes in the family and in the wide aspects of the social structure. The anthropologists further found that extremely diverse ethical systems exist in different societies, all equally valid as far as pragmatic or other objective tests go⁴ and they are decidedly relative to social structure⁵.

Simpson says : "The need and the search for an ethic are unique to Man". He also points out that ethics enters evolution only when

1. Simpson, G. G. 'The Meaning of Evolution' pp. 294-295.
Dampier, W.C.A. History of Science and its Relation with Philosophy and Religion
2. Simpson ; Op. cit.
Vetter, B. G., Magic and Religion — pp. 211-226.
3. Childe, G : What Happened in History, pp. 17-18.
4. Tylor ; Primitive Culture
Frazer ; Golden Bough. Vetter op. cit, pp. 264-265.
5. Westermarck, E, ; Ethical Relativity.
Vetter : op. cit., pp. 264-265.

man has evolved by natural process from lower animals. The pre-human organic evolution was and is essentially amoral. It was Darwin⁶, who for the first time connected the moral with the biological and, thus, made the moral sense dependent upon the predominance of the social tendency in man. Since it is only man who, among all organisms, feels the need for ethics, and makes moral judgments, it follows that there could be only one kind of ethics, namely, human ethics — and such ethics should be based on man's own nature. In order to understand human nature, in which the origin of human ethics is to be sought, it is necessary to consider briefly the process of evolution through which man came into being.

Julian Huxley⁷ points out that, in a sense, evolution can be regarded as the essence of reality. Biological evolution, governed by its specific laws, in addition to those of physics and chemistry, is only one sector or phase of this total process. There is also the inorganic sector, which is governed by laws of physics and chemistry and the human or the psycho-social sector which is governed by the laws of social evolution in addition to those of life, as well as of physics and chemistry. These phases succeeded each other in time, the later being based on and evolving out of the earlier. The inorganic phase is thus called pre-biological and the human phase is post-biological.

According to Simpson,⁸ "Organic evolution is a process entirely materialistic in its origin and operation", and "life is materialistic in nature, but it has properties unique to itself, which resides in its organisation, and not in its materials or mechanics". Both Huxley and Simpson assert that modern biology has proved it beyond any doubt that man arose as a result of the operation of biological or organic evolution and, as such, his being and activities are also materialistic. But human species has properties unique to itself, among all forms of life. As Childe⁹ says, man is the last great species to evolve through the process of natural selection and, hence, man is the highest product of the process. Concomitant with this fact, all characteristic human attributes such as intelligence, flexibility, individualisation, socialisation, paternal and filial affection, ability to use non-biological extra-organic

6. Darwin, C., *Descent of Man*.

7. Huxley, J : *Emergence of Darwinism*.

: *Essays of a Humanist*.

8. Simpson ; op. cit.

9. Childe : op. cit. p. 1.

tool such as stones, etc., are attributes that occur widely in the animal kingdom. Only in the case of man, they are carried to a degree incomparably greater than in any other sort of animal. However, "the accumulation of knowledge, the rise of a sense of values and the possibility of conscious choice," says Simpson, "are all typical elements in human evolution" and presuppose certain level of rationality. Rationality or reasoning, as defined by Thorpe¹⁰ as essentially a process of mental trial and error, is itself an outcome of biological evolution, this ability being present in non-human mammals specially in anthropoid apes¹¹.

The human evolution, therefore, has been termed by Huxley and Simpson as a new type of evolution, described by the former as primarily cultural — the term 'culture' being used here in its broad archaeological and anthropological sense as to include language, religion, social organisation and material advancement. According to them, this new type of evolution is based on a new type of heredity, which operates in addition to the biological system of physical inheritance. This new kind of inheritance is defined as inheritance of learning — the capacity of transmitting experience and the fruit of experience called cumulative tradition from one generation to the next. The mechanism of this new type of heredity or tradition is based on man's capacity for conceptual thought and symbolic language. The basis of its operation is human social organisation. Human society, therefore, is the vehicle or medium through which tradition and custom is transmitted from the earlier to the later generations.

Man, however, is not a social animal in the sense in which bees and ants are. Unlike these animals, his sociability is rationally conceived and not mechanically or instinctively determined. Coming out of the background of biological evolution, human species also, like any other species started its struggle for survival as individuals. Human individuals formed the natural units called families. This human trait of forming a family consisting of male and female individuals and their offspring, can directly be traced in the non-human anthropoid stage of evolution. Many of the anthropoid apes also live as family units.¹²

Man, therefore, may properly be called a 'family animal', because his natural or instinctive concern or love is not for his neighbour but

10. Thorpe, W : Learning and Instinct in Animals — p. 71.

11. Hayes, C. : The Ape in Our House.

12. Zuckerman, S. : Functional Affinities of Man, Monkeys and Apes, pp.156-160

for his family. That is why he had to be commanded again and again through various religious or authoritative imperatives as "Love thy neighbour". As Childe¹³ says, theoretically, the primitive man with simpler wants, and rudimentary equipment could solve his problems alone, presumably in the context of his family. In practice, however, even the rudest savage lives in small groups, organised to co-operate in such essential functions as hunting, gathering food and preparing various kinds of tools. From these evidences, it may be inferred that while conducting their grim struggle for existence against the overwhelming and formidable forces of nature in the primeval jungle of pre-history, relatively isolated individuals realised, in course of time, that together they could carry the struggle more successfully. That was the origin of society.¹⁴ Thus, like his extra-corporeal tools (limbs are also tools from the biological and anthropological points of view) man creates society as an instrument for solving his problems of survival. On the human level, the mechanism for the biological struggle for existence, then ceases to be more mechanical process of physical adaptations and becomes transmuted into purposive efforts of individuals bound by mutually beneficial co-operative relationship, now called social. For smooth functioning of the co-operative social relationships, it is imperative that certain amount of restraint be placed on individual inclinations or desires deemed disruptive of social cohesion. This is possible because man, unlike all other animals, possesses will and therefore can make his choice. Consequently rules designed to enforce obedience of all members of the society, for mutual benefits in the struggle for existence, constituted essentially the first moral code. As Westermarck remarks, it is very probable that originally such moral rules were not clearly differentiated from other more comprehensive generalisations of the primitive man, and that they assumed a more definite shape only in course of time and by degrees. That the moral concepts originated as restraints on individuals composing the community is evident as Hall¹⁵ observed from the fact that "earlier chapters" of morality "are written in a series of commandments saying 'Thou shall not'." Westermarck, in this connection, says: "It has often been noticed that in early moral codes, negative commandments, which tell people what they ought not to do, are much more prominent than the positive commandments which tell them what

13. Childe : What Happened in History — p. 23.

14. Roy M. : Reason Romanticism and Revolution. Vol. II, p. 283.

15. Hall, T. ; Moral Obligation, E.R.E., Vol. 8 , pp. 834-835,

they ought to do".¹⁶ The moral concepts, however, acquired, in course of time, some positive commandments in addition to the negative ones. These positive rules of duty came into being when certain actions were regarded as conducive to a better life, as the result either of experience or of the supposed connection of such acts and some benefits obtained during or after such action. These negative and positive commandments or the primitive moral rules, therefore, were the outcome of the rational efforts of man to ensure better functioning and greater permanence of his society which is his powerful instrument in the struggle for existence. Morality, then, as Roy says, emanates from the rational desire of man for harmonious and mutually beneficial social relations. The moral sense or conscience, therefore, can truly be defined as the sense of enlightened self-interest.

It is obvious from the foregoing discussions that the moral concepts, like the human society, undergo changes, along with the evolution of man from savagery to civilization. Any particular system of morality may be said to be of a lower or higher order, in proportion to its being influenced by the expanding knowledge making the progress of civilisation, and moral evolution largely consists, in a gradual progress in acquisition of knowledge or enlightenment. Consistent with the anthropological stages of evolution of human society from savagery, through barbarism into civilization, the moral ideas also underwent corresponding changes. Society being the birth place of moral consciousness, historically, the tribal custom was the earliest form of duty. "In early Society" says Westermarck "customs are not only rules of conduct, but the only moral rules ever thought of".¹⁷ As pointed out by Hall,¹⁸ these primitive moral rules are shaped and sustained in an increasingly elaborate system of 'taboos', which come to form, in a later period, a link between the external and the 'supposed' internal authorities. The realisation of an internal authority, either of religion or of intuition, as compelling as any external coercion is a relatively recent conception.

Summary and Conclusion :

The origin of ethics, thus, is traced in the co-operative social relationships, designed to derive mutually beneficial advantages in the

16. Westermarck : Ethical Relativity.

17. Ibid.

18. Hall ; op. cit.

course of the grim struggle for survival, waged collectively, against the relentless forces of nature. Experience and lessons of experience, acquired by generations of individuals, in the course of this struggle, since the dim past of pre-history, became incorporated into the custom of the community and was handed down from one generation to the next, as social tradition, for its guidance. Thus the moral evolution is a part of social evolution, the laws of which are rooted in anthropology. Society, being a creation of man, is a part of nature, just as man himself is. The biological evolution, therefore, connects human phase of evolution including origin and evolution of morality, with the evolution of the physical universe. Since all phases of evolution are governed by appropriate laws and since each later phase is based on the earlier one, out of which it is evolved, the entire reality is law-governed. Human will and capacity of making choice, having arisen from this law-governed system, cannot be antithetical to the cosmos and, hence, the moral idea which arises as the felt need of human choice for the survival of his species, cannot be arbitrary.

Thus, on the basis of the findings of biology, anthropology, sociology and psychology we conclude that ethics, either in origin or in its function, has historically nothing to do with 'divinity' or 'divine will'. It originated as a biological necessity for man and developed along with the psycho-social evolution marking human progress and civilization.

TWO CONCEPTIONS OF LOGIC

V. S. GAJENDRAGADKAR

The definition of Logic is a controversial matter because of the simultaneous developments of the subject in different directions. It is true that formalisation in Logic has a longer history than its philosophical interpretation. But the latter is as important as the former. Not realising this, Stebbing claims special credit for advances in Logic in the latter part of the 19th century and in the early twenties of the 20th century. In doing so, she divides Logic, particularly books on Logic, according to their approach, as being (1) traditional (2) metaphysical (3) pragmatic and (4) mathematical. Stebbing pictures the movement in Logic as progressing unilaterally towards the mathematical. Traditional Logic is supposed to comprise the Post Royal Logic along with that of Aristotle and the Schoolmen. The exclusive acceptance of the subject-attribute form of propositions, Stebbing takes to be the characteristic mark of this early logic. The metaphysical logic of Bradley and Bosanquet, to speak only for England, according to Stebbing, developed in opposition to the Formal Logic of a predominantly Deductive Reasoning as in the Traditional. According to Stebbing, the Idealistic conception of Logic as the "Morphology of Knowledge" shipwrecked on the rock of Metaphysics, giving rise to the Pragmatic conception of Logic as the "art of thinking". This "art of thinking" made no progress. The real advance in the Science of Logic is marked, for Stebbing, by the conception of Logic as essentially formal. It is a Science which results in the identity of "pure Logic" and "abstract mathematics".

Stebbing's analysis is guilty of the fallacy of oversimplification. Traditional logic of Aristotle or of the Schoolmen has far more in it than the four-fold scheme of subject-attribute propositions and rules of inference based on the relation of class-inclusion and class-exclusion. It has a metaphysical background from which it cannot be separated. Traditional Logic required a broadening in two directions, which is supplied on the one hand by formal logic and on the other by transcendental or philosophical logic. Hence, it is that Formal and Philosophical Logic stand at opposite ends in the present stage of its development.

Clearing away of some common misconceptions regarding the function of Logic is necessary for both these Schools. Aristotelian Syllogism with its schematism in figures and moods had given rise to

the impression that logic could be considered as an art of thinking. This degeneration of Logic into an art of thinking raised a protest from both the sides. Bradley's famous tirade against it is as follows : Understood as an art of reasoning, "Logic has no existence, for there is and there can be no art of reasoning. Logic has to lay down a general theory of reasoning which is true in general and in the abstract. But when it goes beyond that, it ceases to be a science, it ceases to be logic, and it becomes an effete chimaera which cries out for burial". Stebbing also points out that "there may be an art of thinking, but the art of thinking must not be confused with logic". The aim of logic is purely theoretical viz. "to determine the nature and conditions of valid thinking by criticising types of argumentative discussion". Bosanquet also contends that "Logic has no criterion of truth nor test of reasoning". These developments in Logic therefore agree in denying to logic the normative character attributed to science in Aristotle.

Both these Schools would agree in regarding validity and/or truth as the subjectmatter of Logic. Even the mathematical logicians agree that thought is of interest logically only so far as it constitutes truth.

The bifurcation in logical theory starts at this point. Following Aristotle, Formal Logic starts with the distinction between formal and material truth, a distinction which, Idealist logic would say, is valid upto a point but not absolutely. Next, it is realised that formal truth is the property of certain relationships evident in knowledge, particularly in reasoning. These relationships are of the general nature of implications, i.e., of "If... ~ then necessarily" type. These relationships hold between objects of thought or propositions by virtue of their logical significance and independently of their content and the content of these propositions. Hence grows the conception of formal logic as comprising a study of logical relationships as such. Therefore Eston defines logic as "a study of inferential relationships considered in respect of their form only". From the side of sciences, Cohen and Nagel define logic as "a sciencs of types of order".

This conception of Formal Logic sets for itself two specific tasks, which are two sides of the same development. Formal logic has grown in the attempt to stabilise mathematics. Pure mathematics could not make much headway until it was realised that the basic mathematical concepts are logical in character. This realisation led to the progressive

identification of pure logic and pure mathematics, giving rise to what is known now as symbolic logic.

The first step in symbolic logic is to clearly define and determine the meaning of logical connections as evidenced in words like 'and' 'not' etc. Its main business is not to draw any specific inferences, but "to exhibit all the relationships permitting valid inferences that hold between various concepts or propositions considered merely in respect of their form". This part of symbolic logic is comprised of the calculus of concepts, of propositions etc.

Since mathematics is a deductive science, a logical rebuilding of pure abstract mathematics also gives rise to the theory and analysis of any deductive system as such. From this point of view symbolic logic becomes the study of special types of deductive systems; it involves the investigation of algebra of logic. It aims at the construction of a deductive system out of the basic logical concepts "so as to supply a common basis for the whole of human knowledge" to use the words of Tarski. Morris Cohen puts it as; "The form of structure which logic studies is the system of relations which hold between all possible objects that can be ordered into a system". The goal of this development is to construct a deductive system wholly independent of intuitions of spatial relations.

Limitations of Formal Logic :

1. The total identification of pure logic with abstract mathematics is not universally accepted. The inclusion in mathematics of an intuitive element cannot be entirely avoided. The empiricist and mathematicians interpret it as an a-logical element in an otherwise wholly deductive system. This provides no solution to the problem.

2. Formal logic, in selecting its basic concepts and fixing up their meanings in terms of truth relationships among their elements works within a limited view of the nature of thought and of truth. It studies only reflective thinking or what involves inference, and means by truth nothing more than coincidence of truth and falsehood between the elements of implicative relationship, i. e. truth-tables.

3. It denies, as Morris Cohen points out, objective reality to reason and to logic. In fact it feels that the question of objective reality is not necessary to be raised at all.

To sum up (without going into the internal limitations of symbolic logic) logic is not merely a system of truth-tables, but it has to be a science of truth as well. Even Carnap grants the need for interpretation of fundamental logical concepts as against mere analytical definitions. Morris Cohen puts it clearly : "Logic cannot be isolated from any realm of being, and cannot be confined to the analysis or description of thought and symbolism, even assuming it were possible to have thought without objects, or symbols without things symbolised". Indeed logic could not possibly illumine thoughts and symbols if it did not illumine that which is the object of thought and symbolism. If logic were indeed only a manipulation of symbols, it would be as devoid of philosophical significance and scientific utility as chess".

"To put it affirmatively, Formal Logic is the heart of philosophy, because the subject-matter of logic is the formal aspect of all being, an aspect not only of objects and events in time and space but equally of non-spatial and non-temporal relations of objects. In view of this claim to objectivity implied and presupposed in all logical investigations it becomes necessary to develop logic as the science of thought.

Logic as the science of thought is Transcendental Logic as Kant called it or the metaphysical logic of the Idealist thinkers. Even Johnson defines logic as "the analysis and criticism of thought". The word "thought" is ambiguous. Protests raised against this type of logic are due to a psychological interpretation of thought. Thought as the subjectmatter for logic is not merely reflective thinking depending on the use of certain components. It means and stands for the awareness of Forms of experience. Thought means the awareness of or consciousness of itself, of forms of experience, and not merely their employment. Once it is realised that thought is the awareness as such of every type of experience, the distinction between form and matter becomes irrelevant and unnecessary. Secondly because the awareness is a total awareness of a type of experience, the distinction between the formal and the intuitive element again is beside the point. The form of any type of experience will be determined by the experience itself and its formal properties will be conditioned by it. Hence, the subject-matter of philosophical logic is to comprehend and analyse the activity of thought in which all awareness arises.

Awareness is the content of knowledge and Logic is the analysis of the knowledge-building activity. Thus is formed the conception of

Logic as the morphology of knowledge. The distinction between Form and Matter of thought or knowledge is not totally irrelevant even in transcendental logic. It is important to make this point, as many logicians like Joseph try to dismiss the distinction by saying that matter determines form, and by other similar arguments. A distinction between form and matter or object of thought has to be made, if knowledge is to make any progress. Science develops out of the experiences of the particulars only by the pursuit of the general i.e. the formal element in the experiences. Even as such science, formal logic and philosophical logic belong to different levels-each with its distinctive subjectmatter. Science is the study of the general feature of the objects of knowledge, the facts of experience of all the possible orders. Formal logic is the study of the formal properties of thinking, i.e. relations in thought which operate in our knowledge of objects, i.e. facts of experience. Formal logic is formal in a way different from science, as being the study of relationships in thought as such. These relationships are far from being irrelevant to the structure of knowledge, as they operate in all knowledge. Logic, therefore, is formal but not unconcerned with truth as was imagined to be the case for a long time. The difference between Formal logic and Philosophical logic is of a different order. Formal logic is content to observe these relationships in thought and to analyse and study their behaviour i.e. mode of operation in the most general manner, i.e. as unconditioned by any property of the objects of thought or experience. But formal logic does not propose to raise any question regarding the origin of these formal relationships in thought. In fact according to Formal logic such a question need not be raised at all. That constitutes the limitation of formal logic, which is a self-imposed limitation.

The 'if...then necessarily' relationships studied in their abstractness in formal logic show a pattern of meaning. These patterns of meaning are not due to any object. In fact they are called logical because of their unvarying character. Yet these patterns of meaning have a special appeal for the understanding, in that to recognise their meaning is to accept them as valid. If apprehended they are accepted together in their form and content or else not recognised at all. The question why should it be so is not dismissed by merely calling them 'logical'. It has to be recognised that the apprehension of these relationships in their total character is the result of an activity of the mind, an activity which by no chance is psychological. This activity

of thought or mind has a specific direction viz. to accept the objectivity of these relationships. The acceptance of objectivity does not need any hypothesis as to their existent or subsistent character. It is the conviction of their functional or operative role as the conditions of all possible knowledge or experience. They need not be called axioms if it suggests any kind of antecedence to knowledge or experience. To recognise them as patterns of meaning i. e. to be aware of them as such is different from treating them as so many relationships given in the fabric of knowledge. Formal logic is satisfied with their givenness, and studies only their mode of operations. Philosophical logic contends that these are specific forms of awareness which constitute the body of knowledge. Transcendental logic or philosophical logic is a study of these forms of awareness. As C.R. Morris, in his book "Idealistic Logic", puts it, 'Logic is analysing not experience itself but certain forms of experiences-forms which are to be found in all experiences at all times, not ways of experiencing, or kinds of experience".

It is of primary importance to remember that philosophical logic does not make these forms of experience antecedent to any kind of experience, nor does it believe that they can ever be recognised in their abstractness, as sort of ready-made moulds. They are and can be apprehended only in concrete experiences, and display their formative properties only in real experiences. All real experience for formal logic is of the nature of a judgment. Judgment is the context of all awareness. Philosophical logic does not make the distinction between simple apprehension and judgment. Hence, it does not make any distinction between logical and non-logical thinking. Even what is known as simple apprehension is the function of judgment. For philosophical logic to be aware, to be conscious, to know is to judge. Hence Bosanquet, in his Logic, speaks of "consciousness as a single persistent judgment". It is in this sense that Idealistic logic becomes "the examination of the nature of pure reason considered as a conditioning form of real experience", as C.S. Morris puts it.

Logic as a study of pure reason or as an analysis of the activities which construct knowledge is not vague in its description of its subject-matter. Philosophical logic is based on the fundamental principle that meaning and truth in thought are inseparable. This inherent relation between truth and meaning is the essence of accepting judgment as the form of all knowledge or awareness.

Idealistic or philosophical logic may be called the logic of judgments, as contrasted with Aristotelian logic which essentially is the logic of concepts. The logic of concepts when severed from its metaphysical roots in Greek thought presented for philosophy the crucial problem of relating an idea in the mind to the object outside the mind. Formal logic tries to dismiss the question by shutting itself up within the framework of inferential relationships between propositional forms, considered largely as linguistic expressions. There is no linguistic expression which can remain current if totally devoid of meaning. To possess meaning is to be objectively related. Hence objectivity is the essence of meaning and of truth. It is these conditions of objectivity or its inherent possibility that we study in philosophical logic. It is the basic contention of philosophical logic that the basis of objectivity is not in the outside facts, but in the activity of thought which is itself responsible for the concepts of both the subject and the object in knowledge. Objectivity in knowledge, thus, is not a fact to be proved or demonstrated but a truth to be realised as pervading the very nature of thought or knowledge. Philosophical logic, thus, studies not any particular type of truth but the original conditions of truth in the activity of thought. The project of philosophical logic may thus be described as a study of the relation of thought to truth.

But a word of warning is necessary for every over-enthusiastic advocate of philosophical logic. Kant in the introduction to the Transcendental analytic imagined that since the understanding is an absolute unity it would be possible to set out an exhaustive and systematic account of all the forms of experience. This is a task impossible of achievement. For, there is no reason to suppose that thought has exhausted its task of rendering experience significant. A form of awareness can arise only in its mode of experience, and a mode of experience will occur in an act of polarisation between the subject and the object. Thought is inherently progressive because of its spontaneity, to use a Kantian expression. If philosophical Logic does not lock itself up in the known modes of awareness, then in its analysis of thought it will progress *pari passu* with every new mode of experience that happen to be revealed either in commonsense or in the sphere of thought or art, or even in philosophy itself.

THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH

BIJAYANANDA KAR

At the ordinary level we have no difficulty in understanding and using the word 'true'. We can easily decide which statements are true and which are false. But some philosophers raise a theoretical question about truth inspite of their ability to use this concept appropriately at the practical level. They have been mainly concerned with two questions about truth. The first one deals with the meaning of truth and the second with the criterion by which the truth or falsity of statements can be decided. These two questions, though distinct, are often confused with one another. Many philosophers advance answers to one of the questions that might possibly be regarded as possible answers to the other. There are others who give one answer to both the questions. Some again have dismissed the first question though have accepted the second in a different form. Our main object, in this paper, is to analyse these different answers and to show to what extent the philosophical question about truth is answerable and to what extent it is not.

The realists of all varieties accept truth to be propositional. Though they distinguish the meaning of truth from its criterion or test yet some of them hold correspondence to be both the meaning as well as the test of truth. According to them a statement is true if it agrees with or corresponds to fact and false if it fails to correspond. I describe a thing by saying that it is sweet and if the thing is really sweet my statement, 'It is sweet' is true. But the problem is, how can there be any correspondence between a statement and a fact? Since by saying that a statement corresponds to fact one is formulating yet another statement. While explaining the notion of correspondence some have taken resort to the analogy of a picture or a copy. It is said that a statement is true because it mirrors or copies or pictures fact. As there is a structural similarity between a map or photograph with the state-of-affairs which it pictures being a true reproduction, so also a statement is a picture of the fact to which it refers. Both Russell and Wittgenstein argues for this kind of structural similarity between a proposition and a fact. But how can a statement be at all a picture, is not clear. Atleast the vehicle of sentence i. e. the linguistic utterance is different from the fact expressed by the statement. Further there is no scope to see whether there is a structural similarity at all between a statement and a fact. Since, as we have already pointed out, to say

something about fact is to state it ; and to state it is to state another statement.²

This point, perhaps, becomes most advantageous to the idealists who hold that since statements cannot correspond to facts; it can only be said that they may be compared with one another. According to some of them³ no judgment is allowed to stand isolated ; but each judgment depends upon other judgments already known. A judgment cannot be true by corresponding to an outer particular object, since it is impossible to identify and to refer to any particular object unless it is specified completely ; but to specify an object completely one must include the description of all the relation that it will bear to other objects. Because each and every object is in some way, related to each other and to specify any object is to specify all others ; hence it follows that no judgment is true isolated but is so by being coherent with other judgements. But then the problem would be how to distinguish true judgement from a false one ? It may be said that since no judgment is true isolated only the completed form of all judgements alone is true. But then, the completed form of all judgements is true not by cohering with some other judgements since all judgements are already included in it ; all it can possibly do is to correspond to the reality as a whole. And this would mean ultimately an admittance of correspondence. Since this can never be accepted by the idealists, they hold that the completed form of all judgments is not a judgment but truth as such. There is no question of correspondence of truth to reality ; rather truth and reality are identical. Coherence is admitted not in this ultimate level but in the judgmental level. A particular judgment, being a member of the completed system of all judgments which is the absolute truth, is true to some extent and at the same time false to some extent. It is true so far as it agrees partly to the absolute truth and false so far as it falls short of that. This ultimately leads to the paradoxical situation that a judgment is both true and false.

Another formulation of this coherence theory developed by the logical positivist like Carnap⁴ etc. reject correspondence on the ground that by comparing statements with facts, it is rather metaphysical. A single statement is true only when it fits into the coherent system of statement. But there may be any number of system of statements, each of which is internally consistent, but any two of which are not compatible with one another. Since they are mutually incompatible they

cannot all be true. How then is it to be decided which is the true one? Carnap replies that the true system is that which is accepted by the scientists of our culture-circle. But, as Ayer rightly points out, in that case each one of the competing system may consistently contain the statement that it alone is accepted by the scientists of our culture-circle. What Carnap has in mind is that only one of these systems is accepted by the scientists in fact.⁵ This shows how gradually the coherence theory slips into a kind of correspondence again. If it does not, then perhaps it becomes a formal theory of truth applicable to artificial language.

Even the pragmatic account of truth does not seem to be very much adequate. Dewey, who gives the most refined exposition of the pragmatic version of truth in terms of warranted assertability, goes along with his predecessors so long as he accepts the point that truth is not a finished product. It depends upon human acceptance. But this human acceptance need not be all arbitrary or whimsical. Truth of a judgment can be accepted only if it is being accepted on the basis of scientific method. But this basis of scientific method presupposes external evidence in the light of observation. As Ayer points out, "Although it is the case that to ask some one what is true always comes down in *practice* to asking him what he believes, this does not mean that we can dispense with the concept of objective truth."⁶ This again, shows how the pragmatic account of truth is dependant on a kind of correspondence⁷.

We have analysed three major classical theories of truth and have found all of them to be inadequate in giving us a definition or meaning of truth. Some present philosophical analysis dismiss the problem itself arguing that there cannot be any definition of truth. Ramsey holds that the words 'true' and 'false' play no essential role in our language. While using these words we do not say anything more than what we would have said without using them. "There is no separate problem of truth but, merely a linguistic muddle."⁸ If Ramsey's arguments are valid then it is illegitimate to ask about the meaning of truth, and also it would be pointless to apply the category of truth to a sentence. The expression, '.... is true' may be grammatically flawless but certainly not enlightening from the logical point of view. Russell who is a great supporter of correspondence theory of truth does not find it easy to see that by the employment of his own logical technique of the

distinction between logical and grammatical form Ramsey could outright reject any view about truth including that of correspondence. That's why in his later publication,⁹ Russell tries to defend his position saying that it is not a sentence but the belief in a proposition which can be rightly said to be true or false. He writes, 'truth' we have agreed, is a property primarily of beliefs, derivatively of sentences."¹⁰ The belief is true if the fact to which it refers exists. But can a belief be at all said to be true or false ? As, if I say that I believe that X has assaulted Y and from the subsequent verification suppose it is found out that X has not in fact assaulted Y then I may cancel my belief but I do not say that my belief is false for the very reason that I believed it and I was not sure of it. In belief, there is no truth-claim. So beliefs may be entertained or cancelled without any direct look at the facts. Hence it is not the belief but the content of belief i. e. the assertion or statement which is true or false.¹¹

But granting that statements alone are true or false the philosophical problem still remains to be answered, i. e. whether by saying a statement to be true we say anything more or simply repeat what we have already stated. Tarski, in this connection, suggests that 'p' is true in L if and only if p.¹² In other words, to say that a statement is true is to make a statement about a sentence of the language in which the first statement is made. It is to make a statement in a meta-language ascribing the semantic predicate 'true' to a sentence in object-language. The sentence, 'Snow is white' is true in English if and only if snow is white. Tarski's contention that truth is a genuine semantic predicate to the sentence in a full statement, is directly opposed to Ramsey's contention that truth can in no sense be a predicate at all. If Tarski's account is accepted then definitely we would justify the meaningfulness of the philosophical problem of truth concerning the search for a definition or meaning of truth. But the expression 'is true' in 'snow is white is true' is not a predicate about 'snow is white'; since all that it says is about the *snow* not about the English sentence, 'snow is white'.¹³ And in that case truth is not a predicate in any sense of the term. It is strictly not an assertion (Strawson); it does not fulfil any more than the role of assertion or negation signs even when it apparently functions as predicate (Ayer). Strawson further, supposes that truth is functioning in the ordinary language as mere confirmation. He agrees that by saying something true one is not simply repeating it but rather makes an advance in endorsing or confirming it. But this advance need

not be supposed to be descriptive in nature. Let it not be understood that truth predicates a sentence or a statement. Though both Strawson and Ayer here reach a conclusion very similar to that of Ramsey as against that of Tarski yet there is a remarkable difference between them. While Strawson takes the radical view of dismissing the philosophical problem of truth altogether reducing it to a matter of confirmation, Ayer is more catholic in reducing the discussion from the level of meaning to that of criterion and thereby granting the validity of philosophical discussions on truth⁴. He argues that the dispute between the different classical theories of truth can properly be intelligible if those are to be taken as answers to the genuine problem of the criterion or test of truth. He finally, concludes that even though theories like those of coherence and pragmatism are acceptable to a certain extent yet correspondence in a sense has got to be admitted in all affairs of truth.

But this conclusion of Ayer in support of correspondence as criterion of truth is not readily acceptable in the philosophic circle mainly due to two reasons. Firstly, this theory of truth has already faced the difficulty as to the precise formulation of correspondence. Secondly, because of an overall suspicion of the logical positivistic standpoint this reinterpretation of the discussion of truth is not encouraged. Further, later Wittgenstein (of Investigation) already rejects his earlier view (of Tractatus) which has definitely inspired a positivistic thesis. Later Wittgenstein thinks that the view that statements are either true or false is having one misleading suggestion. It appears that one first has a clear meaning of truth and falsehood and then decides which expressions are statements and which are not. This means that the concept 'true' is logically prior to the concept 'statement'. But 'true' is neither prior to nor independent of the concept 'statement'. To say that statements are only those expressions which admit truth and falsity is simply to say that 'statement' 'true' and 'false' are inter-dependent in our language. So, 'what a statement is', is not to be determined by means of its reference to truth or falsity but by the rules of grammar and its use in the particular language-game. Thus 'statement' belongs to a particular language-game which also involves the term 'true' and 'false'. One could just as easily define the latter in terms of the former.¹⁵ To put it in other words, it is the language-game which decides the concept 'statement' and 'true' and not the former the latter nor vice versa. Hence, there cannot be any meaning or definition of truth not simply because truth is itself meaningless, nor is it indefinable, nor even

it is objective or non-linguistic but because there cannot be any theory of meaning in general. "To ask for meaning is to ask for its use."

This conventionalistic view of truth of later Wittgenstein, though brings out the fine point as to why there cannot be any theory as meaning of truth, yet it does not seem to have done equal justice to the second question : what makes the statement true or false. It is of course true that in calling a statement as true or false, one is only referring to the rules of one's own language-game. But even within that sphere of language-game can one not ask how the statements are validated ? This, indeed, is a philosophical question which requires a further analysis of the logic of the use of the expressions like 'true', 'false' and 'statement' etc. Now the fear that any general answer with regard to this question may ultimately demand some old metaphysically-oriented answer is groundless. Because, just to construct a generalised theory in any manner does not necessarily lead one to be a victim of metaphysics. We do not mean that piece-meal analysis of particular expressions in particular context is irrelevant. But the acceptance of this attitude does not necessarily reject the acceptance of the former one. Besides this, too much emphasis on language-game at times, suggests a short of formalism. 'Truth' being interpreted in terms of language-game does not seem to have any direct relation with fact. One may not take fact as sensible as the early logical positivists have supposed. But the point of fact, because of this reason, need not be overlooked. Ayer, in this connection, seems to be more accessible while he agrees in general that statements must correspond to fact. Now, what is this correspondence to fact is not proper question in this scheme. Since to answer what fact is one is to state a statement and not a fact. And this never means that there are no facts.

General Estimate

After the discussion of various theories or views on truth, the natural question that arises is : what is the general outcome of such discussion. In our treatment of the issue two types of questions are distinguished (i. e. meaning and test). It is definitely confusing to treat them as one. The question about meaning of truth can be seen to be improperly set only when one becomes clear about the use of 'true' by means of a proper logical analysis of language. In this respect the attempt made by all the recent philosophers beginning from Ramsey (1927) ending with Ayer (1963) are commendable.

Tarski's attempt of framing a definition of truth within the frame work of artificial language is acceptable and yet its application to the ordinary use of the word definitely raises much complication. Any attempt at defining truth naturally brings formalism and does not therefore meet the philosophical problem at all. The second question, i. e. test of truth, is to be taken as a genuine philosophical question when it is formulated in such manner like what makes statements true or false. Attempts to answer such types of questions have been made by many (for example Strawson) in terms of confirmation, admision and endorsement. This is alright so far as it goes. But naturally, the next question is to be asked here. On what basis the statement is confirmed or admitted as true ? On what authority and with reference to what it has been endorsed as valid ? Surely by reference to fact. There must be some agreement to be made between the statement and the fact. Of course the exact agreement between them cannot be accurately pinpointed. That is impossible not because there is some inherent difficulty in the very theory of correspondence, (Of course, the word 'correspond' gives rise to such misleading suggestions), but because the very diverse and dynamic uses of our language-system in which the terms like 'truth' and 'falsity' are in operation. The old version of correspondence theory for giving an account of the test of truth is mistaken in so far as it confuses the issue of truth with the mode of correspondence.

To put in other words, the logical question with what truth is concerned is, "What makes statements true ?" and a psychological question as "How a true statement is known to be true" is irrelevant here, since for this psychological question there may be diverse answers and each may claim to attain superiority over the other. This is not philosophically interesting. So far as reference to fact is concerned one may take the analogy of structural or pictorial or representational resemblances and all these suggestions may adequately work in their respective fields. But the logical point to which they all agree is that the fact or state-of-affair must exist so that a statement is true. One may claim many statements to be true; but this claim is granted only when there are actually such corresponding state-of-affairs. It is interesting to mark here that even Tarski who gave a different formulation of definition of truth has also agreed to this vital point when he says that 'Snow is white' is true in English language if and only if snow is white *in fact*.¹⁹ The greatest merit of the correspondence theory is its separating

fact from statement. Statement is true not by virtue of itself but on the basis of facts. Now the relation of statement and fact in terms of correspondence is often suspected. It is asked : 'What is fact and how does a statement correspond to it ?' But as we have already made it clear; the very question about the nature of fact is simply to ask what cannot be asked. Since to state a fact as 'this' or 'that' is to state a statement and not the fact. But this does not imply that fact cannot be accepted and we should move within the forewalls of statements as the coherence theorists wrongly suppose. The source of this difficulty is perhaps due to the point that there is unnecessarily too much fuss over making a statement true. This psychological question is not at all a theoretical one but purely a practical one and is very often solved in practice.⁵⁰ Even when Wittgenstein emphasises the role of use in preference to meaning all that is to be implied from that is that the use of an assertion can be known by actually going through the process of verifying the instances where it is operated in the practical sphere.

Therefore, we conclude that the problem of truth is not a theoretical problem so that controversies are unwarranted here. Our overall sympathy for correspondence theory need not imply that we are propounding another theory in preference to other theories like coherence etc. and aiming at a theoretical justification of the knowledge of truth; but we simply explore the logical point that truth of a statement is decided by only a direct look to facts and not in any other way.

Referential notes :

1. Russell's Atomism lectures, printed in Logic and Language, Allen & Unwin. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
2. For a detailed difficulties about the structural similarity see Ayer : Truth. in The Concept of a person and other essays, Macmillan. 1963.
3. Vide specially Bradley : Essays on truth and reality and Joachim : The nature of truth.
4. Carnap and Neurath : 'Protokollsätze' (Protocol statements) in 'Erkenntnis', Vol. III, and Hempel : On the logical positivists' theory of truth, Analysis, Vol. II, No. 4.
5. Ayer : The concept of person and other essays, p. 180.
6. Ibid, p. 181.

7. Dewey has also admitted this point in a later writing. See his 'Propositions, Warranted Assertability and Truth' in "Problem of man" New York, 1946, p. 343-344.
 8. Ramsey : Facts and propositions, reprinted in "The foundations of Mathematics".
 9. Russell : An enquiry into meaning and truth, Allen & Unwin.
 10. Ibid, p. 236.
 11. For an epistemological account of belief see A.D. Woozley, "Theory of knowledge" We may add here that our view that statements and not beliefs are either true or false is in conformity with Austine's account of truth and is opposed to the views of J. N. Mohanty.
 Austine : Truth, Aristotelian proceedings, 1950. (Vol. XXIV)
 Mohanty : Meaning and Truth, The Visva Bharati Journal of Philosophy, Vol. I, No. I.
 12. Tarski : The semantic conception of truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. IV, 1944.
 13. Strawson : Truth, reprinted in (Macdonald edn.) Philosophy and Analysis, p. 262.
 14. Ayer : The criterion of truth, reprinted in (Macdonald edn.) Philosophy and Analysis. See also his latest view on the subject in the Concept of person and other essays, Macmillan, 1963.
 15. J. H. Grill : Wittgenstein's concept of Truth, International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. VI, No. I March, 1966.
 16. Wittgenstein : Philosophical Investigation, 66,340.
 17. Max Black : Semantic definition of truth, reprinted in (Macdonald edn.) Philosophy & Analysis.
 18. Ayer has explored this confusion in detail in his latest view on truth. This confusion is also present in the recent defence of correspondence theory made by Austine : Truth, Aristotelian Proceedings, 1950. (Vol. XXIV).
 19. Italics are mine.
 20. Ayer : Truth in The Concept of person and other essays, Macmillan, 1963.
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STRAWSON AND QUINE ON NECESSITY

ROOP REKHA VERMA

In a brief note on 'Meaning and Necessity'¹ Strawson points out that the thesis of some 'formally-minded logicians' (e.g., Quine), that there are no necessary truths, is not quite self-consistent. Since his argument is extremely condensed, its elaboration may be worthwhile. To do this is one purpose of this paper. Secondly, the case of necessity mentioned by Strawson is not the only case which Quine's account of knowledge (or belief-system) is bound to accept. There appears to be another case of necessity, apparently ignored by Strawson. To argue for this case is the second purpose of this paper. Lastly, an attempt will be made to examine Strawson's objection to an anticipated reply from Quine's side.

I

The thesis in question is that no sentence can ever be necessary; that "any sentence can be abandoned, any can be preserved — so long as we are prepared to make such adjustments elsewhere as are required to secure consistency in the system of accepted sentences."² The doubts arise in connection with this proviso. The question is, what is the need of these "adjustments" besides the simple rejection or acceptance of certain sentences? Why should one bother about the 'consistency in the system of accepted sentences' at all? And, what is the nature of this 'consistency'? To make our point specific we may refer to the pragmatic principle³ adopted by Quine for accomodating a so-called 'recalcitrant' experience, viz., the principle of bringing the 'least disturbance' into the totality of beliefs. But what is meant by saying that the revision of a proposition disturbs the totality more than that of another proposition? The only sense of this seems to be that revision or re-evaluation of the former entails the re-evaluation of some other propositions the number of which is greater than the number of those, the re-evaluation of which is compulsory if we reevaluate the latter. But what does this 'entailment' mean? What decides that the rejection of a specific proposition about, e.g., brick houses or centaurs brings lesser disturbance in the system than the rejection of a highly theoretical statement of physics or logic? Nothing but necessary connections between propositions seems to account for this fact, in which case, the

1. Philosophical Logic; (ed. P. F. Strawson); pp. 10-13.

2. Ibid.; p. 12.

3. From A Logical Point Of View (by W. V. Quine)

conditional statements about these connections must be regarded as necessarily true.

One may point out that these conditionals are nothing but the so-called logical truth which Quine regards as quite revisable. In that case while revising a certain proposition, there will be no real necessity for revising all those propositions which are supposed to be entailing it. But then, what is the point of Quine's pragmatic principle itself? If no amount of disturbance is necessarily entailed by any proposition, this principle is futile.

However, let us suppose, for argument's sake, that an entailment-statement, say, "S entails T", is empirical and contingent. But, will Quine regard it as rational that we retain both : "S entails T" and "S", but reject "T"? It may be said that Quine regards all logical laws, including the law of Modus Ponens, as susceptible of rejection in face of an experience and therefore he would regard it as possible that we accept the propositions "S implies T" and "S" but reject "T", because for doing so one needs only reject Modus Ponens. But, we may again ask : will it be reasonable to accept the conjunction of these three : the principle of Modus Ponens, "S implies T" and "S", but to reject "T"? What is the point of saying that we can accept "S implies T" and "S" and yet reject "T" *provided* we reject the law of Modus Ponens? Can we not do the former without doing the latter? If we cannot, the necessity of that statement is accepted which asserts implication-relation between the aforementioned conjunction and "T".

At this point one may object that even this statement (call it 'K') is not necessary, nor is Quine bound to accept it as necessary because it can be surrendered provided we surrender the law of Contradiction. The implausibility of the rejection of this statement is due to our adherence to the law of Contradiction which Quine has clearly declared to be revisable. But to this answer also we wish to raise a similar question : why does the rejection of "K" need the rejection of the law of Contradiction? Can we not both accept this law and reject "K" rationally? If not, the necessity of "K" 's implication by the law of contradiction will have to be admitted.

The possibility of doing both—accepting the law of Contradiction and rejecting "K"—can be accepted only if we admit that the law of Contradiction itself can be both accepted and rejected simultaneously.

But this appears to be not only highly implausible but also unintelligible. Because the simultaneous acceptance and rejection of the law of Contradiction itself is a violation of this law. That is, doing this needs and presupposes an absolute rejection of the law of Contradiction which means not to accept it at all.

So, it seems that so long as we put any limitations on admissible combinations of accepted propositions, we will have to accept at least some conditionals as necessary.

II

The case of necessity we were examining, concerned relationships between propositions *within* one's belief-system. Another type of necessary connection which Quine will have to accept, is between the totality of beliefs on the one hand and experience on the other. Certainly Quine will not maintain that we can reasonably continue with the same belief-totality without making any change within it, in face of what is called a recalcitrant experience. Because otherwise we can not make sense of Quine's own contentions that our belief-totality is a field whose "boundary conditions are experience", that the totality of beliefs is a "man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges".¹ Thus, even if it is granted that there is no necessity to make a change at this or that particular part of the system, the incompatibility between a recalcitrant experience and the system as a whole, does not seem to be contingent. It means that those statements which assert this incompatibility, or assert the consistency between a 'favourable' experience and the system, must be regarded as necessary. And if Quine accepts this, he will have to accept a typical distinction between contingent (empirical) and necessary (apriori) propositions.

III

Strawson anticipates a possible reply from philosophers like Quine, that the 'necessity' pointed out by us is not grounded in meanings, as logical necessity must be; rather it is a matter of psychological compulsion. This will mean that while abandoning preserving any chosen sentence, there is no logical necessity of making some further adjustments. Yet we do feel a compulsion to do so because of some psychological and sociological facts.

1. From A Logical Point Of View (by W. V. Quine); p. 42

To this, Strawson objects by pointing out that "as language-users we do not merely experience compulsions, but know what we mean by what we say, well enough at least to recognize (some) inconsistencies and consequences attributable solely to the sense of what is said". As such, this point is very correct. But as an argument against the reply in question, its strength may be doubted. The very question in dispute is, whether any knowledge or belief can be regarded as justifiable by, or grounded in, meanings alone. Strawson's answer appears more as an *assertion* of his view, than as a proof or argument against the reply in question.

In fact, there seems to be no way of positively *proving* that there is logical or absolute necessity — necessity grounded in meanings alone — besides psychological compulsions. Here, the only thing to be pointed out is that an answer like the one anticipated by Strawson will not be in tune with the accounts given by Quine and others like him. Because they do not appear to be giving an empirical description of sociological or psychological phenomena which most people, as a matter of fact, display. There is no indication that Quine e.g., will regard it as merely a matter of psychological inhibitions that some experiences are recalcitrant for our belief-system. When he points out the need of adjustments and re-evaluations of some propositions as a result of the re-evaluation of certain others, he does not appear to be recording merely a psychological fact; he is rather making a logical point. What so often goes unrealized, is that the very idea of the interplay between language (concepts) and reality (experiences) will become futile if the need of any revision in our belief-system — either the revision of single sentences at the periphery or of centrally located sentences — is regarded as mere psychological.

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE CONCEPT OF UNCONSCIOUS IN SAMKHYA, YOGA AND FREUDIAN PSYCHOLOGY

K. C. DAS

The Samkhya-yoga Psychology holds that the unconscious is the potential cause of our conscious life and is dynamic too. The unconscious is the receptacle of the entire heritage of the personality both pre-natal and post-natal. The pre-natal aspect of the unconscious, however, seems to be more significant in the life of the individual, because apart from its potency in bearing upon the varied experiences and activities of our present conscious life, it bears the stamp of our past life in and through the latest impression (Samskaras) and psychic dispositions (Karma-sayas). These unconscious latencies are held to be carried forward through the agency of the suksma sharira (Subtle body) by virtue of the law of Karma. It thus appears that the Samkhya-yoga psychology advocates the concept of the unconscious like the Freudians, although more scientifically, on the basis of the law of causality. This means that the unconscious is the potential cause of the conscious in the sense that the latent Samskaras or propensities become actual in and through the varied conscious experiences of the individual concerned in his cognitive and conative aspects.

According to Freudian psychology, the unconscious is the receptacle of our entire past experiences from birth. To the Freudians it is also the dark chamber of the mind containing the repressed wishes, blind tendencies, the instinctive drives and urges. To Jung, however, the unconscious is also the repository of the hereditary archetypes, the racial memory and the racial urges of the group-mind. As such, Jung attempted to make unconscious more pervasive so as to bring into its fold also the racial experiences of pre-natal origin. Adler recognized the truth of the Freudian theories, but he made much of one the instinctive urges, i.e. instinct of self-assertion or so-called will-to-power. To the psycho-analytical school, the root of maladies and behaviour disorders lies in the unconscious, and it, therefore, stands as the foundation on which the psycho-analytical therapy lies. On the otherhand, the elements of the unconscious have been regarded by the Freudians as the acts of suppression of unapproved wishes. It is just a burial ground for unsanctioned wishes of our conscious life.

Like Freudian psychology, Samkhya-yoga psychology also includes the conception of causality but in a more scientific and wider perspective.

The unconscious, according to Samkhya-yoga, is the potential cause of the conscious in the sense that the latent Samskaras or psychic dispositions become actual in and through the conscious experiences of waking life. The contents of the unconscious need not always be repressed or suppressed wishes, but they are rather the residues or vestiges of deeds experienced in this or prior lives. Thus, the Samkhya-yoga conception of the unconscious can easily meet the charge of rigid determinism levelled against Freudian theory. Secondly, the unconscious, being the effect of the deeds of the person himself, the person can by his own choice and decision control, re-orient or re-organize the unconscious in context of the present experiences and in view of his own future. It is, therefore, evident that mental transformations (Chitta-Vrittis) and impressions (Samskaras) are sure to maintain a mutual reciprocity and they are, as it were, in a circulation from below upwards or from above downwards. Thus when a conscious state passes into the subconscious or the unconscious in a latent form (Samskara), the Samskara in its latent form tends to manifest itself again in the conscious in its original actuality. It is stated in the 'Yoga Bhasya', that transformations influence the impressions and impressions in turn also affect the transformations, and thus there is a cycle of transformations without any interval.

Freud's conception of the conscious, pre-conscious and the unconscious are treated in yoga psychology as the varying states of the mind stuff (Chitta Vrittis) which differ not in kind but only in degree of clearness. Experiences, when occur, leave their impressions on the mind and may be intervened by thousands of varied experiences in lapse of time, and these may again be revived with the proper cause of their revival. So, the Vasanas (Psychic tendencies) are also revived in no time according to fructification of the Kamasaya in the form of a particular life, as a man, or a dog, or anything else.

It is to be borne in mind that the concept of unconscious is not a negative one in Samkhya-yoga. There is difference between the two in respect of degree only and not in kind. The objection raised against the Freudian concept of unconscious will not hold good in respect to the Samkhya-yoga concept. It is only a tamasika (gloomy) state of the mind-stuff and stands as the adrista in the individual. It has the potentiality of being expressed again when occasion demands, being influenced by the conscious process through the agency of the senses (Indriyani). Samkhya-yoga mentions five kinds of transformations (Vritis)

of the mind-stuff "Pramana vipanyaya vikalpanidrasmritayah" — right knowledge, wrong knowledge, fancy or imagination, sleep and memory. These transformations may be painful or indifferent according to circumstances. The dreamless sleep (Susupti) even may be a state of mind predominated by tamas, because on waking, the individual concerned remembers saying "I slept soundly", "I slept happily" etc. Illusion like considering mother-o-pearl as silver is also considered by yoga as a form of knowledge, which consists in considering a thing as something which it is really not (Anytha Khyati).

Dream which forms a central concept in Freudian psychology illustrating the potency of the unconscious has also been interpreted by the Samkhya-yoga psychology in a different way. According to it, the dream experience that comes about even in the absence of presentations, the chitta or the mind-stuff in virtue of the impressions (latent Samskaras) produces from the things thought of or remembered the shape or form that approximately resemble them. "Antahprajnam Vahiruddham swapne jnanam bhavati bhavitasmartravya visayakam". It is the purusha who intelligises these states by receiving the reflection from the Buddhi and this reflection in the Purush appears as the notion of the ego as the perceiver of the states. For internal thought is also the process of citta transformation. Dreams are, therefore, not always retrospective but they may often be constructive and prospective. But Freudian concept of dreams as a mechanism of fulfilment of repressed wishes is always retrospective and compensatory in character.

According to Freud, libido is the main force behind all activities of the unconscious and he treats the ego and the super-ego as two distinct entities. To Jung libido is a vital force resembling 'elan Vital' of Bergson or 'Will-to-live' of Schopenhauer. But yoga-psychology considers it only as a form of 'Chitsakti' (an energy of mind-stuff). The same psychic energy functions in different capacities or forms through the influence of the cosmic principles of Satva, Rajas and Tamas at various stages of consciousness. It is, therefore, said—"Citta evesam trividhagunadharanam tavaccittam trigunam". The Samkhya-yoga psychology also seems to admit the theory of localisation of mind-functions, the seats of consciousness are specifically mentioned in different parts of the cerebro-spinal column and not in the brain alone. Thus, according to particular locality or centre, conscious process vary ranging from the lowest to the highest thought-level—unconscious, subconscious, conscious and super-conscious state. The last state of

consciousness as the highest level thought or centemulation emanates only from the cerebral centre.

In the opinion of some writers on yoga-psychology, the unconscious "is the store-house of all impressions of past desires, thoughts and acts. All the experiences and accumulated knowledge of the past aeons and aeons of births and deaths of a being remain in the unconscious in their casual form — The vast portions of one's knowledge of past desires, thoughts and acts live in the unconscious plane of the mind. The unconscious plane of the mind is also called Chitta" (mind-stuff). This plane has been regarded as beyond the reach of ordinary people, when a man gets inspired in art, poetry, science etc, one gets an easy access into the treasures of all past knowledge.

Jung speaks of racial unconscious in personal element and makes use of the same in interpretation of dreams. But it is difficult to understand how the collective mind is inherited by the individual and how the so-called archetypes play so important a role in the human individual. How is it possible for the living protoplasm, which are material elements to carry forward the impression of the collective mind of the past generation which are purely psychical in character ? But Yoga-psychology conceives of mind in dual aspects — the Karana Chitta (causal mind) and the Karya Chitta (the individual mind). "Karana Chitta" is the inherent quality of Mahat (Intelligence) and is all pervasive. Every person shares the basic stuff of Karana Chitta through the agency of the principle of individuation (ahamkara). The Chitta-transformations (Vritti) conform to the working of the principles of Prakriti. The Karana Chitta is said to work in different minds in conformity with the impressions latent in the unconscious and the nature of the body of the person concerned. The individual mind is thus only an expression of the Karana Chitta, the larger psychical whole, and expresses itself in and through the particular body it occupies. McDougall makes a similar observation — "Each human mind is conceived as but a fragmentary and temporary expression of some larger psychical whole: and it is sought to explain the super-normal phenomena by assuming that they are rendered possible by some temporary relaxation or breaking down of the conditions by which the isolation of the individual mind is commonly maintained, so that for the time being, it may share in the larger life of the whole, of which it is in reality a part, and may draw psychical or spiritual energy from the common store

more freely than is possible in normal condition". Yoga claims that by restraining the varied Chitta transformations (Vrittis) through practice and non-attachment, the Karya Chitta may be made to merge into Karana Chitta and the individual may get over the limitations of the body and fragmentary individuality. "Abhyasavairagyabhyam tannirodhah." That may be restrained through practice and non-attachment.

Dr. Radhakrishnan observes, "the Hindu system of yoga sets forth the discipline by which all parts of our nature, the body and the senses, life and mind are controlled and integrated so as to allow the free and creative working of the spirit of which all these are the developments.... Meditation is the method by which our convictions soak into our bones, become our breath and without needless conscious interference". Psycho-analysis, on the other hand, maintains that human life is full of tensions and complexes and that the unconscious is rather a dark chamber under the domination of Id and is full of suppressed and repressed wishes. Freedom from the tensions may be attained through some process of analytic cathexis or purging of these pent-up tensions and complexes to restore mormalcy. Samkhy-yoga, however, holds that the complexes and conflicts are not aways between the conscious and the unconscious, not between the super-ego and the libido, nor between reality-principle and pleasure-principle, but in fact lie in the duality of human nature, in a conflict between our animal and spiritual nature or between the empirical and the spiritual self, which brings about sorrow, suffering and bondage. It is not through analysis alone, but through a process of synthesis that tensions may be brought to an end and peace and perfection attained. The whole process is not, of course, easy of achievement by a man in the ordinary walk of life. The whole process is not an intellectual or a logical enquiry but practical activity of yoga through restraining mental modifications is pursuit of self-knowledge. "Yogah citta-vrtti nirodha". Freedom results from true knowledge and bondage from ignorance. "Janat muktiḥ : bandho viparyayat". Such a view reminds us of the teachings of Buddhism and Socratic ethics too. The sources of suffering, according to Samkhy-yoga are five-fold and they are—wrong knowledge (Avidya), egoism or sense of agency (Asmita), attachment (Raga), aversion (Dvesa), and clinging to life (Abhinivesa). The activities arising from these in turn produce fresh potencies for actions (Karma Vipakas) ad infinitum. By acquiring real knowledge of the true nature of things (Tattva jnana), these may be rooted out once for all.

The process of yoga may be called psycho-synthesis in contrast with Freudian psycho-analysis. Both, no doubt, aim at mitigation of human suffering and maladies, the one by a process of synthesis and the other through psycho-analysis, W. Brown thus observes, "We are all of us pathological, not only in the sense of showing tendencies to psychoneurosis or psychosis, but in the more general sense of being blinded in our insight, being cut off, being obsessed by our individuality, not going out sufficiently smoothly into the touch with the totality of existence round us". The lower we go into the plane of life dominated by the pleasure principle, the more do we become subject to the unconscious, the rule of the libido (samas). and the greater are the suffering and bondage in our life. Such indeed is the paradox of life.

Many western psychologists to-day seem to be inclined to lend support to the Samkhy-yoga point of view. G. W. Valentine writes, "Certainly as regards ourselves, we should have to regard the knowledge of our conscious motives, which first come into conscious, as complete in judging our own actions; and an enquiry into the unconscious seem to be foreshadowed as a necessary means of fulfilling the Greek adage, "Know thyself"....."A further knowledge of the subconscious and unconscious means a more complete knowledge of the whole self, and with so wider vistas of the selves open to an inspection, the area of the conscious control would be increased and the sphere of normal responsibility, so far from being reduced by exploring the unconscious, as some seem to fear, would be indefinitely widened".

Thus it appears that the unconscious has only relative existence, although in the so-called normal people, it plays a great role in the process of development of personality. The unconscious which is also in a way unseen (Adrista) is personal and largely of pre-natal origin. The present is built upon the remains of the past with a prospect for the future. Conflicts and complexes are of course, there in a life of the libido of passions and the flesh (Prakriti), and the way to release and wholeness is that of Sattva (Consciousness) and particularly of self-knowledge (Atma jnana). G. Coster writes, "In a sense, it is true to say that one fundamental difference between eastern and western psychology is that the former habitually and as a matter of course recognises these layers of consciousness objectively, whereas the latter has hardly as yet begun to differentiate them at all.... Hence that these varying functions of consciousness should be comprehended by western psychologists seems

vital to future progress", Through a process of synthesis, Samkhya-yoga aims at attaining a super-conscious state through a practical synthesis of the conscious and the unconscious. The unconscious is not always the product of repression or suppression and alien to the conscious life, but it forms a moral back-ground and is not always a root of personal malady, and as such, needs to be restored and reorganised in the progressive careers of human personality. Yoga attempts to make its way to the realisation of this psychological truth and undertakes to furnish a practical proof through actual practice. The whole process is one of practical synthesis of the conscious and the unconscious to regain the wholeness of our being.

In Samkhya-yoga view, therefore, the unconscious is not amoral with repressed wishes lying hidden in a dark chamber to escape notice of the super-ego, but is a normal personal heritage keeping in record the underlying career of personality. All impressions, good or bad, desirable or undesirable of the deeds done make up the unconscious as our potential nature which influences our activities and behaviour in our present life and deeds. These unconscious impressions in their potential forms are the constituents of a migrating body called the 'Linga Sharira' (mergent body) or 'Suksma Sarira' (Subtle body), which is held to be the cause of cycle of birth and death (Samsara). The unconscious in Samkhya-yoga is neither an unwanted libidinal black-sheep, nor imprisoned criminal in a hidden chamber. The unconscious is only a forgotten record of our past life, which potentially determines as the unseen (Adrista) our birth (jati), longevity (Ayuh) and experience (Bhoga) of our present life. The Samskaras (impressions) as the psychic residues of our past deeds remaining in the unconscious have been termed by Prof. A. B. Keith as "Psychic dispositions." It is evident that the unconscious as interpreted in Samkhya-yoga psychology is different from the Freudian concept both in its extension and intention.

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